FOREIGN POLICY

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 59, Issue 20, 3 November 1938, Page 5

FOREIGN POLICY

MUNICH AGREEMENT DEFENDED. ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO FORCE. SPEECH BY MR CHAMBERLAIN. (United Press Association —Copyright.) LONDON, November 1. A debate on British foreign policy during the recent crisis was opened when the House of Commons reassembled to-day after the vacation. In reply to criticism by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr C. A. Attlee), the Prime Minister (Mr Chamberlain defended the Munich settlement.

Instead of the use of force, the agreement had been carried out in an orderly manner. He denied the right of opponents to criticise the results of the agreement, in which it had been possible to lay clown general outlines, leaving to the International Commission the filling in of the details, unless these critics were prepared to say that they would have accepted the alternative of war. The Refugee Problem. After explaining the conditions in which the proposal for plebiscites had been abandoned as a result of the agreement reached between the Germans and Czechs, Mr Chamberlain said that Mi Attlee could not claim that the right of option provided for in the Munich agreement was illusory, since the German and Czech, Commission had not yet formulated its conclusions for submission to the International Commission.

Mr Chamberlain joined with Mr Attlee in expressing his sympathy for the refugees, and mentioned that authority had been given for temporary, admission to. the United Kingdom of 350 refugees, who were actually in danger, and whose maintenance while in England had been arranged for. This would be extended to their families if similar undertakings for their maintenance were forthcoming. He also announced that the Government had appointed Mr R>. J. Stockford, who accompanied the Runciman mission, to report on the number and condition of refugees in Czechoslovakia and the progress of relief measures. Rebuke for Mr Attlee. Mr Chamberlain said he was not yet in a position to make a fuller statement on the proposed guaranteed loan to Czechoslovakia, but an advance of £10,000,000, which had already been made, could be drawn upon for the maintenance and settlement of refugees. The Inter-Governmental Commission, which was dealing with refugees from Germany, had made it clear that involuntary immigrants of German origin from Sudetenland would be put in the same position as the other involuntary immigrants with which the committee was concerned.

Replying to Mr Attlee’s questions regarding the offer of a guarantee for the new Czech frontiers, Mr Chamberlain said that he was not yet in a position to add anything to Sir Thomas Inskip’s statement on October 4. The position could not be cleared up until the whole question of minorities in Czechoslovakia had been settled.

Sir John Anderson (Lord Privy Seal) would, also bie responsible, in consultation with the other departments concerned, for the arrangements for national voluntary service. In connection with air raid precautions, Sir John Anderson would preside over the Coordination Committee of Ministers of the various departments affected, and he would, of course, be a member of the Committee for Imperial Defence. National Semico Project. As to national service, the Government was satisfied that it was desirable and practicable to meet the need of civil defence by voluntary action, suitably organised. The review of the military, naval, ,and air defences was not finished, but in the meantime Mr Chamberlain reiterated the unwillingness of the Government to accept a proposal for a Ministry of Supply, which, he argued, would cause dislocation of the existing arrangements without guaranteeing any improvement, and would involve tlie use of compulsion, which employers and, 'workers would not normally accept in peace time. He made the point that Britain was thlen only in the third year of her rearmament programme, which was undertaken and organised as a five-year programme. To argue that, because everything was not completed in thnee years, the programme had broken down was therefor© foolish.

He doubted if it would have been possible to squeeze the five-year programme into three years, hut he admitted that the review had shown special urgency of certain parts of the programme for which certain practical reinforcements were necessary if they were not to jeopardise the wnoie schemes. The Government would therefore direct itself to those parts. He reminded the House that there undoubtedly would he an, addition to the total cost of the programme. Finally) Mr Chamberlain turned to some' criticism which had been heard abroad on British rearmament, and he asked why a different standard was being applied, to Britain in this matter. However, he added the repetition which lie clearly thmight should have been unnecessary, of assurances of Britain’s peaceful intent. “No Aggressive Intention.” “I would repeat here, categorically, that wo have no aggressive intention against Germany or any other country,” lie said. “Our sole concern is lo see the country and her Imperial communications safe, and that we shall not to be so weak relatively to other countries. Our diplomacy cannot enter upon discussions upon an equal basis. There is nothing further from our minds than to enter upon a new armaments race.”

This brought the Prime Minister to bis joint declaration with Herr Hitler after the Munich conversations, which lie said, seemed had dropped out of sight. “Yet, I myself feel that in that declaration, if properly followed up, lies the chance for a new era of peace in Europe. 1 believe, indeed, I am

convinced that Herr Hitler meant it when he signed it. lam equally convinced that the views expressed are the views of the majority of people, both in Germany and in this country. That being so, let there be no mistake as to our policy and our intention. It is our firm determination that there will be no sitting still and waiting for peace to comf 1 . “We shall not- wait until a crisis becomes acute,” said Mr Chamberlain. “We shall try to consolidate the goodwill of the four Powers which assembled at Munich and endeavour to restore European confidence by the removal of fears and suspicions. ' IVe will not get far unless we get the idea that the democracies and the totalitarian States are not to be ranged against each other in opposing camps, but that they can, if they choose wont together, not merely for the settlement of differences after they hare arisen, but also in consideration of a constructive programme which will facilitate fine international exchange of goods and improve international relations in various ways for the ‘•good of all. That is what is sometimes called a policy of appeasement. That is the policy to which the British Government intends wholeheartedly to devote itself.”

MR CHAMBERLAIN’S SPEECH. WELCOMED INI GERMANY. BERLIN,' November 1. Mr Chamberlain’s speech in the House of Commons caused the greatest satisfaction in political circles. One commentator welcomed especially the confidence in Herr Hitler’s good faith and the acknowledgment of Germany’s position in central Europe. He stressed that Germany does not wish to hinder the trade of other nations in these markets, but always opposed England’s political loans. He explained, with regard to rearmament, that Germany’s interest lay in who should direct the powerfully rearmed nation, Mr Chamberlain or Mr Churchill.