19

(b) Occupation Costs The Far Eastern Commission policy decision provides that reparations should be in such a form as would not prejudice the payment of occupation costs. The treaty should include provision for the payment of occupation costs, but the nature of such provision must inevitably depend largely upon the attitude of the United States Government, which will be the largest claimant. 7. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS A number of other provisions of greater or less importance cannot properly be considered under the preceding general heads. Many of them will have the object of protecting the political or economic rights of States members of the United Nations or of their nationals. Any specific undertaking which may be required for the protection of aliens in Japan would fall within this category. There should be provision for the restitution to the original owners of property looted by the Japanese or removed by fraud or duress, and for the restoration to United Nations nationals of their pre-war property, rights and interests in Japan. Where property has suffered damage, this damage should be repaired or full compensation should be payable in the local currency. Japan should be required to subscribe to all international conventions to which she is not a party but by which it is in the Allied interest that she should be bound. In view of Japan's past record in whaling, it will be desirable not only that Japan should subscribe to the International Whaling Convention, but that careful supervision should be exercised over Japan's whaling activities. 8. POST-TREATY SUPERVISION OF JAPAN (a) General Considerations Many of the foregoing provisions which have been proposed for insertion in the peace treaty depend for their effectiveness on the existence of some control machinery. Without attempting to formulate detailed views as to the nature of such a control system, it is possible to suggest certain broad principles which satisfy the primary requirement of security. The system of control must be both durable and workable. To be durable it must contemplate the continued enforcement only of such provisions as are likely to command long-term support on the part of the supervisory powers. To be workable, it must involve neither undue strain upon the Powers nor undue interference with Japanese affairs. Indeed, to satisfy both requirements it would seem that the system should be the minimum necessary to achieve the basic objectives.