CITY COUNCIL V.W.J. SPEIGHT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIV, Issue 10424, 23 April 1897, Page 3

CITY COUNCIL V. W.J. SPEIGHT.

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT. , Yesterday afternoon at the Magistrate , * Court, Mr. H. W. Brabant, S.M., gave judgment for defendant in the case of the Auckland City Council v. W. J. Speight, manager of the Auckland branch of the Government Insurance Department. The plaintiff's, it will be remembered, claimed £9816* 3d, in respect to rates and penalties alleged to be

due OD the property in Queen-itreet, known

as the Government Life Insurance Buildings, of which defendant was held to bt the occupier, and the Government Life Insurance

omp&ny the owners. Mr. T. Cotter, solici-

tor for plaintiffs, and Mr. S. Hesketh (of Hesketh and Richmond), under whose instructions Mr. Theo. Cooper defended the case when brought on-at the Magistrate's Court, were in attendance. His Worship, after briefly detailing the case, gave judgment as under :-It is now argued by Mr. Cotter for the plaintiff body that the defendant having objected before the Assessment Court, and his objection having been heard and determined by that Court against him, that the valuation list and the rate-book are conclusive evidence against him, and that this Court cannot; go behind them or inquire into their correctness. The following sections of the Hating Bill beiiij quoted in support of that view, viz., 18, 20,28,30,32, 34, 43, and thi Fourth Schedule to the Act. It was allowed by Mr. Cotter that the case might be different where no objection had beeu made or determined by the Court; for instanc« where a person's name had beeu entered on the list without his knowledge. Oα the other hand, Mr. Theo. Cooper for the defeuce drew attention to the tacts that the defendant is not the occupier, nor even if the Department were liable it the defendant the proper person to be on the roll as occupier, and that there is uo such iompany ai the " Government Life Insurance Company, Limited." He also in an able and interesting argumeut contended (1) thut the property of the Government Insurance Department being vested in Her Majesty it not liable to be rated, and (ii) that the Assessment Court went beyond its jurisdiction in placing the property of the Department on the roll, and that therefore this Court is not bound by the decision of the Assessment Court, nor is the valuation list conclusive evidence of its contents. (1) With reference to the question whether the property of the Department is rateable, I have carefully gone through the whole of the statutes affecting the Government Insurance Department, and the Rating Ace; I have also referred to the case of the Kiwitea Highway Board and the Wanganui Harbour Board (N.Z.L.R. 3, S.C. 278), relied on by Mr. Northeroft, nud the conclusion I have come to—with considerable difficult} and doubt—is that the property of tho Department is ratable. I shall be prepared to go into my reasons more fully when the question is before the Assessment Court, sub« ject, of course, to the consideration of any further argument in that Court. (2) With reference to Mr. Cooper's second contention, I have gone through the whole of the authoatttcs cited by him, and compared those authorities with the statutes on which the several decisions were given, and I am prepared to accept as correct the principle which I understood Mr. Cooper was endeavouring to establish, viz., that the decision of the Assessment Court (notwithstanding the tirovisions of the Bating Act) would not be final on a question without jurisdiction to decide. That is what the case of the Borough oi Randwick v. Australian Cities Investment Corporation decides. It was a case in which the interpretation of the statute of New South Wales, 30 Victoria, No. 12, Municipalities, were in question. By that statute the justices in petty sessions (corresponding to the Assessment Court in Now Zealand] are entitled to hear and determiue question! of value'only (section 175). Their decision it made final and the rate-book conclusive evidence. It was held that the decision oi the justicei, if they decide the property which is non-rateable under section 163 ia non-rateable. But the New Zealand Rating Act clearly gjves to the Assessment Court power to decide that question. I am ol opinion, however, that this case must bi decided against the plaintiff body, buc on less broad grounds than those urged by Mr, Cooper. (1) It seems to me that the Assessment Court did not deal with the defendant'i objection as a whole, and therefore the decision is not necessarily find. It did determine the final objection against the objector, but did not alter the entry in the list to agree with the decision. Probably the judge's attention was not drawn to the entry, and the second objection appears not to have been determined at all. lam of opinion that supposing the defendant's property to be rateable, that does not make Mr. Speight the occupier within the meaning of the Rating Act. (2.) Allowing Mr. Cotter s contention to be correct, thai the Court must accept the valuation list as conclusive evidence, in the list " William James Speight, for Life Insurance Company, Limited," is entered us tho occupier; not William James Speight, personally, but it is Speight personally who is sued, II judgment were given against Mr. Speight, could he re> cwrer from his department, who were held by Mr. Northcroft to be the body liable? I do not think so. For these reasons I cannot give the plaintiff body a judgment. Judg. ment is given for the defendant with costs. Mr. Cotter gave notice of appeal.