After Brussels SOVIET REACTION TO N.A.T.O. SPLIT

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30092, 28 March 1963, Page 20

After Brussels SOVIET REACTION TO N.A.T.O. SPLIT

[By

ISAAC DEUTSCHER]

How has Moscow reacted to the British and French conflict over the Common Market? And how has it received General de Gaulle’s call for the .defence of Europe against the "invasion of American capital?” Has this call not struck a cord in Moscow?

Surprisingly, perhaps, it has not. Moscow appears to be taking no advantage at all of the Gaullist antagonism to the ’’Anglo-Saxons.” Some time ago such an attitude in Moscow would have been almost unthinkable. General de Gaulle would have been applauded; and the cry “Yankee, go home!” would have risen at once in response to his anti-American cue. No “Yankee, go home” is to be heard now. And although some people in the West pretended to see a Russian-French deal in the offing, there was no sign of it in Moscow. On the contrary, General de Gaulle has the worst passible press in Russia; and the Soviet Foreign Ministry has vehemently protested against his pact with Dr. Adenauer signed on January 22. Agreement With U.S.

It goes without saying that Moscow hopes to benefit from the dissensions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. But rather than play the French against the American, Mr Khrushchev is tacitly and not so tacitly aligning himself at the moment with President Kennedy—and to some extent even with Mr Macmillan—against General de Gaulle. This is certainly one of the consequences of the RussianAmerican deal over Cuba and yet another manifestation of the climate of Russ-ian-American conciliation which Mr Khrushchev has been trying to foster in the teeth of Chinese opposition. He has decided to give Washington proof that he is not seeking to exploit American difficulties in Europe. In this way he hopes to advance the exchanges between himself and the American President that are evidently still going on in private and to some extent have effectively replaced the earlier, more ostentious summit diplomacy. Very quietly something like a permanent summit conference for two is in progress; and the Soviet Premier does not seem in a mood to take off his shoe and bang. His new tactics are bound up with a new Soviet appreciation of the Common Market and a profound distaste for the "Paris-Bonn axis.” Gone are the days when Moscow's experts played down the Common Market and treated it as a more or less ephemeral development. They now take it for granted that the Common Market has come to stay; that it signifies a profound change in the economic structure of the Western world the —emergence of a new suipra-national power bloc — although they do not really believe that Western Europe will ever become the equal either of the United States or of the U.SS.R. They point out in Moscow that the United States has been the foster parent of the Common Market, and has hoped to control and use it, but that the Common Market has turned out to be the monster with which the United States does not now know how to deal. Moscow intimates that it might be willing to lend a hand in taming the monster. Front Against E.E.C.

The Common Market, by demonstrating so defiantly its economic protectionism, has created the ground tor something like a Russo-American-British front against it. Such a combination can hardly be solid or lasting; but it may now and then assume reality. Neither Russia—nor any East European ally—nor the United States nor Britain cherishes the prospect of commercial discrimination by the Six and of being gradually squeezed out of Western European markets. The economic motive is not decisive, however. Far more inpontant are the political and military stakes. As the Russians see it, Bonn and not Paris is at the head of the Common Market; and they are sure that as time goes on German preponderance will become more and more evident and heavy. The economic weight of the Federal German Republic, the Russians say, is nearly double that of France; and Gaullist ambitions and dreams of grandeur cannot conjure this "stubborn faot” out of existence. Once again (they say) defeated Germany is winning the peace, if not from the United States and the U.S.S.R., then from France and Britain. For it is at their expense that Dr. Adenauer is creating for Germany the economic empire that eluded both the Kaiser and Hitler. It is. indeed, not without a certain grudging and terrified admiration that Dr. Adenauer’s “foxy game” jp

watched in Eastern Europe, where he is seen grasping the substance of Western European power and leaving General de Gaulle to play with its romantic shadow, to act the European leader, to decree Britain's disgrace, etc. —and, incidentally, to take the odium of a policy of grandeur. British Application Britain's efforts to enter the Common Market were therefore followed in Moscow with mixed feelings until recently. In so far as British entry would have marked a new phase in the application of the West, it would have been unwelcome to the Russians. But they also hoped that within the Common Market Britain might counterbalance German strength and exercise a moderating influence on Western Europe’s attitude towards the U.S.S.R. Now that Britain is excluded, Moscow is convinced that Germany is taking virtual command of the economic resources of Western Europe at a crucial turn, namely, when the integration of Western European industry is extending to armament plants, aviation, and the production of nuclear energy. This aspect of the Common Market is, of course, arousing intense Russian interest, for Soviet experts believe that only little of the mtegration of the Western European armament industries is being carried out in the open, and that most of the process is enveloped in deep secrecy. In its Notes protesting against the latest Franco-German Treaty the Soviet Government has therefore dotted the "i’s” and reserved its right to “take measures” against nuclear arms for Germany—something which it claimed to be on the order of the day. Moscow treats as sheer pretence the denials of the French Foreign Ministry and the latter's assertion that the Paris Treaty of 1954 (which prohibited the nuclear armament of the Federal Republic) is still in force. Soviet Policy

Here again Mr Khrushchev seems to bank on the possibility of a common RussoAmerican front; and, according to information from Moscow, he has decided to do so after a thorough survey by the Presidium of all the major elements of the world situation and of Soviet foreign policy. The Presidium is reported to have authorised the Soviet leader to make a direct appeal to President Kennedy’s known desire to keep the "nuclear club” limited to its present membership, or rather to reduce it to the two “super-powers." Because such an appeal to Russo-American nuclear solidarity is bound to bring forth the strongest Chinese objections, the Soviet leader must have held it necessary to obtain from the Presidium full and formal endorsement of his initiative. This is to consist in strengthening the hands of the American President towards General de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer and in co-operating, if possible, in “preventing West Germany from entering the ‘nuclear club’ by a back door.” Thus a paradoxical situation may develop in which the two antagonistic “superpowers” may tacitly cooperate against their respective allies. The paradox works on both sides, tor the American President is just as inclined to “back” Moscow against Peking as the Soviet Premier is to "support the Anglo-Saxons” against the Paris-Bonn axis. What is difficult to see is how these inclinations and preferences can be translated thio effective politicies. However anxious both Mr Kennedy and Mr Khrushchev may be to prevent the multiplication of nuclear arsenals in the world today, they still find it rather hard to arrive at any agreed cessation of nuclear tests, which would be the first preliminary tor any further action in this field. The idea of a Russo-American nuclear condominium, is. after all, too much at variance with the basic antagonism of the two “super-Powers” to find more than a fleeting reflection in their respective policies and to inject itself seriously Into Russian and American thought and action.—World Copyright . Reserved by Isaac Deutscher.