H.—l2

35. The Government had undertaken in 1941 to pay the costs of the Emergency Fire Service and also to provide all fire-fighting equipment required either under the modified Scheme B approved by War Cabinet or as might be required at any later stage of the war. This arrangement was given effect to in 1942 when the full Scheme C was adopted. The Government further agreed at this time to subsidize all Civil Defence expenditure of the local authorities on a£2 for £1 basis. The previous arrangement was modified to provide that all accommodation and billeting costs of the Emergency Fire Service and the equipment and general costs both of all fire patrols and the brigade auxiliaries in the non-vulnerable centres should be paid by the local authorities under this subsidy scheme.' The subsidy payments came to charge over a period of several years and it was not practicable to dissect the fire-protection costs from the other Civil Defence charges paid for under subsidy. The direct payments by Government for equipment and on the Emergency Fire Service exceeded £500,000, and on a conservative estimate the total cost of emergency fire protection was at least £800,000. Approximately one-third of this has been, or will be, recovered either by sale of surplus equipment for overseas requirements, transfer of equipment to the regular fire service, or sale of material still available for disposal. MAN-POWER 36. The wartime man-power position as it affected the service can be conveniently divided into three periods. For the first two years the internal position was much as in 1914-18. Man-power withdrawals were limited to the requirements of the 2nd N.Z.E.F. plus a limited number for Navy and for R.N.Z.A.F. air crews and the New Zealand training establishments. Primary production was softpedalled owing to shortage of shipping, and secondary industry largely restricted to the production for local requirements of materials no longer available from overseas. Most of the Fire Boards had during this period carried resolutions that enlistment of fire-brigadesmen would not be opposed and no appeals would be made for men called up for military service. A request was made by the Minister of Internal Affairs that auxiliary units should be formed from which the regular firemen going overseas could be replaced. This proposal was approved by the United Fire Brigades' Association, and these auxiliaries were formed by practically all the volunteer fire brigades. It was recognized, however, that training by itself is insufficient to ensure efficiency or the safety of the men working at a fire and that it was desirable to retain at least a few experienced men in each brigade. The staffing position in the regular brigades had in some cases become serious towards the end of 1941, and a conference of senior Brigade Superintendents, together with representatives of the Fire Boards' Association, the United Fire Brigades' Association, and the Union Federation, was called in September to consider the whole man-power position. It was then recommended that appeals should be made for men with three years' or more service in all cases where the number of experienced personnel fell below one-third of the normal brigade strength. 37. The second stage began when Japan entered the war. It was then considered necessary to establish a home-defence Arniy of two divisions and to develop the R.N.Z.A.F. in New Zealand on an operational basis. This involved the call-up of all available man-power. The consequent drain on both the regular and Emergency Fire Services, which were not given any special exemption, was such as to threaten seriously the efficiency of the former and to prevent the expansion of the latter to the numbers necessary for an effective fire defence of the vulnerable centres. The position arose that experienced firemen and E.F.S. personnel who had been given a highly technical training in specialized duties were called up to commence training in the home-defence Army. There was therefore a partial turnover of personnel throughout this period. The fire service, which was expected to provide protection against initial air attack, was required to train a continuous succession of recruits—these in due course being called up for the Army, in many cases before their fire-service training had even been completed. Several conferences were held, and a series of memoranda were issued to the Man-power Tribunals by the Director of National Service without achieving anything but a partial solution. The difficulty appeared to be that the Appeal Boards had absolute power and could at their discretion either accept or disregard the instructions of the Department. Every credit is due to the officers of both Services for the high standard of training actually achieved under these conditions, but had the organization to face the trial of major enemy attack, the man-power handicaps would inevitably have resulted in its falling short of their aims and desires. 38. The third stage marks the clearing-up of the Pacific war position which took place fairly rapidly after the beginning of 1943. From April onwards all appeals against overseas service were withdrawn by the Emergency Fire Service, except for men transferred to the permanent staff for the protection of special war risks. The fire service generally had by the end of 1943 reverted to the man-power basis agreed upon in 1941. The release of the home-service Army personnel and the discharge of longservice overseas men made it possible in 1944 to release even a number of the Grade I men from the permanent staffs. There was, however, a definite limit to the extent to which this could be done, since a considerable expansion of the secondary industries had taken place in the meantime and a high standard of fire protection was essential in the cities and larger towns in order to safeguard munitions and supplies of major value to the war effort. Most of the regular brigades were, and still are, maintained above pre-war strength, the ranks having been filled up in most cases by men from the E.F.S. or brigade auxiliaries. 39. It is necessary to record the opinion, which was expressed to Government at that time on behalf of the senior brigade officers, that particularly during the first eighteen months of the Japanese war the facts justified much more consideration than was given to the needs of the fire service. The Armed Forces were, by common consent, accorded first priority call on man-power. If, however---and this is represented to be the case in modern warfare—the initial attack is against the centres which supply the Armed Forces and fire is the principal weapon, it follows logically that the fire service should be included with the primary man-power requirements of the Armed Forces. In support of this it is to be noted that a high degree of physical fitness is required to stand up to the constant wetting, the exposure to smoky atmospheres, and the heavy work of handling charged hose lines up ladders and through and over buildings. The standard required is that laid down by the Army for overseas service, with the exception that the age limits are wider and that certain minor disabilities, such as flat feet, varicose veins, certain eyesight defects, &c., do not disqualify. 40. Both the regular and Emergency Services very deeply resented comments made on several occasions before, and by members of, Appeal Tribunals. Strong exception was taken to the viewpoint, which appeared to be fairly common, that the wearing of the uniform of the Armed Forces necessarily indicated the undertaking of a greater personnel hazard or more meritorious war service than did the uniform of the fire service,

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