LOSS OF THE TYRONE

Evening Star, Issue 15308, 7 October 1913, Page 4

LOSS OF THE TYRONE

THE NAUTICAL INQUIRY. THE MASTER IN THE BOX. The nautical inquiry into the circumstances surrounding tho loss of the Tyrone near Otago Heads on September 27 began this morning in the Magistrate’s Court before Nil - H. Y. Widdowson, SAL, and two assessors—Captains Sundstrum and Hunter. Mr Fraser, K.C. (Crown Solicitor), appeared for the Collector of Customs, and J-.H. Hosking, K.C., for tho master (Captain M'Lauchlan). Mr Fraser said that this inquiry was into the wreck of the Tyrone on September 27 on Waihino Point at 4 a.m. The formal report announcing the stranding was sent in by the master of tho ship under date of September 50. The mishap occurred on a foggy morning, and ho would call evidence to show that the proper precautions were taken by the officials at the Heads. THE FOG AND FOG SIGNALS.

Robt. Leighton, lighthouse-keeper atTaiaroa Head, examined by Mr Fraser, said he was on duty on the morning of the wreck. There was a light northerly breeze and a dense fog set in about 2.40 a.m. He then started the fog signal, consisting of explosives of tonnite cartridges every 6min. These were continuously fired until he was relieved at 4.10 a.m. The fog still continued, as well as the signals. There was no impediment to the sound waves seaward as far as lie knew. He had had considerable experience of the fog signals, and if there was any impediment such as land between the signal and tho ship the signals were considerably mitigated in effect. There was such an impediment between the lighthouse and the scene of the wreck a headland which would deflect tho sound in various ■ directions. The sound in a light northerly breeze would deflect back towards Port Chalmers. Ho had heard the fog signals (with a similar quantity of tonnite) for from five to seven miles away when he had been out at. sea. It was not possible to locate exactly from seawards the site of the explosions. To Mr Hosking : It was an automatic signal, and. generally worked without difficulty. It was a fact that notwithstanding it was automatic they eat near it all night. Mr Hosking : I suppose that is on account of its eccentricities. Witness : Oh, no! We have to keep watch anyhow, and might as well watch there. Does she misfire?— Yes, she does, but notion the morning of the 27th. You say that sometimes the signal might be heard at Port Chalmers, and yet not a mile out to sea?— Yes. In answer to a further question, witness said that ho agreed generally with statements in Lloyd’s calendar as to fog signals —namely, “Tiound is conveyed in a very capricious way through the atmosphere. Apart from wind, large areas of silence have been found in different directions and at different distances from the fog signal station, in some instances even when in close proximity to it. . . . A fog often creeps imperceptibly towards the land, and is not observed at tho station until it is upon it, whereas a- ship may have been for many hours in it, and approaching the land. ... When sound has to travel against the wind it may be thrown upwards ; in such cases a man aloft might hear it when it is inaudible on deck.”

Witness continued that tho fog signal at tho Heads was considerably above the level of the sea., being even about 18ft above the level of the ground, ■where the lighthouse stood. This combined height would bo considerably above the. height of a man in a crow’s nest. In the case of a northerly wind, to a ship coming from the north these shots would to al i intents and purposes be fixed into the air, as far as the map in the crow’s nest was concerned. Fogs sometimes occurred winch lay over the back of the Peninsula., and did not extend seawards. The fog sat like a cap on the. land. In such a case it might be very often quite clear at sea up to within a short distance of the land. They from the station could not see through a. dense fog to discover how fax it went. If the captain of tho UHmaroa had stated that the night was hazy, but could not bo called a. foggy night , witness should not agree with that. Ho was inside the lighthouse when on watch, but that did not prevent him watching the fog. They kept a lookout on the bajeony door in the usual manner. On the morning of the wreck the fog came in from the sea, becoming dense at 2.40 a.m. He could see fairly_ well to windward up to about 2.35, If it was stated by those on the Tyrone that no fog was visible up to 3.45 or l ater from the "ship he should disagree with them. The ship would come along with the fog, though the fog mightbo considerably ahead, Tt sot in" with a general thick- fog—sea and land—at- 2.40. If the men c,n the Tyrone had not seen any fog it would he quite in accord with whit might happen in the case of fog. To Mr Eraser: He had been two years and three months in charge of the Taiaroa light on this occasion, and had been there before. He had heard no steamer whistle between 3 and 4 on the morning of the wreck. It was cloudy and overcast before 2.40. He could sec out (o sea, but not as far as the light at Moeraki (23 miles away), which, however, could be seen on a clear night. His Worship ; Can you suggest anything by which it could be arranged that these signals could be put in any"other position to be heard better?

