NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16219, 23 May 1918, Page 8

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

The great attack hps still to bebegun. A week ago it was believed in Paris that the delay was due to the enemy's difficulties regarding reinforcements. Germany ivas uiidcr.-twi to be pressing Austria to send to the West the ha!l-miliion troops sho had massed in tho Tyro! in preparation for an offensive against Itaiy. Austria- Was then as uniiKcly to accede to her >'dv*s wishes, for several reasons, ono |>eing that if she depicted her own front Germany might gct:nore _ than .her share of tho Jroodstulls T-.\e Central Powers both need so badly from tho occupied provinces of Russia, and from Rournania, while another was thai the withdrawal of so many of her troops for service in the AN est would possibly encourage the Czech-Jugo-Slav (rising which is always one of the possible developments of the present situation in the I>ual Empire.

Germany was believed to bo unwilling to withdraw morn of her armies from tho Russian front. Her forces in the West have already be.:n strongly reinforced from the East, and though a cable in this issue states that sho has few iroops in Russia, "her penetration being largely on bluff," this can liardly be accepted literally. In view of the increasing hostility that tho. Germans aro raising against themselves in Russia, it is not likely that Germany would leave that front practically unprotected. quite apart from the fact that even in tho present distracted and divided state of Russia sho must have sufficient troops there to secure the supplies of which she is in such need.

Tho position is made no clearer by tho latest news. Yesterday wo were told that von Mackensen was on the West front in command of an army of inanosuvre which would bo flung into any opening that might be made in tho Allied line. To-dav a Rome paper is reported as stating that at Germany's request Austria is sending a newlyformed arinv of manoeuvre to the West. Mackensen's divisions were on the East front when the March offensive began, and if he has been withdrawn from there to take part in the now offensive, there seems little likelihood that an Austrian army has also been sent there. It floes not greatly matter -which the Allies hare to meet, but it is improbablo that they will have to withstand both.

As stated by the Italian Minister ot Marine, the Allies arc "masters of the submarine situation, in tho Mediterranean." This may be a somewhat optimistic view of the position—one is iathcr cautious now in accepting assurances that the submarine is beaten. But there is every reason to believe that whereas some time ago Sir Eric Geddos made it clear that the Mediterranean was the least satisfactory oT all tho seas, from the point of view of our anti-submarine campaign, matters have since improved considerably, and Italy can claim no little of the credit for this state of things. It was pointed out recently by a naval expert that oar most effective hold on the Üboat in tho Mediterranean was afforded by the barrier Ave have maintained across the Straits of Otranto at tho mouth of tho Adriatic, and the one thing that has enabled us to maintain that barrier has beeu the possession of secure and well-equipped bases on the Italian coast. If the Teuton invaders had succeeded in over-running Italy these would have been lost to us, and we should hare had no base nearer than Malta, German U-boats would have swarmed in tho Mediterranean. and our lines of sea communication with our armies in the East and Salonica. in Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia would Jiavo been in grave jeopardy.

In the course of the war Several | British ideas as to what is permissible in warfare liavo been jettisoned. As a nation we loathed the idea of using poison gas, but the Germans conld not be left in £ple possession of that ghastly weapon, and now they are trying to induce us to forego its use. There was a time when almost to a man we disapproved of the idea of bombing German towns, but incessant enemy raids on English towns in time changed our views in that respect also. But there is one form, of warfaro that we can confidently assert we shall never adopt—the murder of helpless seamen at sea. We read to-day that TJ-boat commanders are pursuing in the Arctic, on the crews of Scandinavian fishingfroats, tho brutal policy that has marked their conduct in other seas. The sinking of the vessels is accompanied, we are told, by "the customary murders of the members of the crews after they have taken to the boats."