Ex-Servicemen's Corner VERDUN

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 70, 23 March 1940, Page 6 (Supplement)

Ex-Servicemen's Corner VERDUN

Ruthless Use Of Force

"IN January, 1916, the Allies seemed in a favourable position for the campaign of the New Year. They had considerably increased their strength in men and material. . . . Germany and Austria were already pressed for men. . . . Germany was not in a position to sit still for long." Germany needed a victory. It was clear Hint (.lie first great movement of 191(1 would be made on the initiative of Germany. Political exigencies, wavering neutrals, demanded some attempt to restore waning prestige in the world outside, while it was becoming increasingly necessary to allay the alarm amongst her own people, grown impatient of victories which brought no decision, no peace. There was acute danger for Germany in stalemate. Thus was conceived the ltattle of Verdun. "This was mainly a political consideration, for the taking of Verdun could not be rated as a military success of the first order." With the use of fifteen divisions Germany hoped to pierce the French front, and then,

launching another fifteen divisions against Paris, obtain complete victory. .She counted on being able to achieve the first in four days. In the event of the failure of the second part she could at least proclaim to the world—and the wavering neutrals—the capture of a famous city, Verdun. "But there was another reason. Germany was well aware tiiat as soon as Russia was ready, after the winter campaigns in the East, France, Britain. Russia and Italy would make a concerted effort, exactly timed, which would prevent her resorting to the olcl device of rushing reinforcements across Europe." She wished to fight on one front at a time. In attacking Verdun she hoped to induce the Allies to make premature use of their gathered strength elsewhere on that front, to relieve Verdun; or to throw in their reserves to defend it. No Subsidiary Movement Contrary to- the German theory of war, there was no subsidiary movement to aid the stroke at Verdun: The explanation lay in the fact that Germany intended" to use her reserves to meet the expected Allied counter-attack. "She counted on the success of this effort, which she believed to be irresistible, and to which she devoted her bes:; troops and much powerful artillery." I do not propose to recapitulate the events of this long-drawn-out battle. It would be impossible, by reason of its very nature, to do so. But Verdun stands "out as the classic example of "a strategy which refused to count its losses, and* persistence ill a game which under no conceivable circumstances could bo worth the candle"; a strategy in which pride, arrogance and complete disregard for human life supported political considerations: "the parents of disaster." Over the weary months of this wasteful struggle Germany sacrificed tens of thousands of men—and failed completely to achieve either, or any, of her objectives. At a quarter past seven on the morning of February 21, 1910, the true bombardment opened on the first battle of Verdun. "History at that date had not seen so furious a fire. It blotted out the French lines, it shattered the communication trenches, it tore the woods to splinters and altered the very shape

"PASSERONT-PAS!"

"Trooper" Looks Back

of the hills. Following hard upon it the Germans moved forward to what tlicyi had been told would be an easy and" uncostly triumph." Not by the end of April, when this first battle died down, were they in Verdun, a heap of rubble though "they hod made of .it meantime. Germany reckoned without the French. Swallowed Up In The Earth "Xo less spectacular battle was ever fought. On an arc of :10 miles a million men stood to arms, but to the observer from any point .'. . they seemed to have been swallowed up in the earth. ... It had stretched from the snows of February into the spring sunlight of April." Of all that Germany had set out to win she.had gained nothing. Ami she needed a victory! "If we ask the secret of Germany's failure we shall find it largely in the neglect of that military doctrine which preaches the economy of force. . . . Verdun to her was worth a price, but it was not worth any price; and it was lieyond doubt not worth the price she offered after February 2(i" —live days after the start.

France resisted the attack, not without loss, for in war there must be losses, but certainly with nothing to bo compared with that of Germany. Marshal Pctain, whose aim it was to conserve men, held Verdun at the minimum cost, "and spent men only when he could make the enemy spend in a fourfold ratio. But for all this generous parsimony he never let a strategic position slip from his grasp; he would give up an irrelevant mile but strike hard to win back an essential yard." "Paseeront-pas" sang the French soldiers and hold the gate. "They did this cheerfully and without complaint, because their minds were utterly made tip. There was no alternative but victory. The whole race was ready to perish on the battlefield sooner than accept a German domination." This was also true of Britain. •

Tile public memory is proverbially short. It is now often forgotten that the last war was fought to resist German domination, the rrlhlcss exercise of force. The young men are called on to-dav to step "into virtually the same trenches we stopped out of in 101S—to resist the domination of Pan-Germanism under the new guise of National Socialism—Xazi-isin. "For the first lime ill history an entire nation is making its appearance before the eyes of Almighty God and entreatin,.' llim to bless its struggle for existence. ... I live now for one task —to concentrate night and day on victory. . . ." These recent words of Hitler's ring, softly, it is true, in his recent utterance—strangely like those of Wilhelni the Second. Williclm needed a victory. Hitler needs a victory—"lie is not ili a position to sit still." Will he also venture a Verdun? Time will tell.