ARMY & AIR CHIEFS HIT OUT AT NAVY’S CRITICISM

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23083, 22 October 1949, Page 5

ARMY & AIR CHIEFS HIT OUT AT NAVY’S CRITICISM

WASHINGTON, Oct. 20,

General Omar Bradley, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, and General'Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of the United States Air Force, yesterday criticised Navy testimony in evidence to the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. They contested the Navy’s ease that use ot 836 aeroplanes for atomic bombing in a future war was over-emphasised in the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff's strategic concept.

General Bradley accused the admirals who gave evidence last week of taking a “spoiled brat” attitude toward the unification of the services. He said they were doing infinite harm to national security by publicly airing grievances. Grim and angry, General Bradley said in a 10,000-word statement that it was time all the services realised they had an important job to do. It was follv for the admirals to say the Navy’s fighting power was being destroyed under unification. Value of Atom Bomb He, as a believer in humanity, deplored the use of the atom bomb, but as a soldier lie respected it. The United States should be prepared to use the bomo's mil psychological and militarv effect toward preventing war, and if it was attacked, toward winning the war.

General Bradley said the Bikini and Eniwetok tests revealed that the Navy afloat was one of the most profitable targets for an enemy with an atom bomb.

The need for realistic preparedness had become even more urgent since the announcement of an atomic explosion in Russia. The United States, in spite of Navy complaints, was building a balance military force. Seaborne island hopping would play little if any role in a future war. Broad Strategic Aims

The nation’s broad war strategy was firstly, defence of the American Continent: secondly, early retaliation from available bases: thirdly, seizure of other bases: and fourthly, carrying the war back to the enemy. The plan would mean both strategic air bombardment and large scale land operations.

Strategic bombing had a high priority in planning because it would slow down the enemy at the outbreak of war and give the United States time to mobilise. The 836 was the best bomber available. General Vandenberg said the United States strategic air plans were not made “on a lone-wolf basis” but in increasingly close co-operation with Western Europe’s free nations. He told the committee that If the United States reduced its strategic bombing strength, Russia would, be free to concentrate on developing offensive power. Effects of Naval Policy Naval officers last week argued in evidence that the Air Force should spend less time and money on strategic bombers and more on tactical air Dower. General Vandenberg said such a policy shift would mean:— 1. The United States would surrender the value of its atomic weapons and place itself in disagreement with those people who “on both sides of the ocean” believed Soviet aggression was in fact being deterred. 2. The United States would be telling the Russians that they need not take defensive measures against a possible atomic attack on their hearthland. The existence of atomic bombers could and did not force the Soviet to channel its industrial power, technological skill, manpower and money into purely defensive measures, thus reducing resources which would otherwise be devoted to offensive purposes. 3. If was was forced on the United States, the Navy’s proposal would deprive the United States of the opportunity of choking off the enemy’s warmaking power at its source. General Vandenberg said the 836 could defend itself against enemy fighters, baffle enemy radar and consistently achieve the necessary accuracy in bomb dropping.