U.S. REPLY TO INDIA

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26511, 28 August 1951, Page 7

U.S. REPLY TO INDIA

(Rec. 10 p.m.) WASHINGTON. August 26. The United States, through the State Department, to-night deplored India's decision to make a separate peace treaty with Japan. The State Department s views, were expressed ifi a reply to the jHdiin Note declining the invitation to the Japanese Peace Treaty conference iji San Francisco and conveying India S cbjeetions to the treaty. The united Press Comments that the sarcastic tenor of the United Suites' reply to India Was a Sharp departure froth the State Department’s previous policy of handling India with gloved hands. The State Department said: "There can never be united action for peace unless the natiohs ate Willing to accept what to each may seem imperfections. The United States Government believes that peace will be more stable if it is founded on Ufiited action, just as victory involved united action, and occupation IriVolVes Ufiited gCtldfi.” Commenting on India's objections to the treaty provision Which Wbuld permit American troops to remain in Japan, and to arrangements for United States trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin islands, which the Indian Note said must carry the seeds of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East, the State Department said it would be quite impracticable and totally unwelcome for the United States to help defend Japan if that were not wanted by the Japanese TTne department expressed surprise at India’s claim that the proposed treaty would not restore the Japanese to a “position of honour, equality, and contentment among the community ox tree nations." The departmeht quoted the Japanese Prime Minister IMr ShigetU Yoshida) in a letter bn Jtny 13 as saying that “the treaty as it stands reflects abundantly American ieirttess, maghahiffiity, and idealism. ’ The United States questioned the logic by Which India arrived at the simultaneous conclusions that first the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, which .are proposed for United States trusteeship, should be returned to Japan, second, that the Kuriles and South Sakhalin should be confirmed as Russian, and third, that Formosa should go to Communist China. The United States said that the return of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands would be a major departure from the surrender terms laid down at Potsdam, which specifically limited Japan to its four home islands and such minor territories as the Allies might determine. India never questioned this understanding durifig its five arid ahalf years' membership of the Far Eastern Commission. It failed to understand India's argument that because of their Japanese tradition, the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should not be placed under United States trusteeship, but that the Kuriles, which had a similar tradition, should bh Confirmed as Russian.

FUtare of Formosa On the question of iormoaa, the United States said India knew that agreement on the future of the island was impossible at present. It added that Formosas future status would depend on latter negotiations. The Note said the United States did not claim that the proposed treaty was in every respect perfect. It involved adjustments, such as were an inevitable accompaniment of any concerted human effort. "The essential tfnhg is that the treaty is a peace treaty and is drawn in terms which do not contain within themselves the seeds of another war. Delay would cost a price which makes petty all sacrifices incident tb the present action.’’ Commenting bn India's intention to end the state of war with Japan as soon as practicable and establish full diplomatic relations with the Japanese, the department said it welcomed this move at least and added: “The people of the United States Will not feel their efforts and sacrifices fOr victory in the Pacific have been ih vain if they have made it possible for the Government of India to make peace with a Japan which is no longer a militaristic aggressive threat.’’ The United Press comments that while the Prime Minister (Mr Nehru) lis respected in the United States as a leading spokesman fof Asia on mahy foreign policy questions, it is felt that he was not speaking for the rest of Asia on the Japanese treaty. Most other Asian countries wanted the treaty to be much tougher, and had no sympathy for India’s suggestion that Japan was being too harshly treated.