33

D.-4

34. Do you now say that the prospects of these reserves being made interfered with the finance in 1891 ?—No ; I say the whole indefiniteness of the position. 35. I want you, Mr. Scott, to tell us, if you can, what causes created the difficulty of finance in 1891. You have told us about clause 33 : will you be good .enough to specify what other causes operated ? 36. Hon. E. Blake.] Did you say the prospect or intimation that mining reserves might be proclaimed in the future affected the finance in 1891 ?—No ; I did not say that. 37. You put it down to the indefiniteness of the whole position and the friction about sales ?—■ Yes ; there was constant friction of one kind or another. 38. As far as I can understand, without suggesting that I appreciate it for a moment, the frictions are on paper and in the letters, so that we need not trouble ourselves about word of mouth ? —I have not looked at the papers in any way for, I suppose, two years, and at this moment it is rather difficult to recollect back to then. It being conceded by the company that the causes of trouble, whatever they are, are on paper, it would not be necessary to hear them again. 39. Mr. Stringer.] If you had a grievance, either you or Mr. Wilson would soon have put it in writing ? —As far as I was concerned the difficulties were arranged or tried to be arranged verbally. It is generally the quickest way. 40. However, we can deal with the grievances in the correspondence, so that I will not trouble you about the verbal ones that you say were arranged. 41. Now, Mr. Scott, you say you continued in the service of the company until what date?— Until July, 1894. 42. And, up to that time you had principally to manage the land business ?—Only. 43. Will you tell us when the company first definitely decided to abandon the Nelson end of the line ? —The first intimation I had of it was at the time of the parliamentary Committee, in 1892, I think. 44. You learned then for the first time that the company did not intend to proceed with the line at the Nelson end on the basis of the contract ? —Yes ; the general manager then stated it, through Mr. Bell, I think. 45. In the course of your connection with the business, did you or others in the service of the company ascertain that they had made a very great mistake in estimating the possible traffic of the Nelson end of the line —that the company had ?—I am not aware that the company ever did estimate the traffic returns, but the way was that we as delegates submitted the estimates we had received from the Government or official papers to the company. I have always myself said that I could not make any estimate of the traffic on the North and South, and I am not aware that any definite attempt at an estimate was made by the company. 46. Do you know as a matter of fact that the statutory estimate of the cost of the Nelson line was likely to be very much exceeded ?—Yes, I became aware on my return to New Zealand that the Government estimate I took Home—what you call the statutory estimate—was borne out by the plans roughly, but that that was completely wrong. In fact, this plan was not nearly as good as it appeared to be —the North and South plan. 47. And the result was that the line was going to cost you? —One-half as much again. 48. As the statutory estimate?—Eoughly. I am speaking as a layman, and roughly. 49. That was after the contract was signed?— When we came back. 50. After the contract was signed ?—I did not know until another couple of years, because the question had not been gone into. 51. Can you tell us when you first learnt that ? —Shortly after the Eeefton piece was finished. I do not know whether you can give me the cue as to when the Eeefton line was finished. Mr. Wilson: February 15th, 1892. Mr. Stringer : It was after that time. Witness : As far as I was concerned, by learning the proportion of cost one part of the line would bear to the remainder, it was clear then that the Government estimate was wrong. 52. Hon. E. Blake.] When did you form that impression?— When I got to know what the cost of the Eeefton line was going to amount to. 53. It must have been towards the end of the construction of the Eeefton line ?—Yes. 54. Mr. Stringer.] I think it is correct that when you came to construct the Eeefton line you found it very much exceeded the statutory estimate? —I believe it did, speaking from memory. 55. Eeefton was the simplest and easiest portion to construct, was it not ?—ln appearance, on first looking over it, it might be thought so, but there was more expense than anticipated owing to the number of rivers and creeks. At the same time, it was not one of the more difficult ones. There are easier pieces, which would be found in the north and south. 56. Was it because of the fact that the Eeefton construction was greater than you anticipated that you estimated the discrepancy would be still greater on the north extension?—l think, so far as my knowledge is concerned, that the proportion of actual cost to the estimated cost was such as to immensely increase the total cost. 57. It is obvious that it became a very undesirable portion of the line to construct?— Further north. 58. On those terms ? —Yes. 59. On the contract terms ?—Yes. 60. And I think the company would have been glad to get out of it if they could ?—I never was informed of that in any way—excepting what the general manager said before the parliamentary Committee. 61. You were at the parliamentary inquiry, of course. Do you remember Mr. Wilson being asked in 1893 with regard to the proposals of the company as to the continuation of this line north ? —(No answer.) s*—D. 4.