WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AND UNITED NATIONS

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25304, 2 October 1947, Page 6

WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AND UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In the article below, THOMAS J. HAMILTON, chief of the “New York Times” staff covering United Nations proceedings, contributed to the “Nation” a forecast of American policy on issues to be raised before the General Assembly. Writing on September 2 from Lake Success where the Americsn delegation to the Security Council had been waging a iull-scale diplomatic offensive, he predicted that it would be continued, anticipating Mr Geoffrey Blunden’s reSort (printed on this page a few days ago) of the American drive for le initiative. Mr Hamilton soberly observes, however, that such an initiative, driven too hard, may act like a wedge on the United • Nations. (By exclusive arrangement with the “Nation.”)

Whether it is because of the ineptness of Soviet diplomacy or for the more fundamental reason that Soviet aims are incompatible with a peaceful >nd orderly world, the United States will play an even more important role at the coming session of the United Nations General. Assembly than heretofore. In particular, the Soviet attitude toward the Balkan problem, which is likely to be the most bitterly contested issue, has won friends and influenced people for the American ■side. Considerations of Realpolitik are never overlooked in the most technical diplomatic conversation, and it would be unrealistic to disregard the fact that the United States is now not only the greatest military Power but the only source of food and machinery lor war-crippled countries. But new strength has been given to the American position by the succession of Soviet vetoes and by the general intransigence of Soviet officials at Lake Success and everywhere else that the Soviet. Union is in contact with the outside world. The United States is therefore able to raise a standard around which the wise and honest may rally. If it does so, it can completely dominate the meeting at Flushing Meadows. The permanent delegates are saying that this will be a critical session, that the future of the United Nations largely depends on it. The position taken by the United States on the principal issues therefore will be of fundamental Importance in determining whether the basis of an enduring peace can be laid. Retrospect The United States hardly lived up to its opportunities or its responsibilities at previous sessions of the General Assembly. A year ago, when the Assembly held its first meeting in this country, Mr Molotov was allowed tQ take the initiative with his disarmament proposal. It was largely beSause of the efforts of better-briefed elegations, particularly the Canadian, that the resulting storm blew itself out in a resolution that at least did not jeopardise the work already done by the Atomic Energy Commission. Other countries took the lead on such matters as the Franco regime ip Spain and the discrimination agaipst Indians in South Africa, and the American delegation found itself in a position where it could soften but not hold ud the resolutions that gave mortal offence to Franep and Marshal Smuts.

On the other hand, although the Assembly was hard-put to keep up with the astonishing reversals 'of position bv Warren R. Austin, the chief United States representative, it followed through to the end on the site question, and accepted Mr Rockefeller’s offer of the East River location. Even more inexorably the United States held fast on the matter of sunplying international relief after the liquidation of UNRRA, and Secretary General Trygve Lie was authorised to ascertain the need without beinggiven the slightest means of doing anything about it. Palestine At the special session on Palestine the leadership of the United States was noticeable plainly in a series qf procedural manoeuvres which somehow or other created the impression that We were sympathetic with the Arabs. We said nothing aboyt President Truman’s reiterated demands for the admission of 100,000 Jews, though we did not say anything parttofftony friendly-to the Arabs either. We were not showing our hand, and neither were the Russians; so the Assembly managed to set up a committee of inquiry with relatively little difficulty. A panel suggested by the United States contained most of the countries placed on the committee. . We declared we had po policy qn Palestine and would not have any until the committee submitted its report. That gave us a delay of four months, but this reprieve is now coming to an end. and sooner or later the walls of the seating rink at Flushing Meadows will echo with a statement that will give mortal offence either to the Arab countries and the American oil com-, panics doing business with them or to the pro-Zionist Jewish vote in the IJnitea States, or to both. Partition npw appears to be the best hope of settling the Palestine question, and Mr Gromyko has already indicated that he would accept it as a last resort. It is apparently agreeable to the United States as well. If the committee of inquiry proposed the return of- the twelve lost tribes to their former home, the General Assembly would acquiesce if both Washington and Moscow wanted it No solution is conceivable unless the United States apd the Soviet Union do agree. Looking at the situation from the most hopeful point of view, toe vital question now is what steps can be taken to carry out the General Assembly’s recommendation. It is obvious that force must be used, and it is equally obvious that the United Nations has none at its command—even the long-talked-of “international pplice force” wpuld be at the disposal of the Security Council, not of the Assembly. Judging from the recent fighting ip Palestine, in which Arabs as.well as Jews are now taking part, a major effort will be required. The British have the only immediately available troops, and they are less and less inclined to carry the burdeps of empire in the Mediterranean, In any case, they have made it clear that although thev will accept any decision on Palestine by the General Assembly, thev will not carry out any decision which does not square with their conscience and their means or which is unaccentable to both sides. The British will certainly nave an out if they choose to use it. a a Headquarters A few montps ago, in the relatively halcyon days of the United Nations, it appeared that plans for the permanent headquarters would be the second outstanding problem. It is stßl a problem, although other and even mere controversial issues have arisen. As for toe site, it is obvious that toe other members of the United Nations will find the greatest difficulty in siiprgying the dollars required for their Share. Sixty-five million dollars, the latest revised estimate, is not much whfn it is divided among fifty-five eouptries, but the accentuated austerity programme in England is a fair

