ARE WE FEEDING GERMANY

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 49, 26 February 1916, Page 6

ARE WE FEEDING GERMANY

FACTS IGNORED. MISLEADING FIGURES. (From Our Special Correspondent.) LONDON, January 18. There are always two sides—eomeitiraes twenty-two—to'- every question, but it is hard to get most people to look at more than one. At the present juncture some of our English newspapers are full of etatietical articles designed to proye that our blockade of Germany is a mere farce. But those same papers are content to print on other pages all sorts of statements from any source to show us that Germany is in dire etraite for those very articles which they have already proved—on paper—she must be receiving in luxurious abundance. In ione paragraph we arc told that tbe latest trade statistics of America prove beyond question that our blockade of Germany exists only on paper; in another we are assured .by quotations from a dozen alleged neutral sources that the Faftherland is actually taking steps to utilise the "by-products" of its sewer systems to augment its scanty supply of certain articles. This sort of thing is calculated to "produce serious mental confusion in the mind of the everyday kind of business man. He can't at the same time picture Germany wallowing in unlimited euppliea of, tsay, a certain commodity "X," and at the same time conjure up visions of learned German professors experimenting with Hamburg sewage in the hope of being able to extract huge quantities of "X" therefrom. The two things don't seem to hang together somehow, even after making due allowance for German foresight and "thoroughness." Consequently, when we read in a certain paper that the latest United States export statistics "prove unmistakably how the blockade has been nullified and the power of the Navy destroyed by the failure of the Foreign Office to grasp the situation," whilst on another page of the same paper we are informed that Germany and Austria are desperately short of the very articles that these export statistics seem to show the Central Powera are receiving in abundance—well, the plain man begins to wonder. And his wonder is not lessened by neutral reports con cerning the condition of affairs eeonomrt in Germany and Austria, nor by the quotations from private correspondence found on dead or captured enemies which the newspapers inveighing against the "farcical blockade" continue to publish whilst still calling down the wrath of the gods upon those Foreign Office officiate who are "paralysing our Navy."

STAETLING FIGURES. If we keep a single eye on American export figures, we must come to the conclusion that the Foreign Office—or some of her undefined agency—has really rendered the British blockade a faice. For instance, in the tot ten months of 1013 the United States 6ent 12,000,000 bushels of wheat to Germany, and in the corresponding period of 1915 cr.ly 15,000 bushels were sent; but the wheat export to the Xctherlan&s, Norway, Sweden and Denmark rose from 19,000,000 bushels in 1913 'to-more than 50,OGOj()o6 bushels last year. Thus you have "positive proof" that Germany got conic where about 31 million bushels of whea* in 1915, whereas she only required 12 million bushele of the United States in ; 1913. Yet, according to some of our papers, Germany—to say nothing of Austria—is so desperately ehort of flour that she has to set a very short limit to the supply of her people's bread. Granting that the war has made big inroads upon Germany's productive capacity in this particular direction, owing to labour shortage,- surely the ostensible 19 million bushels extra import ought to have rendered "bread riots'" in Berlin and elsewhere quite unnecessary. We, are told by our newspaper statisticians that the American foodstuff export figures "tell tlie same story," namely, that Germany under tha British "blockade" is getting more than she ever did in the piping times of peace. At a casual glance it appears that she is doing so. Comparing the American export figures for the first ten months in 1913, when the world was at peace and trade was normal, with those for the corresponding period of last year, that from January 1 to October 31, the latent date to which the figures have been made up, the falling off in German imports was in every cose apparently compensated by the-in-creased imports of her neighbours. Thus in 1913 Germany took in rpupd figures 6,000,000 bushels of maize from America and only 15,000 bushels last year; but the Danish importations increased from 4,750,000 bushels to 10,050,000, those of the Netherlands from 6,900,000 to 11,600,000, and other neutrals increased their importations from 2.100,000 to 6,40(5,000.

In 1913 Germany bought 140,000 barrels of wheat flour in the United States, and in 1015 none. In 1913 the Netherlands imported 708,000 barrels and in 1915 1,300,000. Other neutrals increased their importations from 709,000 barrels in 1013 to 3,800,000 barrels in 1910. As to bacon. Germany's American purchases were 1,100,000 pounds; in 1915 they were 273,000 pounds. The Netherlands in 1913 purchased 3,900,000 pounds, and in 101u 9,000,000 pounds, and other neutrals increased their importations from 27,000,000 pounds to 82,500,000 pounds. Now, as to American boots. In 1913 Germany purchased 471,000 pairs in the United States, and not a single pair in 1915; but neutrals' purchases jumped from 462.000 pairs to 4,800,000.

