LEAGUE REFORM

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 56, Issue 275, 2 September 1936, Page 6

LEAGUE REFORM

: NEW ZEALAND’S PLAN.

I AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. : ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS. 'W ‘ “ (United Press Association—Copyright.; (Received This Day, 9.20 a.m.) ;; GENEVA, Sept. 1. “ The League has received only five i: replies to the question how to refoim - the League. ’ “■ The most interesting and detailed r. was New Zealand’s favouring an international force controlled by the League, and a plebiscite among the peoples of member States whether they are prepared automatically to enforce Article XVI, and whether, in such event, their armed forces would automatically be v available for such a purpose. ’NEW ZEALAND’S REPLY. TEXT OF THE PROPOSALS. WELLINGTON, This Day. * The Prime Minister (the Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage) stated to-day that the New Zealand Government had forward- ■' ed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a memorandum setting out the Government’s views on the reform of the League, in compliance with a resolution of the League Assem- ■* )>ly inviting members of the League *' to make proposals with the object of J strengthening the authority of the *, League. . In forwarding its reply, the Government indicated that if New Zealand’s proposals were not consideie .wimmediately practicable it would not " demur to consideration of progress by " stages or of alternative proposals. The * New Zealand Government’s memoran'X dum is as follow: , ■; ‘ ‘ln accordance with the resolution ot the Assembly of the League on July 4, ‘ 1936, and anticipating a formal request * from the Council (as is necessary in f the circumstances of New Zealand if the proposals of the New Zealand Gov--2 ernment are to be received by the Sec- *, retary-General before September 1 next), I have the honour to forward £ herewith an expression of the views of the New Zealand Government on the * Covenant of the League of Nations: - i (i) We believe, in the first place, : : that there is no material fault in the * existing provisions of the Covenant and * that the difficulties that have arisen ;;. and that may arise in future are due * to the method and extent of its opera- « tion. x J' (2) We believe that the Covenant has ■; 1 never yet been fully applied and that *• • jt cannot he characterised as an ineffective instrument until it has been so > applied. *' (3) We are prepared to reaffirm with *'’the utmost solemnity our continued acceptance of the Covenant as it stands. f (4) We believe, nevertheless, that the 1 Covenant is capable of amendment ;■ which should take the form of streng- * thening, rather than weakening, its provisions. (5) We are prepared to accept m principle the provisions proposed for the Geneva protocol of 1924 as one method of strengthening the Covenant 2 as it exists. (6) We are prepared to take our collective share in the application against any future aggressor of full economic sanctions contemplated by Article XVI. and we are prepared, to the extent of our power, to join in collective application of force against future aggressor. We believe that sanctions contemplated by the present Covenant will he as ineffective in the future as they have been in the past: (a) Unless they are made immediate and automatic; (b) unless economic sanctions take the form of the complete

boycott contemplated by Article XVI; (c) unless any sanctions that may he applied are supported by the certainty that the members of the League applying the sanctions are able and, if necessary, prepared! to use force against force.

(8) It is our belief that the Covenant as it is, or rn a strengthened form, would itself be sufficient to prevent war if the world, realised that the nations undertaking to apply the Covenant actually -would do so in fact. (9) We are prepared to agree to the institution of an international force under the control of the League or to the allocation to the League of a definite proportion of the armed forces of its members to the extent if desired of the whole of those forces, land-, sea, and air. (10) We consider that there can be no certainty of the complete and automatic operation of the Covenant unless the Governments of all members of the League are supported in thoir determination to apply it by the declared approval of their peoples. (11) We propose, therefore, that all the members of the League and as many non-members as may be persuaded to adopt this course, should hold immediately a national plebiscite with ~the object of taking the opinion of their people on the following points: "(1) Whether they are prepared to join automatically and immediately in the sanctions contemplated by article XVI. of the Covenant against any aggressor nation nominated as such by the Council or the Assembly; (2) Whether in such case the armed, forces of their country (or such proportion as may previously have been fixed by the League) should be immediately and automatitcally placed at the complete disposal of the League for that purpose. . (12) We do not accept the desirability of regional pacts, but if members of the League generally approve of such pacts we should he prepared to support a collective system in which all members of the League while accepting immediate and universal application of economic sanctions contemplated by Articlo XVI, nevertheless if they desired to would be 'restricted to defined areas then undertaking to use force.

(13) In such case we consider that the questions of the use of force in defined areas should also be made the subject of national plebiscites. (14) We believe it improper to enforce a system of preventing war without at the same time setting up adequate' machinery for ventilation and, if possible, rectification of international grievances, and we would support the establishment of an acceptable tribunal for that purpose.

(15) We believe that the peace treaties of the Great War carried within themselves the germs of future conflict. We realise the enormous (but not insuperable) difficulties of reconsidering the status established by those treaties, and for our part we are prepared in the most genuine and broadminded spirit to join in such a reconsideration.

(16) As the first step we are prepared. to agree to a proposal that the Covenant of the League should be separated from these peace treaties. (17) For any general reconsideration of the peace treaties we should wish to see all nations of the world, whether members of the League or not, invited to take part. (18) We should'wish also to see all nations of the world, whether members of the League or not, invited to take part in the consideration of the terms and application of the Covenant or of any other universal method of collective security that may be proposed in its stead. (19) We realise the important effect of economic conditions on the peace oi the world and we should wish also that a world-wide survey of- such conditions should be undertaken at the same time. (20) We feel that the peoples of the world as distinct from their Governments should be afforded every possible facility for following the transactions of the League and that all appropriate and League discussions and decisions should accordingly be broadcast by short-wave radio. (21) Finally, although we believe that a collective, peace system that is not supported by all nations, of the world is better than no collective peace system at all, we are convinced that no such system can be entirely satisfactory until it is universal and that everv proper effort should he made to that end.