MISSING AIRMEN

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 48, Issue 83, 18 January 1928, Page 6

MISSING AIRMEN

MACHINE AND ITS EQUIPMENT. ARRANGEMENTS FOR FLIGHT. CAPTAIN KIGHT INTERVIEWED. (Per Press Association.) WELLINGTON, January 17. Captain Kight, the third member of the party) which set out for Sydney to undertake the flight across the Tasman, rturned to Wellington by the Marama to-day. ,- Interviewed, he gave a comprehensive statement of the/arrangements made in Sydney. He can offer no explanation of the tragic failure of the attempt. One point he stressed was that the carrying of a highly qualified navigating officer would not necessarily have added to the airmen s chances. , . "The machine was tested, m America and on assembly in Australia we. tested it on various flights for petrol consumption, speed, carrying capacity, etc., be said. "Certain adjustments were made to the tunuing and so on, but none of them,were of a major character. . "The longest test flight was of five hours with a load of just on three hundred pounds lighter than the load that they left Richmond with. The men were not medically examined in Australia, but thev were examined before tbey left here.' They were absolutely fit- " Captain Kight made it quite clear that it was understood that Lieutenant Moncrieff and Captain Hood were not to change places or relieve each other during the flight. "When the machine was first oraer_d we asked for dual control, but we considered that the capacity should be.

increased from the 1600 miles provided for to 1900, the error in capacity having arisen through nautical miles being taken instead of land males," he said. "Immediately that was discovered, we cabled for extra tankage to give a of 1900 miles. This was done, but .the time spent in fitting dual control would have meant a delay of over a month, which would have meant that delivery would not have been given m time for the most favourable season." . c He explained that when this information was given they inquired and the makers said it would be possible for the pilots to change places, but on assembling the machine, they discovered that it was impossible in flight as the machine would' be without control. They found this on the flight to Svdnev. and decided that Lieutenant Moncrieff would have to pilot the machine right across the Tasinan. , , This meant that the second man would only be a passenger, though lie would be able to do the Mor»e signalling, and he and Captain Hood tossed for the position. Captain Right's statement goes on to show that the wireless set did not come' up to expectations of what was ordered. It failed on the run to Sydney. Amalgamated Wireless undertook to do their best with it, saying that it would be necessary to fit a battery. This message was only received on Monday afternoon, but they immediately set to work to fit a battery and carried' out ground tests which showed that the set was working but how successful it was in the air was unknown. The petrol carried.was sufficient for 17 hours' flying flat out. Captain Kight said that the airmen were informed at what angle the sun

would rise, and from that they could set an approximation of their bearings. That would be the only bearing they would be able to take during the flight, which was to be made by dead reckoning. The magnetic course was taken, giving a mean variation which had been fullv gone into by van on s •navigating officers on vessels, and though the distance so. set out was ai few miles longer than by flying on the! great circle course ,it need not be altered from start to finish, and there was less possibility of error. # The compasses were swuim m Melbourne and tested on the flight to Sydney on a day when conditions were verv hazy, and no points could da picked up. They proved themselves entirely accurate. No flares were carried, although a certain amount of cotton waste was carried which the mlot might have lit and thrown cut in an extremity, but owing to the excessive risk the use of such was. highly improbable. The exhausts came clown m ' two pipes below the fuselage, and when the engine was running at night, nr was suddenly opened, showed long bursts of name. The valve of the wireless was situated on the very top -or the set and would undoubtedly give the appearance that the machine was lighted from oufaide, though from how far he was unable to say. The maximum cruising speed, according to specifications, was 127 miles an hour, but the speed advised was between 55 and 100 miles or even up to 110 miles. Lieutenant Moncrieff decided to run at between 16,000 and 16,-500 revolutions, which would give between 100 and 110 miles in still air. The day preceding the departure was such that they did not expect the flight, would take place for forty-eight hours, and it was not till they returned from a harbour cruise at 6 p.m. that word was given that there was a possibility of leaving. They were informed definitely of the weather at 9 o'clock and it' was then necessary to go to Richmond, 40 miles away, where the machine was housed. They found tiie wireless was ready and, everything else. By 2.15 a.m. the machine was run out, and it' was discovered that there was too much lubricating oil in the tanks. This was soon rectified and in a few minutes the pilots were ready to go. Unfortunately they were delayed by reporters insisting on last minuted interviews at a time when every minute was of value. Everything was taken into account and Lieutenant Moncrieff decided to leave.

STATEMENTS DENIED. NO PRESSURE ON AIRMEN. WELLINGTON, January 17. Captain Kight, who arrived in Wellington this morning, absolutely aemes the cabled statement m the "Sydney Morning Herald" that the navigating instruments were not in good condition No pressure was brought to bear on the airmen to delay their departure. The machine was perfectly airworthy. There was no question of any argument. They never rejected any pro-

fessional advice, and there was abso-j lute unanimity between themselves and the'Royal Australian Air Force. The "Sydney Morning Herald" ihadj been against the flight from its, inception, and had done everything to cast suspicion on it. On seeing the article in tiie Sydney "Herald" the day after the flight, mating certain allegations which the "Herald" said that the Royal Air Force had made, they immediately got m touch with the commanding officer at Richmond, 'who informed Captain Kight that no statement had been made by himself or his officers, and that they were satisfied that the machine was capable of the flight and was proved in every way, although they all had some doubts as to the efficiency of the wireless. The navigating officer had himself assisted in the laying out of the course and had seen that everything was accurate.