indication of the foreign exchange situation in many countries, It may be that the undignified device of mortgaging the new buildings to Massachusetts insurance companies is the only way, tnougn hara-ooued insurance men cannot oe expected to put up the full amount. This seems to be the opinion of some of the members 01 Mr Lie’s high command, who obviously hope that‘such an example of self-help, if not thrift, will wring the head of Mr Taber, and thereby bring an appropriation from the United States Congress for the remainder. The other alternatives are to get the United States to put up its entire share at once and perhaps lend the balance: to require the fiity-five member nations to come across with United States dollars in time to pay the contractors: to postpone—or abandon—the whole idea of ar “workshop for peace” among the topless towers of Manhattan. It is to be feared that dollar-poor members will raise niggling objections to the magnificent design prepared by Wallace K, Harrison and his international committee unless the United States delegation is able to offer generous financial support. Undeniable difficulties stand in the way of such an offer, for Congress is not in session. Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally will not serve as members of the delegation, and the State Department 1 is justifiably cautious about committing the guardians of th nation’s purse strings. On the other hand, the digging of foundations and the erection* of steel girders for the permanent home of the United Nations would undoubtedly have a tonic effect on world opinion.

The Veto Already, of course, the less stouthearted champions of collective security are beginning to say that they are • axraid the United. Nations will be mostly a debating society by the time the headquarters is built, if it is built. The last few weeks have certainly provided a field day for the pessimists. A succession of Soviet vetoes on the Balkan question and the related question of new members has left nttie of the principle of great-PoWer unanimity. The lact.that France invoked the veto on the Indonesian question was at least as damaging as any baker’s dozen of Soviet vetoes, for it removed the potion prevalent among many that tne veto is a diabplical Russian device whieh is eschewed by the four other right-thinking great Powers. Until now these right-thinking countries ' nave had the votes to block any resolution in the Security Council without having to rely on the veto. The French veto left many with the suspicion that even China, even Great Britain, and even the United States, might invoke it if things started getting tough for their side. - In any event, the veto question will be raised in various guises; in the report oq the rejected ''applicant*—lo this year, instead of the five qf 1947; . in the formal protest by the Peibn regime against such an undemocratte device; and finally, and most serious of all. in the formal United States appeal to the General Assembly from the Soviet vetoes on the Balkan question. It is to be noted that the new United Stateg proposals for defining the veto, if they mean anything at all, do not really limit Its operation on important questions. They even confirm the use of the veto on all matters arising qyt of Chapter Vl—matters that threaten peace—as well as out of Chapter VII. which applies to shooting wars. Nevertheless, the United States very clearly means business in the Balkan situation, even though the General Assembly, equally clearly, has toe power to make recommendations only, not to give orders «binding upon all members of the United Possible Cost of Victory Some delegates think the United Stati will have trouble in getting the reauired two-thirds majority for Assembly recommendations on the Balkans, But it is to be hoped that the State Department is giving the necessary consideration to the steps to be taken if the Assembly accepts the United States resolution, and the Soviet-dominated countries of Jugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria refuse tp pay any-attention to it. Mr Johnson has already suggested that in such a case we would invoke Article 51 of the Charter, which authorises both ijidiyidual and collective action f®r selfdefence pending action by the Security Council. It seems obvious that this is a dangerous policy, however necessary it mgy be to prevent the Communist coup which the State Department stijl anticipates as an answer to the Truman doctrine. The threat seems to be part of a full-scale diplomatic offensive that the United States hgs launched m the United Nations in, the last few weeks. We are now giving blow for blow, and every now and then Mr Johnson lets Mr. Gromyko have one fox* old times''even when the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister is apparently just looking at his shoestrings. These tactics no doubt wjll be continued and stiffened when the interest shifts from Lake Success to Flushing Meadows. There is euery reason to welcome more adequate statements of the American point of view, which certainly have been deficient in contr -t with the arguments ad hominem of the Kremlin’s representatives. But it seems worth reminding our delegation that the United Nations organisation, imperfect though it certainly is, is based on the hope that prevailed at San Francisco ' for cooperation among the great Powers, and specifically between the United States and*the Soviet Union. If the other countries are forced to choose, an overwhelming majority will certainly take our side. With respect to the issye qf tfye creation pf a Balkan border commission, our side is obviously is to be hoped that the United States delegation will ponder rf s V lts Pf » series of victories that le«va the United Nations unalterably divided into two camps. If the United Nations can weather this meeting of the General Assembly without a marked loss in prestige, it can look forward to a healthy future, put it is still too young to survive a decisive contest. Perhaps if the showdown js postponed, and it the peace treaties pan be written before the 1948 Assembly convenes, no showdown will be necessary.