CHINA’S LINKS WITH U.S. PEKING’S RADICALS AGAINST FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT AID

Press, Volume CXVI, Issue 34104, 17 March 1976, Page 20

CHINA’S LINKS WITH U.S. PEKING’S RADICALS AGAINST FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT AID

(By

VICTOR ZORZA)

The Peking radicals are sharpening their knives for Hua Kuo-feng, the new Acting Prime Minister, on the ground that he wants to develop China’s links with the United States and to acquire American military technology. Both his own position and Peking’s pro-American policy are seriously threatened. The radicals, who tasted blood last month when they got rid of the Deputy Prime Minister. Teng Hsiao-ping, just as he was about to take over formally the country's management on the death of Chou En-lai. are not giving up easily.

The evidence between the lines of the Chinese press which leads to these conclusions also makes it clear that Hua has powerful allies. The army, which would stand to gain from a policy designed to secure modern W'estem weapons, has not so far joined in the attacks on Hua. But the military commanders also favoured his predecessor, Teng, who restored the centralised military system. Yet they could not save him, ev r en though he too was anxious to give them the military technology they wanted.

The attacks on Hua are disguised in several ways, but politically the most significant is thq press campaign which blames him for imparting the wrong direction to China s science and technology programme. Hua,

who is not named in the press attacks, has been in charge of the science and technology programme for about a year, .and it may therefore be deduced that he is rhe target of the campaign. He has never been ■publicly named to this post, ; but a number of signs — . such as his meetings with : foreign scientists visiting (China — clearly identify him as .holding it. The press campaign makes it clear that the unnamed man in charge of the programme has been saying that Chinese science “is now in a state of crisis” — “stagnant, confused, paralysed.” He complained that Chinese technology had tried to rely on its own resources instead of getting help from abroad. He argued that the crisis “could be resolved only by relying on foreign experts.”

The radicals answer that to do so would be to act “as if China’s destiny is tied to the waist-oelt of foreigners.” If China gave up the policy of self-reliance, they maintain, it could neither attain economic independence nor assert, its "political independence.” They hint at the defence aspects of the debate by decrying China’s space satellite programme. China, they argue, succeeded >n launching its satellite, but only at the cost of a modernisation programme which diverted the country from the Leftist path of Maoist-communist virtue. “The satellites going up to the sky are but a sham,” they say, “while the red flag falling to the ground is the reality.” The satellite effort is, of course closely linked to China’s ballistic missile programme, which is several years in arrears, and to its space reconnaissance programme.

Spy satellite

Without a spy satellite, (China would be in no position to anticipate a Soviet (attack. But Chinese purchasing inquiries in the West suggest that, without foreign help, it may be another 10 years before Peking develops an efficient spy satellite of its own. Those who want Western scientific aid. says the Peking “People’s Daily,” claim that this would provide “the only way to avoid being blind.”

The Washington debate on whether China should be given military-technological aid came to the surface last September with an article in “Foreign Policy” by Michael Pillsbury, a Rand analyst whose passionate advocacy of this course is said by some of his opponents to spring from ulterior motives. They point to Rand’s connection with the Pentagon, which believes that a China armed with modern weapons could draw off some of the Russian heat from the United States, without presenting a serious threat to the West.

Dr Kissinger’s main concern is that to give such aid to China would upset the Russians and could deal yet another blow to detente. Although he must be well aware of Chinese needs, he argues that Peking ha not asked for United States aid, and that it is not for Wash-

; ington to raise the matter [with them. No doubt he [would prefer them to come >to him with a request, for this would put the United States in a position to name (its own price.

Yet this is precisely why (the Peking leaders who want (to develop the links with the [United States cannot ask (directly for United States aid. They have already been [accused by the radicals of selling out to the United States for a mess of pottage. (Any formal request for [United States aid from Hua (would lay him open to the charge that he is indeed willing to abandon China’s “political independence” — as the "People's Daily” hinted — in exchange for arms.

Bleak outlook

In today’s climate in Peking, with Hua’s own political survival at stake, he is hardly likely to take such risks. In today’s climate in Washington, with the Administration and Congress at odds over the use — or misuse — of arms aiJ, any request made by Peking would become involved in the political struggles of an American election year. Th* outlook is bleak, yet the (question is probably more (important than any other issue in the Soviet-Chinese- ! American triangle. I Its importance derives (from the central place which lit occupies in the Chinese (internal debate. The debate (is about the pace and direction of China’s modernisation, anu the means to be used in achieving it. A faster pace, favoured by the moderates represented by Teng and to some extent by Hua, would entail a departure from the Maoist model. Instead of giving priority to agriculture and to the preservation of the peasant society which forms the base of the Maoist model, the new five-year plan — which was to begin in January — would in effect have given priority to industry. The Chinese press has hinted that this was one of the major issues. But industrialisation too could have been carried out only with aid from the West.

Once again the issue is the same as it has been in every one of the Peking power struggles of recent years. Should China pul! itself up by its own bootstraps, however long it may take, and whatever cost it may entail, while maintaining its isolation from the rest of the world? Or should it open its gates to the West, speed up the development of industry, accept the West’s technology and modern weapons — at the risk, as the radicals maintain, of losing its national character, its unique Maoist individuality. There is a third way, to restore the alliance with the Soviet Union, and there are strong hints that some Chinese leaders have been contemplating even this possibility. Perhaps offering China some of the arms it wants may help the proWestern faction in Peking to buy the time it needs. It could also discourage the Kremlin from trying to follow up its Angola adventure elsewhere. — (Copyright 1976 Victor Zorza).