Witness; Xo. Ho added that it was doubtful if they would be heard better lower down. There were much more powerful signals than the one in use here —a. siren, for example. Witness was finally examined by Mr Hrisking. He said that- the light nt Taiaxoa was a. red light, which was not so effective as a. white, one. The interval between tho fog signals was six minutes, which ho thought sufficiently frequent. Ho understood that at Tima.ru the interval was 10 minutes. He did not receive any knowledge of the wreck until 7.30 a.m.

Wm. Carter (Harbor Board watchman, Otago Hoads), examined by .Mr Fraser, said he was on duly on the morning of the wreck, on the lookout elation on the hill, three minutes’ walk from tho lighthouse. It was hazy, and a light north-easter was blowing at midnight, when lie came on duty. Tin’s continued to 20 minutes to 3, when it got thick. The. fog in from the north. He heard the fog signals, and they were, regular as far as lie knew, and it was Very thick—a dense fog—at 4 o’clock. He heard a sound from the- seaward—a. faint sound of a whistle—between 4 and a quarter past. He heard the first detonator from the wreck at 4.30.

By Mr Hosking: He did not keep a book, but a slate, in the lookout. What was on the slate- was transcribed to the logbook later. He thought tho slight whistle he heard was south of the lighthouse.

CAPTAIN MLAUCHLAX’S EVIDENCE.

Andrew M'Lauchlan, master mariner, and master of the Tyrone, said that her registered tonnage was 4,294 tons, and ‘ her carrying capacity 10.000 tons. She left Lyttelton at 12 o’clock on September 25, bound for Taiaroa Head. She passed Akaroa Head at 5.25 p.m., and the second officer took a four-point bearing, which lived her distance off the light when abeam at four miles. Witness laid a course S. 24 W. (as shown in chart!, and averaged just under 12 knots from Akaroa Heads. Her speed was never, to his knowledge, altered from full speed ahead. His estimate was to reach Taiaroa Heads at 4.30 at the earliest, but his estimate was based on the assumption that she would run at 11.5 knots. The ship had never before travelled at a speed just under 12 knots, and in addition she was burning bad coal—Australian. The log was observed from Akaroa. Head (when it was put over) at the following hours--6 p.m., 8 p.m , 10 p.m., midnight, and 1.20 a.m., at which hour witness' was called. The report given to him was that the Moerala light bore S. 74 W r . The course lie gave was S. 24 W. magnetic, or .

lay down at 10 o’clock lie entered the following _ order: —“ Let mo know when Moeraki light is sighted. If not sighted by 1.30, call me. Should, pass 10 miles oft'. See course made good. Compare compasses frequently.” (Order acknowledged by second and third mates.)

Continuing, witness said that at various hours a bearing was taken to ascertain the deviation. The deviation was carefully chocked on September - 26 at 2.44 p.m., 3,12 p.m., 3.44 p.m., 4.40 p.m., 5.56 p.m., and at sunset, all of which bearings wore reported in the deviation book. The result of tho bearings was that the deviation was 41dcg W. He allowed 4, giving the half degree as a margin of safety. He was called by a report down the tube (by the second officer) at 1.20, telling him he had sighted Moeraki light bearing S. 74 W. This exactly coincided with what ho expected, as shown by the night order book, and it ( showed him to be on the right course. Tho log was observed then, and the record was 118 miles. The report of the night was just of tho bearing, not touching on the state of the weather. The bearing of Moeraki light was a compass bearing. He ordered Mr Parrv to alter the course Ideg—S. 29 W.—the object being to compensate for the half degree he had allowed from Akaroa. The distance of the light off was not then reported. Ho gave orders: “ me know how far off tire light is when it is abeam.” This was at 1.20 a.m. The second ofticer called him a little before 2 a.m., and said he had lost the light. He (the captain) at once went on deck. The second officer said ho had got a second bearing, which, he thpught, was west, and the distance from the light was 17$ miles. Mr Parry took his log at the second bearing. He (Captain M’Laucblan) calculated his distance from the Heads from the first bearing, but ho could not then remember what it was. Reckoning it back from the second bearing, however, he thought (from memory) it was 37 miles.

