E.E.C. Not All Americans Hoped For

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31365, 10 May 1967, Page 8

E.E.C. Not All Americans Hoped For

(N.Z. Press Assn.—Copyright) LONDON, May 9. The words that Mr Harold Wilson spoke to the House of Commons last Tuesday were ones that American officials have encouraged and eagerly awaited for years: “Her Majesty’s Government have today decided to make an application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome for membership of the European Economic Community . ( . .” according to Anthony Lewis in the “New York Times” news service.

Lewis wrote: It all sounded like a decisive step toward fulfillment of the goal that successive American Presidents and Secretaries of State have fostered ever since World War ll—a united Europe. But any celebration in Washington would be, to put it moderately, premature. There remains, of course, real doubt that Britain will win a place In the community. These hopes still depend largely on how implacable the opposition of President Charles de Gaulle of France turns out to be.

But the question of real interest is what kind of Europe it will be if Britain does succeed in joining. What will be the dominant interests of an enlarged community? What role will it play in the world? What sort of relations will it have with the United States? There is considerable evidence already in hand on the direction, the pattern of thought, of the E.E.C. and it looks very different from what most American espousers of European unity dreamt. A most interesting example is the proposed treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Americans thought of it an unarguably good thing, one that the allies of the United States naturally favour. And so the United

States worked out a draft with the Soviet Union, virtually ignoring the six countries joined in Euratom as well as the E.E.C. West Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg. It turned out that Euratom and its members strongly objected to provisions that might limit their civilian atomic research and would subject it to inspection by a United Nations’ agency. The objections have effectively blocked progress on the treaty for the moment—a May 9 disarmament meeting at which a new draft was to be unveiled was postponed last week.

Or take the other negotiations that have gone on so long in Geneva—over the Kennedy Round of Tariff reductions. That has become an open, gruelling test of strength between the United States and the Common Market. There is a real chance that the whole effort will fail. Whatever happens, the conflicting economic interests of America and the Six could not have been demonstrated more plainly. Then there is the difficult issue of world monetary reform. Here the United States, seeking radical new measures to increase liquidity, has been opposed by a conservative France for years. American officials had hoped for key support from the other West European countries. But now they seem to be swinging toward a unified Common Market position closer to France's. The lesson taught by these examples is that a Europe grown stronger and more united is not going to be the kind of agreeable Europe that many Americans envisaged. It will have sharply different interests from the United States and it may well be that the kind of conflict already apparent will increase. There has been a lot of talk in the United States, for instance, about how the E.E.C. would become more “outward looking” with Britain as a member.

That is to say, Europe would take on greater defence responsibilities in Asia, would play a larger part in aiding the underdeveloped nations, would open her markets wider to the outside world.

Most of that talk, one must bluntly say, is nonsense. Europe, with or without Britain, is not by any stretch of the imagination going to volunteer for war in Asia. She is going to worry about American domination of her industry and take measures to prevent it.

The Europe of the Six is not interested in a world military role. It wants to be fat and prosperous. It wants no ideological quarrels, no Vietnams. It yearns for rapprochement with the East. And that trend is almost certainly going to continue.

To American eyes this may all seem bad news, but it hardly has to be. An independent Europe, though not the creature Americans imagined, may still be best for Europe—the world.

That is clearly Mr Harold Wilson’s conclusion. He said last week that Britain’s place,

for political more than economic reasons, must be in a larger community—and the natural one is Europe. The importance of membership in the E.E.C. to Britain, then, is as a political opportunity and an economic hope. The goal Is to jar this country out of the rut of economic crisis and American dependence that she has been in since World War 11.

Denmark, Norway and Ireland followed Mr Wilson’s statement with their own expressed hopes that they could join the E.E.C. Even neutral Sweden said she would seek association. The next move is up to the Community, and especially to President de Gaulle.

But at least, potentially, Mr Wilson put in motion this week a reshaping a Europe with the most profound implications for both sides of the Atlantic.