A BRITISH ADVANCE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 168, 15 July 1916, Page 9

A BRITISH ADVANCE.

A HOPEFUL VIEW.

I A decidedly cheerful view of the prospects of a British advance on the western front this year is taken by Special Reserve," who contributes to the May "Fortnightly" an article "baaed on some five months' experience on the front as a company officer in a regular battalion." He deprecates the idea of hoping for victory through, the financial and economic exhaustion of the Central Empires, partly because there is nd record in history of aiiy great military power which suffered defeat through purely economic causes as long as its fleets and armies and national spirit remained intact, Ail economic victory would mean nothing but the renewal of the conflict at a later date. Defeat of the German armies in the field is the only method by which to exorcise the evil spirit that has mastered Germany. The task cannot reasonably be left to Russia unless the period of conflict is to be prolonged into 1917 or even 1918. Mobilisation of Russia's irresistible man power is a longer task than was anticipated. Even now she is credited with little more than 4,000,000 effectives for the coming campaign, a mere fraction of her huge reserves. With this force she might regain the ground lost in I!HS. but without rcsohito help on the western front her armies could hardly hope to advance farther than her own original frontier before the autumn. Hence ah advance from the west i 3 the key of the whole military situation.

Nor does this writer , think it at ill beyond the capacity df the Allied forces on the western front. While not professing to gauge the full extent of German man-power, inclusive of second and third line troops, he claims that Germany is coming to the, end of sucli troops as are competent to go anywhere and do anything which efficient soldiers are expected to do. "In the course of the last five months nothing but her interior lines of railways have enabled her to place her effectives now on one front and now on the other. Before the Polish campaign began the German infantry opposed to us in the west were extremely awkward customers, but as that campaign developed the western line was filled with infantry who, in the main, seemed to have no idea but to dig themselves in and keep as quiet as possible. Similarly it was not until that campaign had been brought to a standstill that the Balkan adventure could be begun, because the active, as opposed to the passive, defence German armies had to be moved to the new field of operations. The counter-attacks at Loos tell the same story. They could not be undertaken until special troops had been brought up, while the Serbian adventure had to be abandoned to meet the attack from Bessarabia. Now the objection to thp manipulation of a stage army is obviously that the heaviest casualties are continually falling on the best troops. The attacks on Verdun have taken their full toll. There must come a period when the spearhead of the German armies is blunted or destroyed, and an insufficient number of mobile soldiery exists for any given front." "Special Reserve" tells how, in August last, during the Polish campaign, he took part in an attack on 1,000 yards of German trenches in the west. "We took and held them," he says, "ngainst the minimum of resistance that could be offered by any European troops, and our casualties resulted almost entirely from the counter-bombardment of three days' duration, to which we were subjected after the attack. The Divisional Artillery had dismounted the German machine guns, the barbed-wire had been blown away, and, robbed of these adventitious aids to defence, the German third-line infantry made practically no attempt to resist the onset, nor did they even organise the counter-attack for which we were prepared." As for our own troops, this officer speaks most highly of the new drafts for regular units, which are well maintaining the old quality, and also of, the soldierly character of the Territorials. He asserts emphatically that "our troops are now superior as tactical and mobile units to those of the enemy; and that we (the French and British together) should possess a great superiority of force," at least 3 to 2, and possibly 3 to 1, or even 4 t0,,l at decisive points. In ammunition also, to judge from the artillery work of the past month, our forces should be at least as well supplied as the enemy. The evidence points to actual superiority on the Allied side. The Anglo-French gunners and infantry have established as marked a superiority over the German? in their tactical method as the line formation of Wellington obtained over the French column in attack. Moreover, it has been proved that the German line is not unbreakable. It is possible that one or two, or even three, attempts to break it on a wide front might fail, but the thing can be done. Generals and staff officers may," concludes the "writer, "be tried and found wanting before better men can be found to fill their shoes. Raw regiments may muddle and break until experience has hardened up into efficiency and valour. But if British soldiers are what we think them to be they will succeed before they have finished, and I look forward with absolute certainty to clearing France and Belgium jof the Huns before the year is over."