ALARM NOT SENT

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 61, Issue 146, 2 April 1941, Page 3

ALARM NOT SENT

FAILURE BY THE HOLMWOOB.

MIGHT HAVE SAVED ftANGITANE FINDING BY COMMISSION. (Sp.) WELLINGTON, April 1, A <Kscl6stffe t pa'i the German raided 10&F.. t|ie New Zealand vessel fP&fdocr fft a ,i.». on November 25 on Her voyage from the Chatham Islands to Lyttelton must have been visible from the ship for at least threequarters of an hotif before the attack, giving ample time in which a wireless message could be sent, with the object of assisting in the location and destruction of the raiders, regardless of the consequences to itself, is made in the official report of the proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry into the loss of vessels by enemy action and tile leak-

age of information, which was released tb-day. A For the failure to send the wireless message, Captain Miller who was the sole wireless operator as well as master of 'the ship, is responsible, states the report. The look-out was defective and the second officer should have called the captain as soon as lie observed the first raider. The consequences of the failure to send a wireless message were probably serious, as it would probably have reached New Zealand and the Jtangitane .which had put to sea about two hours earlier, would then have been recalled, according to the report. Giving a detailed account of the Holmwood’s meeting with the three raiders and her capture by the ship known as the Miinyo Maru,- which was flying the Japanese colours, the commission States that from the bridge of the Holmwood the distance to the horizon could be seen in all directions. Tt followed that each of the three raiders must have been visible when it was substantially more than five miles and si half from the Holmwood, and iriiist have been visibly overtaking her for a considerable time before she was stopped at 8 a.m. The Holmwood had wireless, but made ho attempt to use it. Messages Intercepted. / Dealing with the Germans’ claim to hav.e ascertained the position of the Holmwood by intercepting wireless messages which passed from the Chatham Islands and the mainland, the commission states:

(1) A number of radio messages passed between New Zealand and theChathams in clear uncoded language which, if they were intercepted, must have assisted the enemy to knowledge of the intended movements of the Holmwood. The practice, both in New Zealand and at the Chathams, appears to have been to code messages which actually mentioned a ship’s name or a sailing date, but to sbtid in clear language other messages from which fairly accurate kfidfidedgo of an intended sailing date could be inferred. (2) The master of the Holmwood and the Lyttelton agent of the owners use a private code word “confirming,” which mean “have arrived.” -This was a dangerous practice and was contrary to the regulations. (3) Some time before the final voyage of the Holmwood, some unrecorded conversation in Morse took place by wireless between the Chatham Islands postmaster and wireless operator (Mr McMahon) and operator in New Zealand relative to the furniture of the officer who was shortly to relieve McMahon. This unrecorded conversation may have included some reference to probable future sailing dates. There is no ground for thinking' that this particular conversation aided the raiders, but we are concerned to condemn the occurrence as one which should not have happened and' should not happen again. A Dangerous Practice. (4) The nature of the then recent wireless messages to and from the Chatham Islands was investigated and it was decided that in future all messages should be in code.

(5) The fact that the Germans questioned Captain Miller and McMahon as to the iheaning of a coded message from the Chathams on November 25 appears to settle that the code in use at the time of the loss of the Holmwood, where code was used at all, was not then compromised.

(6) But if it is the practice to send the text of all wireless messages back to New Zealand by regular mail services, and if this record gives Jibe clear language of messages sent in code, we think such a practice dangerous and undesirable. If a raider captures the clear language of messages he has already intercepted in code, he may be provided with the key to the code. Referring to Captain Miller's failure to send a wireless message, the commission states: “In common with other master mariners, Captain Miller had received a series of Admiralty instructions as to the sending of wireless messages relative to suspicious ships. In our opinion, these instructions make i clear to anyone who reads them that the primary purpose of the message is not the preservation or rescue or the ship which sends the message, but the prompt discovery and destruction o the raider.” Message Prepared. After- quoting evidence to show that the faidei-s must have been visible from the Holmwood if or at least forty-five minutes before she was stopped a - a.m., the commission states that Laptdin Miller had a message already coded to. be sent at short notice m case ol tiaptain Miller stated in evidence that three or four minutes IMS the mihimum time m which cotild have sent the message “The watch of the second ofheer, Air Clarke, Was from 4 a.m. to 8 a ™., adds the report. “His therefore, i j the responsibility of discovering the presdfe.of the first raider which became visible,” continues the commwsidh. “We believe he was, in fact the fitiit perfion on the Holmwood to see the

raider. But it is 'clear from his own evidence that lie was not then on the bridge hut toward the stern of the ship,' where ho had been feeding a horse. He says the time was then 7 a.m. or even earlier. lie says that ho then saw the smoko of-a vessel not yet over the horizon. . Weakness in Look-out. “It also appears from the evidence that for about one hour or more, from G a.m. or thereabouts to 7 a.m. or later, the helmsman, Mr McLeod, was absent from the wheel and was going through the sheep, and during this time the ship was steered by Mr Clarke, the officer on the watch.

“It follows that during this time an efficient look-out could hot he kept astern. This was also the position when McLeod returned to the wheel, because Mr Oldrke then, left the bridge to feed the horse. In our opinion, it is. at least possible that it was while Mr Clarke was attending to the horse that the raider first became visible. “We are not disposed to blame either Mr Clarke or the helmsmaii for. the defective manner in which the . lookout was kept on the Holmwood during these absences or McLeod and Clarke froni the bridge. They appear l to us to have acted in accordance with practices which have become usual on small ships similar to the Holmwood. Nor can we say, with confidence, that either of these absences caused delay in discovering the presence of the raider. But it is our duty to say that in wartime such practices are dangerous on any ship. Instructions to Officers. “Upon the evidence, we are not ini a position to determine whether the terms of the Admiralty instructions as to wireless were made known to the second officer. We do not find against him that they were, nor against the captain that they were not. If the captain did not in fact communicate these instructions to his officers, that was a breach of the instructions. And for the future guidance of all masters we think that the following passage of the evidence of C'orhmodore Parry should he emphasised: ‘There is no doubt in my mind that the officers of a ship like that should know an instruction of that kind because they represent- the captain on the bridge when they are on watch, and in the absence of the captain, may have to act oii those instructions.’ .

“We add that we entirely agree with the opinion here expressed by the Commodore, which is in complete con-’ formity with a passage in the instructions themselves. The officer of the watch will be aided in the performance of his duty if he clearly understands hew important are his duties of unremitting vigilance and .prompt report. It is the duty of every master to make a thorough study of all instructions received by him. If he does this, he will find that they clearly inform him to what extent it is his duty to see that certain important portions of these instructions are thoroughly understood by his officers. Captain Not CaM. “In this case it is plain that the second officer did not call the captain as soon as he saw the ship. In our opinion, he should have done so, and his failure to do so increased the captain’s difficulties. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the captain had ample time to realise that the' wireless message should be sent-, and to attempt to send it.”

“Captain Miller put forward the contention that it would have been useless to send the message because his wireless set could not reach New Zealand and because the Chathams’ wireless station would hot lie open till 9 a.m.,” states the report. “For the following reasons we are unable to accept this explanation: (1) It is not established that the set could not reach New Zealand. On the contrary, the weight of evidence is distinctly against that view, and suggests that any difficulty experienced with the set in pre-war time was due to faulty, manipulation. It had been passed by the post and Telegraph Department as recently as June, 1940. (2) Even if the set could not reach New Zealand, or if Captain Miller thought it could not, he could not be sure that a. message might not reach some other ship.. (3) If he thought his set insufficient to reach New Zealand, he should not have been travelling with it without coillplaint to his owners. And he had made no such complaint.” _