COMMUNISTS IN PACIFIC

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27499, 5 November 1954, Page 13

COMMUNISTS IN PACIFIC

Growing Military Strength

(Rec. 11.20 p.m.) NEW YORK, Nov. 4. Recent Chinese Communist air and artillery attacks on Nationalist-held islands off the Chinese coast, and the continued increase in Soviet military strength in Asia, tad aroused some concern in United States military circles, Hanson Baldwin, the m’litary writer, said In the "New York Times” today. The attacks on the islands, he said, were believed to be related to the Soviet-sponsored resolutions, now before the United Nations General Assembly. These resolutions allege violation of freedom of the seas of Formosa and aggression by the United States against Communist China. Military activity against the nationa-list-held island—always presented by the Communists, of course, as defensive—was used to stimulate anxiety and the fear of war in the United States and particularly among United States allies.

Such anxiety, especially the worried representations of Britain and other European powers, tended to act as a brake upon Washington’s actions and weakened the Nationalists’ defence. "Divisive Factor” Moreover, the use of just enough military force to keep those fears and worries alive represented a divisive factor of importance in the Western coalition and rallied political support behind the Communist-sponsored United Nations resolutions. The objective was primarily political, but an actual military attempt to seize the Nationalist-held islands—and

ultimately the Pescadores and Formosa —was entirely possible soon, and was probable eventually. The correspondent said that military observers generally agreed that the Communists could take most or all of the coastal islands, certainly the Tachens, and probably even Quemoy if: (1) They use their air power extensively. (2) They use some of their navy. (3) They are willing to take heavy losses in troops. Peking’s use of aif power would give it a tremendous advantage not only because the islands were 'so close to the coast but also because most of their supply must be oy sea. Moreover, Communist China had a much larger air force than the Chinese Nationalists.

The total Communist air strength in the Far East (Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean), Baldwin said, was estimated at between 7000 and 8000 planes, compared with about 3000 to 4000 United States Air Force and Navy planes. Bases for the Communist aircraft were available all the way from Hainan Island, off Northern Vietnam, to Wrangel Island in the Arctic. Considerable activity had been noted recently in the Wrangel Island area—although contrary to Japanese reports this was not believed to be the site of Soviet atomic tests. North Korean airfields had been rehabilitated and some capable of handling jets were now al4nost as far south as the 38th Parallel.

In addition to the Communist air build-up in the Far East, there had been some—although incompleteevidences of a slight but definite .increase in Soviet naval strength. Soviet submarines based in the Pacific, some of them operate from Kamchatka, might nuipber 85 to 100, including new types. There had even been reports, which the United States Navy had, at least inferentially, supported, that one or two new Soviet cruisers had been assigned to the Pacific.