THE CAPTAIN’S FRANK STATEMENT,

Without further examination the captain read a statement as under;—lt is my intention to give the Court my true and unvarnished story. At the outset I want to tell the Court that I made a mistake; that this mistake, combined with a series of abnormal circumstances later on at the Heads, has led up to this catastrophe. I discharged the pilot at 12.11 p.m. of the 26th between Lyttelton and Godley Heads, and proceeded full speed. Various courses were steered until we reached Akaroa loii OUSC ’ This point was abeam X. 68 W. magnetic at 3.25 p.m., and distant lour miles. It was a fine night, and the course was set S. 28 W. for Otago Heads. The deviation 4J,deg W., I allowed only 4, giving the other half-degree for a margin of safety. I retired about 11 p.m. after writing my night order book, which 1 have read. The second officer reported «*>■» tfe Moeraki light at 1.20, bearing This being as I expected. I told linn to alter the course to S. 29 W., and let mo know the distance off when it was abeam. About 2 a.m. he reported losing the light. He informed me that by a bearing he had taken shortly before she \ vas , ,4 roilcs off. I at once came on deck, but did not see the light. The weather was overcast, but clear, and at 3.40 a.m., the log showing 146, I told the second officer to have it hauled in, with a view of getting ready for anchonng. About 3.50 I heard the explosive on the Heads. 1 felt satisfied I was a good distance off. having heard it from Dunedin myself. I waited for the second report, which confirmed the first, and slowed down engines, porting the helm 0 points, with a view of picking up the anchorage. _ By this time it was after 4. and the chief officer came on the’bridge and asked mo if we were going to anchor. 1 told him to go on top of the chart room —the standing compass was there—and to guc mo the bearing of the next fog signal. Just before 4 (about eight minutes to 4) i," as - 0U ,Tl 4’ knees with my car just over the rail listening for the next fog signal. M hue there I heard the chief engineer come up the bridge ladder and say to the second mate; “What arc we slowed c*wn for? Is it fog? 1 ’ When the chief officer was on the chart house to listen for the fog signal fas I have stated before) I heard someone say: “Is that breakers 1 hear?'’ Without as far as I can remember hearing them myself, I turned the engine room telegraph full speed astern. About, this time the fourth officer saw! “There’s a light.” I sniff “ V hero? 1 ’ Ho pointed soinevMicrc on the port beam. Meanwhile the lead had been got out. and it. was the first indication that I knew she was ashore. I could see no land. I got n report 24ft of water on the starboard how. The engines had been going full speed astern for some time, hut the ship did net, respond. With this light reported by the fourth officer in my mind (which I had not seen), and the 2Mt of water on the starboard how, I ported the helm and wont full speed ahead, thinking I was on the Spit.. About two minutes after, looking for this light. I saw land on the port quarter. The way in which I saw it. was this: A cap of fog over the cliff, shrouding everything hut a Huff running out to the sea-. After seeing this land I realised where I was. and determined to go full speed astern and try to get out the wav T came in. The engines were kept full speed astern. I had to keep her stern co seaward hr at times stopping the starboard engine.' As the tide rose about 10 o'clock she began to show signs of coming astern, and I had worked her about 250 ft astern, when the Mucky got a, rope on the starboard quarter, which. I instructed them to pull broad off on the starboard quarter. We very slowly worked astern, but, the Mucky was not sufficiently powerful to keep her stern to seaward. In spite of the Mucky she fell down on Wahine Point. The carpenter was continually sounding the tanks and bilges from the time of stranding until the steamer toll detui on the point, and reported everything dry, hut after striking the rock I knew Xo. 3 was pierced by the noise of the air coming out of the aiipipe, and at the same time the engine telegraph for tho port engine was put at. “slop” bathe engineer. As a result of this, what I ascertained was that the port propeller had jammed in the rocks. Before I explain to the. Court the mistake I made I want to say that we wore 12£ hours from passing Akaroa. to slowing down, a distance of 149 miles, showing an average speed of just under 12 knots, the quickest speed she has done under my command, and this with inferior coal—namely. Bulli. I have experience on ibis coast for over 15 voars, and I have always thought it was accepted that any current or ocean drift proceeded north from the Bluff through Cook Strait, And in one instance where I met with misfortune in the Southern Ocean, tho ship’s machinery being very seriously damaged, and being bound for Wellington, I came round the Snares and up tho East Coastin preference to coming direct, as customary, knowing that the current had always given me good passages north. But it appears with northerly winds lasting a few davs this northerly set- should not he depended upon. The" southerly set was clearly demonstrated by a lifeboat, being washed overboard after we had gone ashore nmd setting away to the southward verv quickly. The luncheon adjournment was here taken. “MY MISTAKE.”

