LIFE IN VIETNAM—IV FILL BOMBING POLICY UNDO U.S. RECONSTRUCTION WORK?

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31380, 27 May 1967, Page 12

LIFE IN VIETNAM—IV FILL BOMBING POLICY UNDO U.S. RECONSTRUCTION WORK?

(Btl

ALASTAIR HETHERINGTON

In the "Guardian". Manchester. the second of two further articles)

(Reprinted by arrangement)

“The struggle is for the people.” Two American generals in Vietnam separately used the phrase in talking to me. (Were they quoting Mao?) They meant it in slightly different senses—one that the military war is, above all, aimed at making life secure for people living in the scattei-ed towns, villages and hamlets; and the other that the task of civil reconstruction matters as much as the fighting.

My brief visit to Vietnam happened to coincide with the return of General Westmoreland from the United States, where he had spoken to Congress. There were reports that still further American reinforcements might be coming to Vietnam, on top of the 440,000 men already there. For what would they be used? To protect the long, narrow populated areas of the northern and central provinces from attacks coming out of the mountains? Or, conceivably, for landings north of the seventeenth parallel (the border with North Vietnam)? The answer wss “No.” First and foremost they would be used, if any came, to make the Mekong delta (with two-thirds of South Vietnam's population) as secure as possible. Types Of Escalation A distinction ought, I believe, to be drawn between “escalation” that involves extra American troops and aircraft to defend the delta—or, for that matter, the populated valleys near the coast to the north of Saigon—and “escalation” that involves further attacks on North Vietnam.

The first seems fully justified at this stage; the second is unjustified and exceedingly dangerous. One cannot, of course, be sure that if, reinforcements were brought to Vietnam for the first purpose they might not be used for the second. The military commanders have again and again prevailed upon Washington to permit extensions of the war —os in the bombing of targets in North Vietnam, then targets round Hanoi and Haiphong, then the MiG bases. If reinforcements are sent, they ought to be restricted unambiguously to extending security inside South Vietnam. R.D. Teams Civil reconstruction in the south is the task of the “Revolutionary Development” teams. Each of these consists of 59 Vietnamese men end women, and each is trained to work in a hamlet for a ' period of four to eight months. Hamlets can have a 1 population, including outlying ' farms, of between 1000 end 1 5000 people. The RD. teams ' are responsible for organls- ' ing local security, for rebuild- ! Ing schools (often wrecked by Viet Cong) end teaching in , them, for setting up small ‘ health clinics, and for teaching improved fanning ’ lB The*RD. programme began 1 a year ago: it took over where earlier efforts, such ss the “new Mfe” hamlets, left off. It seems better planned than its predecessors, learning from their errors, and it is not being pushed too fast By the end of 1967 barely one quarter of the populated areas—some accounts say barely one sixth—will have been covered by the RD. teams. To do their job properly will take a long time.

Primary Targets They are, as mentioned earlier, a primary target for Viet Cong raids. More than 300 RD. workers have been

killed since the beginning of this year. But there seems no laek of volunteers. In the one RD. hamlet that we visited near the northern

coast—obviously a show place, and not necessarily to be taken as typical—the wort and enthusiasm were enormous. It had been a “new life” hamlet under the old pro-' gramme, but it had been overrun and occupied by the Viet Cong in 1965. They were driven out last December.

The population two years sgo had been over 2000, but many left as refugees. When the RD. team arrived in February it was down to 625. Since then more than 1000 have returned, bringing the total to nearly 1650. Most of the houses have been rebuilt, and a new perimeter defence set up. The rice has been planted, as well ss sugsr, corn, and vegetables. Except for the defences and one or two remaining ruins, you would never think that such s green and pleasant place had been so terribly torn apart. Simply in human terms, one must pray that it does not go through the same experience again. Why Bomb? If the wort of civil reconstruction deserves admiration, the bombing of North Vietnam does not Why, then, do the Americans persist with it —even extending it? The generals have a dear answer. The arms and ammunition for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese fighting in the south must be stopped st their source. The infiltration through Laos and Cambodia and by sea down to the delta, apart from direct crossings of the demilitarised sone, makes prevention at the points of entry to South Vietnam too difficult Why attack the MiG bases? Because the MiGs have been interfering with American air operations over North Vietnam. What if the MiGs retire to China and fight from there? “We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it”

When one puts the usual arguments against the bombing—that it stiffens northern resistance, that it causes

unjustifiable dvil casualties, and that it prevents the opening of negotiations—one is told that that is a political question and not for the military to answer. Would they be willing to accept another pause in the

bombing, to see whether negotiations can be started? No: the restocking of ammvnition in the south (82mm. jnortar bombs and 140 mm. rocket mortars, particularly) during the Tet truce in February was too great At General Walt’s headquarters, covering the sector from Da Nang northwards, one is given detailed figures for the use of tawrtars since mid-Februarjk The average use since the Tet truce is said to have increased tenfold.

Time To Decide The argument that the Tet truce was too short—that it did not give time for a considered reaction from Hanoi, still less from the scattered leaden of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam—is discounted by tho generals. The idea that a Communist collective leadership may need time to make up Its mind seems not tn penetrate. That, however, may be because the generals’ civilian advisers and intelligence staffs have not put it to them. What, finally, of tho risk that the Chinese may come into the war? That, too, is discounted. Ona is assured that contingency plans take full account of tiie possibility, and that the American forces will not be caught napping as they were in Korea. Is it believned that the bombing of the north ean continue indefinitely, without provoking a CMnese reaction? Apparently ft to—at any rate, up to a point at which the Hanoi Government Is expected to decide that the war is becoming too costly to support A Confrontation This war hs.s become a confrontation tartween American air power and Mao’s guerrilla tactics, as practised by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. The Chinese cannot afford to rtbe a neighbouring Communist country, North Vietnam destroyed; nor can the Americans, having committed titemselvec to the physical defence of South Vietnam, mow tun back. As you _watch jet after jet take off Atom Da Nang and head north, you may wonder whether the attack on the Red river? delta, Hanoi, and Haiphong .will not in the end undo ajft the constructive wort thrtt the Americans are honestly trying to achieve in South Vietnam.