I.—9b

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E. .1. CABKY

When to act : The Arbitration Court —the appointed public authority—should not be a body to be used after the trouble arises. It should be the eye of the public, ever watchful and investigating in order to prevent trouble arising. Our Arbitration Court has been the stepping-stone to the Supreme Court Bench—the Mecca of every lawyer. Its writ has been made subsidiary at all times to Supreme Court work. The Bill should stop that situation by ensuring the permanency and separaletioss of the Court. New Zealand has long ago given up the principle " the devil take the hindmost." Our labour laws anil their read] acceptance show a public appreciation of what is due to the worker and producer. Conditions of labour in any trade are accounted fair or unfair by quick and ready judgment of the public just according to what those conditions are. All these principles detailed above are accepted as being fair and reasonable in their application to ordinary industries. A political candidate making his election contest one in direct opposition to the bulk of those principles and their application in trade-dispute settlements would court overwhelming defeat; and yet in award after award many, if not at times all of them, have been flouted and set aside by the Arbitration Court a Court supposed to act at all times in equity and good conscience and in accord with the public mind. The living-wage: Take the first principle, the living-wage. Time and time again the Court has been urged to make this principle the basis of its awards. It has repeatedly failed to do so The whole public sense is antagonistic to sweating and insufficient wages. There are many awards and trade settlements in which a living-wage is not awarded. The failure of the Court to make the living-wage principle a basic factor of all awards has done more than anything else to sap the workers' confidence in the Court and the system. Ihe spirit of the times is, and fvcvy award of tin Court should so order, that the wage prescribed for the settlement of the dispute would be a wage which would meet the " normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized community, and permit of the matrimonial state of every adult worker and ensure for him and his family food, shelter, clothing, frugal comfort, education for the children, and provision for evil days." How many awards of the New Zealand Arbitration Court provide such a wage standard? Eight hours: The second principle is the eight-hours day. What labour principle is more generally accepted than that? It is New Zealand's boast. And yet when unions seek through the Court to have the principle applied in the settlement of the dispute they are turned down without as much as a reason for the Court's rejection of the principle. With ihe question of holidays it is the same. The Court refuses to give heed to many of the pleas for the weekly half-holiday, and the workers in the seven-day industries, for instance, have given up hope of any redress from the Court in that direction. Were a strike to take place in an industry over the question the public to a unit would agree as to the reasonableness of the demand. The Court ignores it, and the union is debarred by the penalty clauses of the Act from pressing the point by striking after being turned down by the unpublic judgment of the Court. With the other principles the same reasoning applies. It will be noted that the suggestions are in the diiection of making it optional for the Court to apply them in the settlement judgment, but the settlement judgment in all fairness should show the reasons actuating the. Court in its refusal to provide for a settlement on such accepted lines. One of the greatest factors that has made for confidence in the Federal arbitration decisions is the knowledge that the " reason for " will accompany the judgment. The dissatisfied union, before securing public support, would have to unreason the reason of the judgment; and no matter how keenly either side might feel aggrieved at the provisions prescribed, confidence in the Court would be lessened or strengthened according to the public's appreciation of the reasons appended. On the above questions of principle there is now no need for further experiment. On the questions of how best to apply the machinery of the Act there is admittedly room for further trials. A single Court : Whether it is bettei to provide just the one Court of Arbitration to be the sole tribunal, or whether it is wise to create minor preliminary tribunals, is still debated in unions. A single Arbitration Court possessing the average confidence of the workers of New Zealand would soon be unable to expeditiously cope with the requests for regulation of labourconditions from organized trades-unions. The remedy would be to provide more Courts, and then when that occasion arose the several Courts might be given jurisdiction to act exclusively in certain sets of industries perfecting their grasp of technical details by permanent relation with that set of industries. Stability, sequence of action and judgment, and more general conformity with the principles and spirit of the Act would be secured by making the one body solely responsible for its administration-. This has been recognized in the Federal ami West Australian Acts, where the single Court is the only tribunal created under the Act. Stress of work necessitating the creation of two or more Courts, provided guiding principles were definitely laid down in the Act. would not mar those advantages. The Federal Arbitration Court consists of a President alone. In West Australia, as here, the Court has the assistance of two representatives, one chosen by the organized workers, the other by the organized employers. The addition of party representatives makes for the machinery improvement of the system. It enables further reasoning of the questions in dispute after the hearing of the advocates for the disputants. It encourages confidence in the system by creating a more direct connecting-link between the Court and the organized parties. But continuity and permanency of office must be provided in the appointment of party assessors. The proposal to appoint assessors to flu- Court merely to deal witli Hie single dispute to be superseded by other assessors as disputes succeed each other will not find majority favour in the trades-unions. The proposal would make for the weakening of the responsibility of the Courts. It would be inimical to labour in that it would not promote steady consistent contest for and adhesion to labour's main principles. Tt would not make for