Continuing after the adjournment, the captain said: “ The mistake I made I only discovered last Wednesday. From the plan of the stranding I have been very much puzzled how we" could have come down so much ahead of the log, and I procured a chart from Captain Beaumont, took it hack to the cflico. and carefully laid off the line of course, all the bearings off Mosraki. That chart I have here. I measured the distance from Akaroa. to Otago Heads, 149 miles. This not. being the. distance that was impressed on ms* mind by over six miles, J discovered that something was wrong. I procured from the shipping office a copy of the New Zealand Nautical Almanac, and-turned up the. course and distances from Lyttelton to Dunedin. I would state that’ every seaman (and I iliirk the assessors will agree with me) would -hold that the easiest departure to set a course from, bound to Otago Heads, would be Akaroa light house. I found from the almanac that ihd distance mentioned there—lss.7 miles—was not from Akaroa, but from Flat /Point. I will show the Court how I made this mistake. After the course was set I

keep in the chart room and look upon as a standard work. The book was in this position, and nil I can see now (holding the book in that position) is Taiaroa Head light—the distance is 155.7 miles. This distance got very firmly fixed in my mind, and when I came on dock at 2‘ o’clock and received the information given me by the second officer, that according to the bearings we were 17$ miles off at the second hearing, 1 brought that calculation back to the first heaving, which left me 37 miles to run. Measuring the distance from the position of the ship at the first bearing also gave mo 37 miles. That I think, explains the combination of two circumstances—the first, through my mistakc, and the second owing to that distance winch has since been discovered to be too far off the light. From the time I came on deck 1 do not want to tell the Court that it was a clear night—it was overcast but never at any time before the stranding did I observe any ravs shown from the masthead lights, which every seaman knows to bo the first indication of fog I can only ask the Court to hear what others who were on deck have to say. For myself, .1 had never any fear of going full speed, knowing that with the assumed distunce that I had to go it was impossible foi the steamer to have got within seven miles of Otago Heads at her highest speed I considered I could see a light seven indes At 3.40, having logged 146-taking that from 156 had 10 miles to go, and soon after, with a view to anchoring, I ordered the log to be hauled in permanently. Inis was at 3.40. It was done. Just about this time I heard the fog signal on the starboard bow, and it was reported by the look-out man—in the crow’s-nest, riiere was a man in the crow's-nest all night. ] heard an explosion on the starboard bow, which, in my mind, verified my calculation amply, because 1 have niany tunes heard the explosive at Dune:lc,7 ™ ■ understand it has been heard at bt. Clair—about 15 nautical miles. I would just like to state that, according to the Admiralty chart you have here, the steamer is at present (that is to sav, as she lies wrecked) a good half-mile off land. (The assessors, after examining the chart, agreed that this was so.) The captain was still explaining the error in the chart at 3 p.m.