A.—4

20

Anglo-Japanese Treaty in particular, and naval defence. There are other problems, of course, which are intimately associated with these. If we are to give effect to the principle, which I take it has already been accepted —viz., the right of the Dominions to sit at the Council table on a footing of equality, and to discuss with you and the other representatives the question of the foreign policy of the Empire —these also must not only be considered, but settled. Ido not think lam misinterpreting the opinions of all my friends here when I say that this voice, this share, in the Council of the Empire in regard to foreign policy must be a real one — must be one of substance and not merely a shadow. This involves the creation of • some kind of machinery ; and here we come to a very difficult position, to which I shal) refer very shortly later. We are now asked to deal with foreign policy, and in order that "we may do this you have said that Lord Curzon would review the present position of foreign affairs. We shall await that statement with great interest. The whole Empire is concerned in foreign policy, though this was for many years regarded as the sole prerogative of Great Britain. Wars are hatched by foreign policy. No one is able to say that any act affecting foreign nations will not, in the fullness of time, lead to war. No one is able to say that the most apparently trivial and innocent action will not involve us in international turmoil, and in the fullness of time bring us to the bloody plains of war. So, when we see on every side the British line—or, if you . like, the line of this Commonwealth of British nations—being lengthened and the line of defence necessarily thinned, the points of potential danger multiplied, we are naturally uneasy. We have seen that a cloud no bigger than a man's hand can cover the whole heavens. And so, sir—l speak only for myself, of course —I am sure you will quite understand our desire to know the reasons for your policy in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, in Russia, in Egypt, and your policy in Greece and Turkey. If I singled these things out it is not because they cover the whole field of foreign policy, but because these matters are perhaps the most obvious. Now, if we are to have an effective voice in the foreign policy of this country we must first of all know precisely how we stand, and the reasons for the policy adopted and the extent to which we are committed to it. I start with the assumption that our right to decide foreign policy is not denied. Very well, let us consider the thing under two heads—first, in regard to matters of foreign policy as they now present themselves before the British Government, and, second, in regard to policy in the future. We can express our opinions, and, if needs be, modify the present foreign policy by a full discussion and expression of opinion. Decisions can be registered and given effect to. But the position in regard to policy in the future is very difficult. Every day a new situation arises or may arise. How is it to be dealt with ? We shall be scattered to the four quarters of the earth. How are the Dominions to have an effective voice on foreign policy when, as things stand, they can only be told after things have been done and are not consulted beforehand ? That is a question which we shall have to consider. I stated, sir, at the outset that other matters than those three of which I spoke —foreign policy in general, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and naval defence —will arise intimately related to these, and that we shall have to discuss them. Difficulty of Communication. I come to one now. You yourself said yesterday, sir, that direct communication between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues overseas had worked well. So it has —that is to say, the principle has worked well —but I think I ought to tell you, sir, that it is rarely that one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, sometimes more than a day, before receiving your telegrams, a very good imitation of their substance. This arises through the great delay in the transmission of messages. lam not going into details now —I have set this matter down on the agenda — ....-but I want to say that it is absolutely essential, if we are going to have any effective voice in foreign policy, that we shall be in the closest possible touch with you and with each other, and that we shall know, not when the thing is done, but before the thing is done,' what is intended or what is desired to be done. This is essential because in foreign policy, as, indeed, in many cases in domestic policy, you cannot