PROJECT CONDEMNED. SYDNEY NEWSPAPER'S OPINION. AUCKLAND, January 17. Some particulars of the history of the adventure undertaken by Lieutenant Moncrieff and Captain Hood are given by a special representative of the "Sydney Morning Herald," who saw the two airmen leave Richmond for New Zealand last Tuesday "morning. In his article which bears the headline, "Risky Project," and which was published last Wednesday morning, the day following the flight (the same day, peculiarly enough, the paper eulogised the reported success of the flight in an editorial), the writer says:

' 'The project of a flight from Australia to JNew Zealand as conceived originally by Lieutenant Moncrieff was a sane and laudable undertaking and one that would have been unconditionally commended by experienced airmen in any country. The flight as actually conducted was a breach of the Air Navigation Regulations which were specially drawn up by an International Convention for the purpose of protecting young aviators against the daring and impetuosity of their own desires •and ambitions. These regulations set out in definite terms that in any flight over an expanse of water greater than fifty miles from shore to shore,, aviators must use seaplanes, amphibians or flying boats. This condition applies to all parts of the British Empire." ' After outlining the difficulties of financing the project, the writer states that when the Federal Government withdrew permission for the flight, Australian Air' Force mechanics engaged on preparing the monoplane were taken aff the work, but after an exchange of cables between Mr Bruce and Mr Coates the former agreed formally to the machine leaving, on the distinct understanding that the Federal Government was not involved in any way. Out of courtesy to the New Zealand Government, Australian Air Force mechanics were then permitted to resume work of assemblage at Point Cook.

Asked to Desist.. The article proceeds: "Expert aviators and others pleaded: with the aviators to desist from the adventure until there was a proper test of the machine. It was pointed out to them that there were grave doubts concerning the accuracy and reliability of the earth conductor compass, as it had never been given a serious test. It was definitely known that the composs deflected considerably from the true course in certain conditions. "The wireless apparatus was never in a satisfactory condition. The radio gear supplied with the monoplane never worked. The aviators had no experience of wireless transmission. They believed they were transmitting messages on the journey from Melbourne to Richmond. Actually, not a signal left the machine. "The wireless generator was defective." About £3O would have supplied a new and efficient generator. The aviators had no money for that purpose. In fact, on their own candid admission, they were ' broke' before they left on the eventful journey. The New Zealand Government never spent a farthing on the organisation or equipment of the flight. Lack of financial support was believed to be responsible for the haste of the aviators to get away.

No Tests. "When a. wireless engineer at Rich mond (Sydney) offered to go with the aviators on a non-stop flight to Adelaide or Broken Hill to permit the compass to be tested and adjusted (also the wireless apparatus) it was pointed out by! Lieutenant Moncrieff that the machine was loaded for New Zealand, and its first flight would be toward there. He said he realised the risk he was taking, but was confident of success. "Captain Hood said calmly and deliberately: 'We realise that if we sink we go west, and that's all there is to it."' "When they started on the journey Captain Hood was apparently a sick manj though he expressed himself as physically lit and in the best of health and spirits. It was, however, realised that he would only be a ' passenger' on the journey, as his physical disability—the loss of a leg in the war, which was replaced by a wooden one—would prevent his moving about in the small space available or replacing Lieutenant Moncrieff at the control stick.

" ' My wife is waiting for me,' said Captain Hood, cheerily, ' and I am flying to meet and greet her.' " EFFECT OF WIND-DRIFT. WERE AIRMEN CARRIED OUT OF COURSE? HASTINGS, January 17. Mr Thomas Tremewan, a motor engineer, of Hastings, who* had seven years' experience in the British Royal Air Force, and has done a good deal of flying in Britain, Mesopotamia, India and Egypt, interviewed by the "Tribune," said it was with very great surprise he noticed that nothing in all the reports received had been said about wind-drift. He had read the meteorological reports and carefully thought out the effect of wind-drift on the day of the flight. He was strongly of opinion that it would take the airmen south of Gretfmouth. According to all reports, the wind would take them that "way. When it is remembered that there was no really exnert navigator on board, it is easy

to come to he conclusion that the air-, men were unable, through lack of experience, to allow for drift. It is possible for the compass to be pointing steadily in the required while all the' time the machine may be sidedrifting hundreds of miles out of! its course. "I have myself been as much as forty miles out in a flight of a hundred miles, due to wind-drift," he said. Another consideration to be borne in mind was tha New Zealand, even in dark and cloudy weather, can be flown over in an hour. He gave it, as his opinion that in the darkness . the men had flown over the South Island. . , Asked if he could account ior the fact that the Government telegraphist .ceased to hear signals from the 'p;ane after 5.22 p.m., Mr Tremewan averred that, knowing what he does of the type of engine employed, he would be more prepared to believe that the wii eless broke down (particular as nether mam was an expert operator) than that tiie engine gave out and came down west of New Zealand. "Moreover," said Mi- Tremewan, "the wireless operator at 5.22 p.m. did not give the location of the 'plane, although he gave the distance. He had perforce to go by the strength of the signal. His revert does nothing to confute the view tl-at the airmen might even at that ' tune have been far off their course. "It is my view," said Mr Tremewan, "that as aviators of experience and skill the men would not run their engine all out, but would do something like ninety miles per hour, and that means, according to my calculations, that at 5.22 p.m. they would be rearer four hundred than, two hundred uu&s, away. I think it quite possible that the 'plane could have been obsec/ed inland. "In conclusion, I would say that two primary mistakes were inaJe. Firstly, the machine should have left Sydney at 8 or 9 p.m.,- so as to the daylight hours of flying to this t-nd, to make sure of bearings, and, secondly, an expert wireless operator should nave been carried. From experience, I know that such an expert could have told them every hour exactly where they were." ,