NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 138, 13 June 1942, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

BLOW TO JAPAN

TRUTH ABOUT CORAL SEA BATTLE

It is now clear from the somewhat belated official account of the Battle of the Coral Sea last month (May 6-9), issued today, what a blow it was to Japanese sea-power and a victory, if not a decisive one, for the Allies, principally the American navy. Like the later battle of Midway Island, it was also a demonstration of the effectiveness of air attack on ships of all kinds. Sea-power will have to be radically adjusted to this new factor. As anticipated, Rommel has followed up the occupation of Bir Hacheim with a drive towards Tobruk, the Allied base in Libya. Sebastopol faces its gravest peril, and in China Chuhsien has been captured by the* Japanese. The story, though still incomplete, of the Battle of the Coral Sea may be allowed to speak for itself. It was a cardinal example of .the shape a battle at sea takes under the influence ]oi i the dominant air arm. In this the 1 Americans proved their great superiority, as they did at Midway. The Japanese losses enumerated were particularly heavy in aircraft-carriers and ; cruisers; they are obviously endeavour- | ing to keep their capital ships—that is, j battleships—out of the fray as much jas possible with a view to future coni tingencies, but various losses since De- | cember 7—Pearl Harbour—must have ' made a considerable dent in the rest jof the fleet and in merchant transport. It is hardly likely now that the Japanese will be able to carry out a largescale invasion overseas anywhere. The Americans suffered one heavy loss— the great aircraft-carrier Lexington, sister of the Saratoga—both converted battle-cruisers under the Washington Treaty of 1922. The Lexington, completed in 1927, was a ship of 35.000 tons. 800 feet long, of 33 knots, carrying eight 8-in guns, twelve 5-inch, and 80 aircraft. Sea-power in Fleet. Surveying the new conditions of sea-power, Hanson Baldwin, in the "New York Times," writing before either 6f the great Pacific sea-air .battles, says: It is the carrier, accompanied by fast cruisers and destroyers, and organised in a striking group or task force, that has been the major naval factor of the war in the Pacific. Today it is the carrier that is tactically the most important naval type. The torpedo and'the bomb, rather than the gun, are the principal naval weapons. . . . Both the battleship and the carrier are in an evolutionary state. Naval design and naval tactics are in flux, violent flux; changes of greater import than any since the substitution of steam for sail are now in the making. The capital ship of tomorrow will certainly not be either the carrier or the battleship of today. The battleship, if it is to survive even in vestigial form, must meet the menace of the torpedo to its unarmoured underwater hull (the Bismarck class has come closer to. doing this than any other, but the problem is not solved), and the carrier of yesterday and today is slowly becoming an armoured ship with side belt and armoured decks and a thoroughly subdivided, compartmentalised underwater hull. Thus, the two types—battleship and carrier—are in: one sense merging to make the capital ship of tomorrow. The question of armament— guns and calibres of guns—is still undecided. More Carriers Wanted. Applying this argument, Baldwin calls for many more aircraft-carriers. The United States is building thirteen carriers, plus the sixteen to thirty auxiliary carriers converted from merchant ships. The construction time of carriers, he says, has greatly decreased. He doubts whether the giant battleships planned are "worth the cost and j effort." The design of tomorrow's battleship should be modified. Summing up his views on air power, Baldwin concludes: ] The war has shown the smashing j tactical strength of air power, used independently or co-operatively. But the United States lies between two oceans—and we cannot hope in this war to develop a bombing offensive across these oceans. Defensively, American air power can be used to great strategic purpose. But today, given the limitations of the plane, air power can develop a decisive strategic offensive, particulaxiy against Japan, only when used in conjunction with sea-power. It is around the plane-ship team that we must build our hopes of controlling the seas—and consequently our hopes of eventual victory. Libya, Russia, China. Rommel in Libya is evidently trying to exploit his gain of Bir Hacheim and the removal of this corner obstruction to his advance by a drive northward in-the direction of Tobruk. This will inevitably entail adjustments in the front of the Eighth Army, which cannot afford to be trapped west and south-west of Tobruk with backs to the sea. Warfare in this area is bound to become more open, with corresponding risks to both sides. Much depends on the relative strengths of the opposing armies after "the exhausting battles of the last fortnight and more. The situation should become clearer over the weekend. Sebastopol is facing its hardest ordeal 1 of air its seven months' siege. The Germans are pushing their attack with the utmost determination regardless of loss, for the prize of the capture of this vital Russian naval base is deemed worth almost any price. The objective here and at Kharkov is, of. course, the Caucasus and oil, and the elimination of Sebastopol would make it difficult for the Russian Black Sea fleet to operate successfully. The other bases, Novo Rossisk and Batoum, are by no means so defensible or strategically so well placed. The Nazi plan is evidently to attack at both ends of the long line in Russia, from Finland towards the White Sea and from the Kharkov-Kursk sector towards the Volga and the Caspian. This puts Russian lateral communications under a severe strain, but there is a doubt whether the Germans can last the pace as well as the Red Army, especially if the R.A.F. keeps up its blasting of Germany's industrial centres. The fall of Chuhsien into Japanese hands, together with the movement of Japanese columns south-east from Nanchang and north-west from Foochow, gravely imperils the Chinese hold on these coastal areas of Eastern China. This is the most serious crisis Free China has had to face for two or three years in its war with Japan.