THE MIDDLE EAST SADAT PREFERS PEACE, BUT NOT AT ANY PRICE

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32563, 24 March 1971, Page 20

THE MIDDLE EAST SADAT PREFERS PEACE, BUT NOT AT ANY PRICE

(By

JOHN BULLOCH

in the "Daily Telegraph" London)

(Reprinted by arrangement) There is a new sense of urgency and a new tension in the Middle East now that the formal cease-fire has been revoked by Egypt. From the Egyptian point of view, there was never any possibility of extending the cease-fire for a further period. According to Egyptian officials, Israel had given nothing in return for concession after concession made by Egypt.

Another formal truce would merely hive confirmed the Israelis in their intransigent stand and encouraged them to further demands. Ending the ceasefire was, for the Egyptians, a demonstration that they had gone as far as they could, and an avowal that, if the worst really did come . to the worst, they were prepared to fight.

The events leading up to the present situation have been the; work of one man. Anwar Sadat, the second leader of "revolutionary” Egypt, has accomplished more in his six months as President than the late, great Abdel Nasser did in six years. His most important move was to free his country from the burden of the resolutions passed at the Khartoum summit conference of Arab leaders immediately after the 1967 war.

At that meeting, the rulers pledged themselves not to negotiate with Israel, not to recognise Israel and not to reach any peace agreement with Israel. President Sadat lost no time in making it clear that, given the right circumstances, he was prepared to .recognise Israel, and that he wanted a peace treaty. President Sadat, for so long regarded as the eternal No. 2, was able to move so far and so fast because he correctly gauged the mood of his people, and sensed that the time had come to break out of the impasse which had caused frustration and dissatisfaction in Egypt since 1967. He also realised something which President Nasser would never have acknowledged: that there was a growing “isolationist” trend in Egypt. The Egyptians, in their hearts, have never considered themselves Arabs, and the people of the truly Arab countries of the Middle East have shared that point of view. But Colonel Nasser became the leader of the whole Arab world, and could never have abdicated from that position, even if he had wanted to. Egypt alone President Sadat, a much quieter performer, took pains to avoid becoming even the spokesman for the Arab world. He was concerned with Egypt alone, and he made that clear on every possible occasion. In his speech refusing to renew the cease-fire, for instance, there was not a single reference to Jordan or Syria, the other two countries whose lands are occupied by Israel. Only Sinai was mentioned, only "Egyptians” were addressed.

In other respects, too, President Sadat has shown himself to be a more pragmatic character than President Nasser. He has faced opposition, as his policies have become apparent. A small group of Army officers, and a few dissident politicians who still hanker for their days of glory in the Moslem Brotherhood 20 years ago, have tried to halt Sadat’s drive for peace. Rather than curb them. President Sadat has sought to placate them. In speech after speech to groups of soldiers, not all of them publicised, he has explained how his diplomatic initiative can benefit the Army. More time is being gained to build up defences, he has said. More hardware is pouring in. And, if it did come to fighting again, then Egypt would have the sympathy of the world because of the reasonable attitude it had displayed in its search for a dialogue with Israel.

If the Army officers have not been convinced, they have at least been kept quiet. The politicians against present policies are also being wooed with sweet reason. With them, President Sadat is. using the carrot, not the stick. He has let it be known that if all hopes of a negotiated settlement have to be abandoned then of course he will want a new Cabinet, a “War Council,” to help him run the country. Who better than those who have consistently said that only by fighting can Egypt regain its lands and its honour? Less resolute In only one respect has President Sadat shown himself less than resolute, and that has been in his relations with the Russians. Nothing exemplifies that better than his secret trip to Moscow recently, a visit obviously designed to extract top-level assurances of help if things went wrong. President Nasser, though he was the man who first brought the Russians into Egypt, was always clearly aware of their objectives and completely determined that communism would never take over in his country. President Sadat seems less Clear about Russian intentions. In the last few months the Russians in Egypt have been “diversifying” as quickly as they can, getting away from their dependence on purely military influence and expanding into other fields.

By failing to move now, Egypt’s new leader isylaying

up trouble for himself in the future. But it is the next few weeks which President Sadat must be considering, not the years to come, for they will be shaped by what happens now. In the days and weeks ahead, the issue of peace or war between Egypt and Israel will finally be decided. The possibility of resumed fighting is there, if only by a miscalculation on one side or the other, or a deliberate act by one of the hotheaded young Egyptian Army officers in command of batteries along the Suez Canal. It is possible that Egypt will revive its suggestion of a limited Israeli pull-back to allow the Suez Canal to be reopened. Egypt has said that the Israeli forces should move back to a line down from El Arish. And this point was not picked accidentally. It was chosen as the first stage in a step-by-step withdrawal, and it was hit on because it was thought it would give Israel what it wanted at the moment—a corridor down to S]iarm el Sheikh and a continued presence there. Joint garrison Once the pull-back—that “earnest of Israeli good faith”—had been demonstrated, according to the Egyptian scenario, negotiations would go on for the second stage of the Israeli withdrawal. And an idea which was gaining ground before Israel’s brusque response to Egypt and to Dr Jarring was that both Israeli and Egyptian units should form part of the international force to garrison Shann el Sheikh. The other troops would probably be drawn from Britain and France, perhaps with American and Russian senior officers also on the spot, either as observers or advisers.

This has gained no acceptance f-om Israel. It is difficult to see what Egypt can suggest next. The one possibility is talks with Egyptian and Israeli negotiators in the

same place but not actually face to face.

This will obviously have to come at some time, if any real progress is to be made. But for Egypt to take this final step—a tremendous psychological leap some move must be made by Israel. What President Sadat expects is that America will at long last consent to put overt pressure on its ClientState, just as Russia has recently done on Egypt. One, thing is certain. Egypt now has the capacity to cross the Suez Canal. It has the equipment and the men to do so in three places simultaneously, and to establish bridgeheads which could be held for some time. Of course Egyptian losses would be enormous. Of course the bridgeheads would eventually be wiped out. But, in the process, Israeli casualties would also be considerable. So would the losses of Israeli planes and equipment. And, while Egypt can absorb casualties almost without feeling, Israel cannot From Israel Neither Egypt nor Israel wants things to reach that desperate situation. But there has to be an urgent breakthrough if that or something similar, is to be avoided. Seen from Cairo, that can now only come from Israel. The key would seem to lie with the four-Power meetings in New York. In an effort to break through the slow progress being made by Dr Jarring, Egypt announced that it would accept any unanimous decision of the four Powers, which meant, in effect, an agreed Ameri-can-Russian compromise, or an agreement reached between Egypt and, Israel by proxy. This itself was a neardesperate cri de coeur. Israel, and the outside world should take note, and realise that Egypt is desperate for peace, but could once again be driven to war. Help is needed. -