VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN SOVIET PRESS TOLD NOT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO McGOVERN

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 32967, 13 July 1972, Page 12

VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN SOVIET PRESS TOLD NOT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO McGOVERN

i By

VICTOR ZORZA)

The Kremlin has ordered the Soviet press not to commit its<v in any way to Senator George McGovern, although, at first sight, stand might appear much closer to Moscow’s than does the j>olit philosophy of President Nixon. The Kremlin's orders may be deduced from the taciturn warinwof the Soviet press which, by the time this stage of the campaign w reached in previous elections, commented with considerable abandon ■■ the “goodies” and the “badies” on the American political scene. Soviet praise of Senator McGovern could no more help him to win the elect iot. than it could get him the nomination: but this is not the i-sue.

Soviet foreign-policy moves during the election campaign could, in certain circumstances, help either of the main candidates — particularly during the crisis situations that blow up suddenly and inevitably in every preelection period. The attitude of the Soviet press now makes it clear that the Kremlin’s influence, to the extent that its own moves may have any bearing on the election, will’ be exerted on Mr Nixon’s behalf.

Why should this be so, when it is McGovern’s call for cuts in the arms budget, and for ending the Vietnam war on terms favourable to the Communists, that should appear so much more attractive to the Kremlin? One answer is to be found in the Soviet belief that American elections are not really a serious political contest between two competing parties which espouse different philosophies, but merely a struggle for power between two “ruling cliques.’ “Uniform policy” The Kremlin’s leading expert on the United States, Georgi Arbatov, who heads the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States of America, says that the differences between the election platforms of the two parties and their Presidential candidates are only “relative.” What is left if one disregards the “pre-election rhetoric,” he says, are minor differences on how best to pursue “the uniform bipartisan policy of the .ruling Mr Nixon thus seemed preferable to the Kremlin

even before the Moscow sum. mit, when another of its leading expens on the United States was quoted in this column as saying that a Republican President could afford to make concessions to the Soviet Union more easily than a Democrat. “Two trends” Mr Arbatov himself, however. reserved judgment Before the summit he saw two trends in American “ruling circles.” There were those who wanted “change" only in order to adapt old methods to the new search “for more refined and more cunning ways of bringing about the same reactionary policies” on both the home and the foreign fronts. But others were prepared to make some adjustment “of the policy itself,” and even to make "partial concession” in order to preserve the “domination of the bourgeoisie” over the country. One way in which this could be done by the American "ruling clique,” in his view, was by diverting money from arms to domestic programmes, and gener-

’ally adopting a more fnendlv policy towards the Soviet Union. Which of these two trends would prevail m the United States? The answer, he said, [would be given not in the i"pre-election politicking and the candidates' declarations.” I but in the Administrations [actions. He apologised for (Concluding his analysis on this "vague” note, but promised his readers that thing [would be clearer after Mr Nixon's visit to Moscow. U.S. change of hear! I After the summit, the [Kremlin mobilised Mr Arba tov to reply in the press to [the "sceptics” who suspected that it was the Soviet leaders rather than Mr Nixon who ihad made the bigger concessions. The summit agree ments, he argued, wen ■major success for the Kremlin in that they proclaimed the departure by the United [States from the cold war, ifrom policies based on posi itions of strength, from insistence on military supremacy They were also, he said, a "major success" for Mr Nixon, who needed them for the election, hut this was imi the main thing. The funda mental question was whether the changes brought about by the summit "are durable.” and his answer was a qualified "yes." Although the struggle between the two systems would continue, he said the changes “can be regarded as natural and firmly rooted.” i In other words, the whole thrust of his analysis — and ihe certainly represents the • Kremlin’s best judgment — was that Mr Nixon repre sents the forces of stability and progress, and that he has a better chance of carry- ; ing out the policies desired : by the Kremlin than has Mr McGovern. — (Copyright, 1972, Victor Zorza).