MALAYAN CAMPAIGN AT CRITICAL STAGE

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23541, 20 January 1942, Page 4

MALAYAN CAMPAIGN AT CRITICAL STAGE

i [By the Military Correspondent of (Published by Spec SYDNEY. January 14. The Japanese southern drive on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies is continuing on a scale and with a rapiditv that cannot fail to be disturbing, in Malaya, in particular, the retirement from the Slim river has been qui k y followed by another south oi Kuaia Lumpur, while the correlated advance down the oast coast into Pahang appears equally unchecked. The rate of enemy progress has not slowed down the further south he has penetrated, and this necessarily raises basic questions of strategy. The first Japanese gains at Kedan. Wellesley, and upper Perak were not entirely unexpected, once Thailand failed to defend itself. They were accomplished by infiltration tactic, against verv light holding forces which could provide no effective answer. It was hoped, however, that, when the Japanese could be met in open battle further south, the British Command would have been able to muster sufficient force and to use counteracting tactics that would at least have held the invaders, probably on some linein south Perak, or, at the worst, in upper Selangor. ... . . ... But the first major positional battle, in the triangle between the Bernam and Slim rivers, went decidedly m favour of the Japanese, although the Imperial forces had had more than a month to make their prepaiations. The only conclusion is that the Japanese capacity for positional warfare is just as formidable as their power of skilful infiltration under guerrilla conditions in the jungle. Reinforcements Needed One of the major causes of the present retreat beyond Kuala Lumpur, with all the strategical losses that followed the cession of the crossroads of Kubu has undoubtedly lam in the failure of substantial reinforcements to reach southern Malaya in time for tne recent operations. It is still not late for reinforcements to turn the tide in our favour, but the margin is becoming distressingly narrow, and the events of the next few weeks will show whether a proper sense of the importance of time dominated Allied strategy immediately after the Japanese blow fell. , , So far, the British have suffered from the initial weakness of mainland Malaya when the Japanese struck through Thailand. This may or may not have been justifiable, on the ground that Britain did not possess sufficient equipment to spread over every front, and consequently had to send supplies where they were most immediately needed; but, even assuming that tne first weakness could be justified, the position now arises that sufficient time has elapsed for substantial reinforcements to have arrived or to be on the point of arriving, even assuming that the direct route through the Malacca Straits has been out of operation since the enemy occupation of Penang, tt the needs of the situation were fully appreciated after the Japanese had actually crossed the Thai frontier into Kedah and Kelantan, reinforcements should be reaching Malaya, even by the lengthier southern route between Sumatra and Java. Dangers of Delay The claims of the Russian and Middle Eastern fronts can afford no satisfactory excuse if rapid action was not take:i early last month to send adequate reinforcements to Malaya. In this sense, the events of the near future will provide the supreme testing time of Allied strategy. R the position was grappled with without delay, we would have good reason to hope that the tide of Japanese invasion may be turned before Johore is overrun. If. on the contrary, undue delay occurred in sending relief to the hard-pressed garrisons m Malaya the entire south of the mainland will be gravely imperilled, anc. a siege of Singapore may Lave to be All the preparations have been made to withstand such a siege, and the island will, doubtless, be able to hoiu out indefinitely as a beleaguered fortress; but, even if this is possible, its usefulness as a base will have almost completely disappeared, both for purposes of maintenance and of offensive operations. Moreover, the effort needed to regain control of contiguous tc "itories sufficient to restore the utility of the base will be long and costly. The crying need is to retain sufficient of the mainland, especially the buffer State of Johore, to allow 1

E the “Sydney Morning Herald.’’] ■. ; ial Arrangement.) Singapore to be used as a base ana unless the Japanese advance i s ’ 3 checked, they will be perilously the point where this will be in»vL sible. m As part of their general southern movement, the Japanese hav-.C, also landed at Tarakan, in ra.lv eastern Borneo, and on the hassa peninsula, along the northern prong of the island of Celebes. These landings are none the less serious cause the Dutch have always fore, seen them, and because they are the almost inevitable corollary 0 ( enemy occupation of Mindanao, Any move across the Celebes Sea is dJ, gerous, not only because it brings the southern advance of the Japane* almost to the equator, and thus opens a new range of bombing activities but also because it menaces the Molucca and Macassar passages and indicates the enemy's intention to use the outer Dutch islands to converse in a throttling constrictive nwvemen* upon the nucleus of Java itself. Such a policy of strangling' attrition would not be an easy line oi advance, and the Japanese would proably be compelled to move on by slow stages: but every gain would further restrict the flexibility qj strategy which is so essential if Allies are to hold south-eastern Asia The main difficulty of the Dutch" is to spread their available strength over so many hundreds of outlying islands. There is thus every reason for Australia to render all possible assistance to the Netherlands Indies in repelling the growing ■ southern thrust, not only because of the imporlance of the archipelago, but because any further irruption of the Japanese may menace Australia’s lines of communication, and will bring the enemy within dangerous striking distance of Darwin. The Dutch will be able to use their secret aerodromes in the northern islands, and to make full use of' the fleet operating from Surabaya and Amboina, but they will need help in every possible form, Japanese In Borneo An immediate Japanese gain, it they can hold Tarakan, will be control of the rich oilfields of northern Borneo, Although the Dutch have made every preparation lor the complete destruction of the workings, the extent to which such plans can be inplemented necessarily depends upon the degree of surprise that accompanied the enemy landings. It is unfortunate at this juncture that the Tarakan fields provide oil which needs very little refining. The position in Borneo and Celebes may fortunately be affected by the stand of the Americans in the Philippines. General Mac Arthur has done a splendid job in central Lqzoi}, taking into account the forces at his' disposal and the denial to the Japanese of the use of Manila Bay is extremely important. The longer the Americans and Filipinos hold out, the more Japanese freedom of action will be hampered The fort at Corregidor and the battlefield north-west of Manila constitute a troublesome thorn in the side of the Japanese military effort. China and Burma The other bright spot in the situation is the widespread China. In addition to the Chi and Nanchang pressures, the (AJ in Kwangtung claim to have tMven through to the very suburbs of Canton; and there are no signs that their attacks are diminishing in intensity. As in the past, it is probable that the extent and duration of the offensive will be determined by the perennial supply problem, but them are good indications that the Chinese fed themselves strong enough to M: UP with the British position further If General Wavell, with tbfs._?i4 dl the Chinese forces already in Burma, is able to start an offensive there, and if the operations in southern China Become an organic part of a wider connected movement, the Japanese may well find all their southern plans adversely. and perhaps fatally, by a threat tq .their essential « is the prospect of this strategical resilience that provides perhaps the Mat basis for a retrieval of the position W the western Pacific; and, so far ffoa shrinking from thes prospect ot wider action, the Chinese Governraui claim that they have always P«n » advance of the Allies desires lh wW 1 respect. ,