PEARL HARBOUR

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 66, Issue 58, 18 December 1945, Page 4

PEARL HARBOUR

INTERCEPTED JAPANESE MESSAGE WRONG INFERENCE DRAWN (N.Z. Press Association —Copyright,.) (Rec.' 2.30 p.m.). WASHINGTON, Dec. 17. Vice-Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, Chief of Naval Intelligence from October, 1941, to July, 1942, testified at the Piari Harbour-in-quiry that he saw an intercepted Japanese message sent from Tokio to Honolulu on September 24, 1941, decoded on October 9, 1941, ordering Japanese agents to chart the harbour in five areas, with details of types and positions of ships.

“I did not recognise it as the precise bombing plan it. turned out .to be. It is now apparent that it was also a plan for midget submarine activity. I discussed the message with my • section, and concluded that it was another example of Japan’s nicety of intelligence and meticulous attention to detail. ■The inference was that, they wanted to know which, ' ships would threaten them elsewhere. The Navy knew that all Japanese warships on November 1 were manned on a full war footing. Japanese ships -were recalled for quick docking and repair on December 1. When all service calls to their ships were changed, the Navy lost track of a number of Japanese fleet units, including carriers and battleships, but I had not the slightest confirmation that Hawaii might be a point of attack. The final part of the Japanese message to Mr Cordell tlull, brought to my office on December 7, at 9 a.m., seemed to me to be fighting words. I saw the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark at 9.15 and pointed out the seriousness of the language, and advised that the fleet should be notified. Admiral Stark tried to reach General Marshall, but could not reach him.”

General Marshall testified previously that he learned of the message after li a.m. General Marshall warned naval stations, but the message arrived at Pearl Harbour while the bombs were dropping.