In 1913 1,700,000 bales of cotton were sent to Germany, and in 1915 194,000. The exports in the same period to neutrals increased from 53,000 bales to 1,100,000. Next as to automobiles and parts. German imports in 1913 were valued <it 775,000 dollars, and in 1915 at 2,800 dollars. The exports to neutral countries in 1913 had a value of 1,300,----000 dollars, which in 1915 rose to 20,000,000 dollars.

FIGURES PROVE NOTHING. Taking tnese figures as they stand, the British blockade is indeed "a sham." But these figures cannot prove anything unless they are subjected to the most careful analysis, for before the war the German ports themselves were, so to speak, "clearing houses" for half Europe.

"It is exceedingly difficult to know what to believe," says a contemporary, after a dive into the question of the blockade. It is, especially when you find —a: is often the case —assertions that the blockade is a "sham," and on another page of the same newspaper elaborate accounts of the scarcity produced in Germany by the "sham." Whatever else it may be, the blockade is evidently not a sham. For proof of that we need go no further than the admissions made by the German Government and the loud complaints in the German newspapers, or —still more significant —in the letters cellected on the battlefield- Whether the blockade can be made more effective still is another matter, and, as the "Westminster Gazette" remarks, "We are not at the beginning of wisdom on that subject

until we understand the very real difficulties which surmount this question and'the points of view which, in spite of all clamour, the Foreign Office is obliged to bear in mind*"

FIGURES AND FACTS. ~ Nearly all figures which are commonly cited as bearing on this question arc misleading, unless evidence can be produced to eliow the destination of the goods. For instance, it is easy to say that none of the neutral countries which are in a position to supply Germany ehould be allowed to import from oversea more of any commodity than they were receiving before the war, since in that way we should have a rough guarantee that the countries in question would have nothing to spare from their own needs for export to Germany. But this is no sooner said than we are "up against" two facts —first, that most of these countries are ; a highway into Russia as well as into Germany, and, second, that, since they are unable to buy from Central Europe a large nnmber of the commodities which they ordinarily take for their own consumption—gastronomic and industrial —they are compelled to take more from overseas. It is impossible to ignore these considerations. In the one case we may blockade our ally; in the other, we may not only do an injustice to the neutral, but deprive it of the means of supplying us with commodities that we need. The Government has attempted to solve this question by agreements with neutral traders who undertake to see that the enemy shall not receive goods imported from oversea which can in any way assist her to prolong the war. The 6ame traders, or others, are, of course, at liberty to make corresponding agreements with Germany to bar goods imported from Central Europe from reaching us. This is not a perfect solution of the question, and it needs constant vigilance to sec that it is not evaded; but it is at least based on recognition of facts which cannot be ignored, except at the risk of strangling our allies and possibly ourselves in this attempt to strangle the enemy. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. Nor can we, as the "Westminster Gazette" rightly points out, regard this blockade question as purely commercial. There are immensely important politiica.l considerations involved in it which have constantly to be borne in mind. Some of the policies recommended would have thrown all the neutrals into the arms of the Centra! Powers, and might easily have brought us to a state of war or a rupture ofdiplomatic relations with some of them. If we alone were at war, and did not want supplies or munitions from any of the neutrals, and could run the risk of seeing our ordinary trade cut off by retaliatory measures, we should be free to take any action that we thought to be in our own interests. But we are not alone, and we and out allies want all the munitions and supplies that to can get from neutral countries, aad some of our allies are sorely afraid lest we should jeopardise their relations with neutral countries by driving our own point of - " view too hard. We cannot for example push controversy with Sweden beyond a certain point without considering whaiytheb-ppritiicar a,nd military—let alo'ne>'tfie' commercial—results might" be to Russia; and we .cannot push controversy with the United States to the point of imperilling the munition snjjplies without jeopardising military interesta of great dmportance to our allies as well ac ourselves. It is idle ta suppose that we can get all that we want for the allied cause from neutral countries without making some concessions in return. It may be possible ' to tighten the blockade, but our block- , ade policy must be an allied policy,' not I merely a British policy. The Entente '■ Powere muet make up their minde to- [ gether bow far the pressure can be in- . creased without jeopardising their mii terests with neutrals, and their policy

should be presented jointly to the neutral Governments. As the "Westminster Gazette" puts it: "The neutral who sees that we are in deadly earnest, and who understands for what we are fighting, will be the more disposed to 6ubmdt to Borne temporary inconvenience rather' than disarm us or trip us up in technicalities, when we seek to uee pur great and legitimate weapon of sea-power."