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The draft resolution which he presented accordingly noted that no " positive results " had been achieved in the field of atomic energy, referred to the " paramount importance of implementing the . . . resolutions of 24 January, 1946, and 14 December, 1946," and recommended the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission—- " 1. To continue their activity in the direction laid down in the above-mentioned General Assembly Resolutions ; and " 2. .To prepare a Draft Convention on the-prohibition of atomic weapons and a Draft Convention on the establishment of effective international control over atomic energy, both the Convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the Convention on the establishment of international control over atomic energy to be signed and brought into operation simultaneously," During the course of the debate it became clear that there was general support for the majority proposals contained in the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. There was a widespread feeling, however, that owing to the paramount importance of the subject, every effort should be made to resolve, if at all possible, the existing deadlock. In view of the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to make at least some concessions it was felt by some delegations that the possibilities of negotiation had not been exhausted ; the delegate of Syria therefore proposed that the Atomic Energy Commission should resume meetings in order to draw up a draft treaty on the basis of the majority proposals. Other delegations, however, in particular those of the United States and the United Kingdom, felt that the concession offered by the Soviet Union was illusory. While existing stocks of bombs could be disposed of immediately, the establishment of an effective control system would take months or years ; the use of the term " simultaneously " in connection with the new Soviet proposal was therefore entirely misleading. In the circumstances these delegations considered that unless the Soviet Union accepted the majority proposals there was little to be gained by a resumption of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. The New Zealand delegate (Mr Thorn) at the beginning of the debate had expressed approval of the majority proposals. On the question of enforcement and of the division of authority between the proposed control organ and the Security Council, he had pointed out that the Commission had wisely avoided too close definition ; these would be matters to be settled by negotiation in the treaty, if and when a treaty should appear possible. A distinction might be made between "technical" enforcement—for instance, the right to set a guard upon the stock pile, or to order a lessening in the rate of production—and sanctions. Technical measures should undoubtedly be within the competence of a technical control authority. On the other hand, if the Security Council had been suffered to function as was intended by the authors of the Charter no one would