GREEK COUP AND CYPRUS CYPRIOT POLITICIANS STEER ISLAND AWAY FROM UNION

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31383, 31 May 1967, Page 14

GREEK COUP AND CYPRUS CYPRIOT POLITICIANS STEER ISLAND AWAY FROM UNION

(By

R. H. C. STEED.

U>r«lna to the "Datlti Telegraph", London. Iron Nicosia)

(Reprinted by arrangement)

For some years now Cyprus has been like a chunk of radio-active material that, at best, can only just be kept under control. Inevitably the Greek coup has set the particles buzzing around again. One result has been to enable President-Archbishop Makarios to march, under the sacred banner of Enosis, even more confidently away from the goal of union with Greece emblazoned thereon.

The local Communists, whose lip-service to Enosis is even more brazen—the last thing that they or the Russians want is for Cyprus to become a province of an anti-Communist pro-N.A.T.O. Greece—are marching with him. The two are now even firmer comrades in deception, but both know that eventually the show-down between them is inevitable. Golden Future Seen The fact is that for the great majority of Greek Cypriots a fully independent Cyprus has proved most attractive as a permanent proposition. When they can shed the last incubus of the festering civil war with the Turkish Cypriots, which 4500 United Nations troops cap only just prevent erupting again, the future appears golden. Obviously the President and his Ministers much prefer to run their own show. Everywhere similar vested interests are building up. In spite of 1 the economic division and the stagnation in the Turkish-held ghettoes, the average income is well ahead of that in Greece.

Thus most Greek Cypriots were only too eager to hold up their hands in shocked disgust at the Greek military coup. They are, moreover, becoming increasingly confident that President Makarios will solve the Cyprus dispute in their favour.

His strategy is clear. First, to maintain the military blockade of the TurkishCypriot defended areas. Second, to whittle down these areas wherever and whenever possible without provoking a clash with the United Nations or Turkey. Third, to increase the effectiveness of the forces at his disposal against the threat of Turkish mainland intervention.

Turks’ Position Eroded According to fhese calculations, the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish position will continue to be eroded until eventually the Cyprus Government will be able to get a settlement on its own terms—complete control of the whole island and of all its population, with modest concessions of local autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots in certain safe fields.

This is a strong hand, but it still has some weak spots. The 60,000 Turkish Cypriots in the defended enclaves—including 25,000 refugees—are holding out The remaining 50,000 are mostly holding themselves ready, so far as they can, for demands that may be made on them in a future emergency. Yet the balance is turning decisively against them. They could turn out about 12,000 trained men, many of whom would be well above or below military age, and they are even drilling the young women. They have no heavy equipment. The contingent of 600 Turkish mainland troops is too small to be much more than a token or a trip-wire. On the other side ( General Grivas has built up a National Guard of about 12,000 men, under Greek officers, with up to 30,000 trained reserves. They have enough heavy equipment of all kinds to pulverise the Turkish-Cypriot positions from a distance and overrun them in a couple of days. In addition there are about 8000 Greek mainland troops.

Two Obstacles

There are only two obstacles. One is the U.N. Force, which is chronically short of funds, and whose presence depends on Cyprus Government approval. The other is the threat from Turkey. Probably Ankara’s only real trump now is the Turkish air force, which

was used with devastating effectiveness in 1964. The Cyprus Government is trying to neutralise this by greatly increasing its anti-aircraft defences.

One great question has always been for how long General Grivas, the over-all military commander-in-chief, champion of Enosis and scourge of the Communists, is prepared to sit doing nothing while President Makarios outplays him and equivocates with Communism. The coup in Greece is an example which General Grivas must be sorely tempted to follow. He could strike against the Turkish Cypriots in the hope of creating a lightning “fait accompli” and leaving President Makarios to handle the diplomatic problems, or against the Cyprus Communist Party, or both simultaneously. It is a moot point whether the National Guard would refuse to obey such orders, or whether it might be incited or tricked into a final effort to settle accounts with the Turks.

Within Bounds

The Greek Government may well think it has enough on its hands without a bloody adventure in Cyprus. Yet General Grivas may not be above trying to force their hand. For an old man of bis disposition the prospect of crowning his life’s work with one last heroic fling must be compelling. So far since the coup, President Makarios, into whose present plans any such escapades would most certainly not seem to fit, has concentrated on keeping the temperature down. Past Greek Governments, while championing Enosis to gratify public opinion, have sought to keep the damage to N.A.T.O. within some sort of bounds. It was certainly more President Makarios's fault than theirs that the GrecoTurkish “dialogue” got nowhere. The Right-wing military Government is presumably even more pro-Enosis. Yet it may not necessarily be prepared to give President Makarios all the support he needs on his own terms. If it turns out to be a strong Government it may even be able to speak the same language as the Turkish generals. Both sides have a strong common Interest in scotching Russia’s game in Cyprus. This, amid many dangers, may be a hope for the future. But it will call for firm and skilled handling of President Makarios, who is very strong at home, has many anti-Western friends at the United Nations, and nerves as strong as any in the game.