END OF SECRET LETTERS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 28 November 1945, Page 2

END OF SECRET LETTERS

INSIDE HISTORY OF BERLIN-ROME AXIS ,

MUSSOLINI PREDICTS FAILURE

LOSS OF TUNISIA AND AXIS FORCES ALLIED CONTROL OF SEA TRANSPORT The series of 21 letters, part of the historic correspondence that passed between Hitler and Mussolini during a critical phase of the war, is brought to a close in this instalment. The letters, which have given a fascinating insight into the scheming minds of the men who planned to conquer the world regardless of the cost in human lives and happiness, were obtained from a secret and confidential source in Rome and have been published by “The Mail” under special arrangement with the King Features news agency which obtained the translations. The letter Hitler wrote to the Duce on 14th March, 1943, is concluded below. It discloses how Hitler viewed the problem of the defence of Tunisia—by every man to the last man—and the importance he attached to the Mareth Line. Mussolini’s communications reveal his pessimism, and the oncoming defeat of the Axis is clearly indicated.

PLANS FOR DEFENCE OF TUNISIA 3. On the basis of papers at my disposal, the report of Marshal Rommell, and from conversations with several of my most capable officers of the General Staff, I have examined thoroughly what line of conduct is worthwhile for us to assume in every eventuality.

The advantage of the Mareth Line position is based on the fact that, given favourable conditions, it provides the best possible jumping off point for offensive action (against the British Bth Army advancing from t’e east). The disadvantage is due to the undoubted possibility that we might be outflanked (bv British and American troops advancing from the west).

If the adversary—and it is in Keeping with British technique of war — breaks through the sector near the coast after a powerful artillery preparation, and simultaneously develops a successful envelopment from the west, it can result, first of all. in the immediate, loss of all non-mobile units. According to my calculations the | position of Gabes and the Schott must l in any case be prepared as a strong j articulated unit and the defence must J be organised in such a way that the I less mobile units will not be isolated j from the Schott. In this way an at- 1 tempted envelopment from the west— j though possible—can always be repelled j immediately by counter-offensive ac- j tion. To my way of thinking the entire I defensive sector in Tunisia must be supplied and defended by every man. —that is, to the last man. I have already given, Duce, to Marshal Kesselring, the order—parallel with the revamping of convoy traffic —to hit the VlHth Army (Field Marshal Montgomery’s Famous Bth), with his entire - aviation, from time to time. At any rate, all we can procure in the way of reinforcements will be placed at your disposal. If we succeed, Duce, in holding the Mareth Line—or, at least, as an extreme position, the Schott—and if we succeed in reorganising our convoys, no force in the world can drive us out of our position in North Africa. I have already given the order that following the transport of the 999th Brigade of the 10th "Marsch Battalionen” and the entire Hermann Goering Panzer Division, the 7th Division be also ready for departure to North Africa. SPECTRE OF TRANSPORTATION The 7th Division —a parachute outfit —is perhaps the best select unit on which Germany can depend. It is a division whose ability to resist, provided it is given sufficient reinforcements and supplies, is really tremendous . It is a division which cannot be broken up by any conditions wh: lever, not even by a British or American force many times superior in number. I have learned with pleasure that the first arrivals of the second “Tiger Abteilung” are in Tunis. I will replace all the losses suffered by these formations and take all measures necessary to furnish them with new weapons which are particularly heavy and efficacious.

But all this dovetails in the problem of transportation. I cannot repeat it enough. I believe that the solution of this problem is all the more important since I feel that the enemy simultaneously, with the Bth Army attack, which we must expect in the immediate future, will launch a second attack • on our flank.

For this reason also I consider it necessary to dispose the mobile armoured formations in such a way that they may be employed according to the needs of battle. At any rate, as a last line of defence against the Bth Army, we would still have the ~ with if: flank hinged to the nountains.

Concluding. Duce, I am of the opinion that the Mareth position must be defended as long as possible while the Schott must be kept at all •—cts. But if we succeed in solving the problem of transport and supply I feel confident that sooner or later the North African adventure will turn out to be a British and American error with the gravest consequences.

HOPES OF ANOTHER MEETING Many other problems remain. But I should prefer to discuss tV ■*m personally with you. I believe that in the last 10 days of the month, if circumstances will permit you also, it would be possible for me to organise our meeting, rnd I am happy at P-e thought w.th all my heart. I am glad that my Foreign Minister was 1« 1 '“•«* me tidings that your colour is again good. I, too am convinced that one’s dedication to ar. ideal for many years, when it is in ad dition so full of preoccupations and tension, cannot in the long run keep his health unimpaired. It would probably do you a world of good if even for a couple of days you get out of your environment, and for me it will be a fortune if, subtracting myself from the horrible Orient (the Russian Front), where for many months now I have touring without interluption, I can see again Salzburg—a region which for us Groans represents jin its construe:ion and in its high arI tistic manifestations a synthesis bej tween Italian and German nature. ! In the meantime, Duce, accept the [ most affectionate greetings of him who | h bound to you by loyal comradeship. ADOLF HITLER. Background.—On 30th April, 1943, ! when Mussolini wrote this desperate letter from Rome, the Axis troops in North Africa were penned up in a 70-mile half-circle in north--1 east Tunisia. They were defeated 1 on 13th May. DOOMED TO FAILURE I Fuhrer, —Unless it be possible to j solve the air force problem in the Mediterranean—on which I have insisted j again and again—and in such a way as to counterbalance 4he overwhelming ja’v superiority of the enemy, not a j warship, not a transport, not a plane will reach Tunisia. j And this means the immediate , loss of Tunisia and of all our forces there. ! All attempts to ship troops there | are doomed to failure. To-day three destroyers were lost, two of them carrying German troops and the other loaded with munitions, following attacks by large enemy formations with 70 to 120 fighter escort. Fuhrer. the problem is urgent—imperatively so. Our troops in Tunisia are fighting magnificently, aj the enemy j himself is compelled to admit, but if we cannot supply them they are doomed. MUSSOLINI. Background.—Hitler’s ring offensive in Russia was petering out when he wrote this note to Mussolini on 2nd May, 1943. “BEING CONSIDERED” | Duce,—l have received your tele- ! gram dated Ist May, 1943. Duce, on Ist March the second air I force consisted of 1012 first-line aircraft. Another 574 planes were sent during the month of March. These shipments were further reinforced in April. In the last month alone 669 first-line aircraft were sent over, and this figure includes only the aircraft of normal delivery, not those of the units transferred into Italy or the transport planes. What can still be done to strengthen our air forces is now being considered. Field Marshal (Albert) Kesselring j will confer with you on this subject. I V/ith greetings in comradeship. ADOLF HITLER. The correspondence ends with a report by Mussolini to King Victor Emmanuel, on 3rd May, 1943, an indication that the Duce did not completely ignore him. Twelve weeks later Mussolini was deposed and imprisoned. Majesty,—l take the liberty to send you here included: A—A copy of the telegrams exchanged between the Fuhrer and myself, concerning the air situation in the Mediterranean. B.—A copy of the note handed to me by Gen. Ambrosio, concerning the situation of the military and civilian commands in Athens. With devotion MUSSOLINI. (The End.—All ts reserved.)