FUTURE ARMAMENTS

Evening Post, Volume XCVII, Issue 56, 8 March 1919, Page 5

FUTURE ARMAMENTS

GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVY

THE LATE MR. ROOSEVELT'S VIEW.

A striking article by Mr. Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star (of 17th December) repudiates the idea that America wants a navy as big as the British, and describes the reported intention of Washington to build a navy in rivalry to Great Britain's as "political bluff." Mr. Roosevelt says:

It was announced from the peace ship that President Wilson was going to work for a reduction of naval armaments and for a form of naval agreement which, if it existed four years ago would have meant Germany's victory and the subjugation not only of Germany's foes, but of all neutrals like ourselves. At the same time, over here representatives of the Administration are demanding a navy bigger than that of Great Britain. The only possible interpretation of these facts is that the Administration proposes to threaten Great Britain with having to get in a neck-to-neck competition with-America to build the greatest navy in the world, and to do this as a bluff so as to make for Great Britain's adherence to Mr. Wilson's exceedingly nebulous ideas. Under these conditJons the American people should with commonsense look at what their own needs are, and at what the needs of- their Allies are. Sooner or later any programme will have to be tested by its results, and even if the United States started to emulate Great Britain's Navy the enthusiasm to do so would vanish when it appeared that there was no earthly interest of ours to be served by the action.

In winning the present war very many instrumentalities have been necessary. On the whole, the four most important in their order have been: (1) The French army, (2) the British Navy, (3) the British Army, (4) the Italian army. Our own gallant army and navy did exceedingly well, but came in so late that the part they played, taking the four and a-half .years as a whole, does not entitle them to rank with the instrumentalities given above. Great Britain is an island separated from the huge military commonwealths of Europe by very narrow seas, and separated from her own greatest colonies by all the greatest oceans. To her, supremacy in thu Navy is a matter of life and aeath. America ought to have a first-class navy, but if she did not have a ship she might yet secure herself from any invasion. But Great Britain's Empire would not last one week, and she' would not make herself safe at Home one week if her Navy lost its supremacy. ' Incidentally to saving herself, the British Navy rendered incalculable service to us during the last four and a-half years, and for the last thirty years has been a shield to the United States. NO^ MENACE TO THE WORLD.

Great Britain is not a military power in the sense that any of the nations of Continental Europe, or, indeed, Asia, are military powers. She had almost as much difficulty in developing her Army in this war as we had in developing our army. Her Army ie no more of a threat to other peoples than ours is. Therefore, we Americans, find ourselvos, as regards the British Navy, in thi3 position, that it is of vital consequence to Great Britain to have the greatest Navy in the world; it is emphatically not of any consequence to us to have "as big a navy 'as Great Britain, for we are not in the slightest danger from Great Britain, and in all ordinary circumstances the British Navy can be counted upon as a help to the United States, and never as a menace. In such circumstances, to set Ourselves to.work to build a navy in rivalry with Great Britain's, and," above all, to do this as political bluff, is worse than silly. Our own navy should be ample to protect our own coasts, and to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. There are in Europe and Asia several great Military Commonwealths, each one of which will, in all probability, always pqsses afar more formidable army than ours, even though, aa I earnestly hope, we adopt some development of universal military training on the lines of the Swiss system. Therefore, it is of the highest consequence that our navy should be second to that of Great Britain. The analogy with the oase of the French army is complete. The French army would not have been able to hold the German army, and be the chief factor in Germany's military overthrow. The British Navy could not have averted Germany's complete viotory. Great Britain is_ separated by narrow seas from the military Powers of Continental Europe. We are separated from them by the width of the ocean.

In the circumstances it is sheer impertinence for either American or English statesmen to tell the French, or for that matter, Italy, what ought to be done in abolishing armaments, or abandoning universal service, or anything of the kind. The interest 'of France and Italy in the matter is vital; the interest of England and America is%tartly secondary. If we have well thought-out arguments to put before the French, put them before them, but treat France as having the vital interest in the matter, and therefore the final say, so far as we are concerned, and when France is determined what the needs of the future demand, so far as' her military preparedness is concerned, and when Italy has made .a similar determination,' and. our other Allies likewise, back them up. It is not the business of America to. tell Great Britain what she should do with her navy. It is not the business either of America or England to teU France what she should do with her army. The plain American common sense of the situation is that we should recognise our immense debfe to the British, Navy and the French Army, and stand by Britain in what she decides her vital needs demand, so far as her navy is concerned, and stand by France in the jposition she takes as to what the situation demands so far as her army is concerned.