7

G.— 3

such certificate has been confirmed by Act of the General Assembly." Our recommendation, therefore, avails nothing until the Legislature takes further action. It is the Legislature that validates, not this Court. If we stretch our authority, as inquirers, too far, and inquire into matters not committed to us by Parliament, then Parliament still has the remedy in its own hands, and can refuse to take further action. But if it should so happen that, though we have acted beyond our delegation, and "recommended" in excess of our powers, and Parliament considers the case one that it ought to take further action upon, then it can act on our recommendation regardless of the verbal limits of this statute. I quite admit that such a doctrine as this would be a very dangerous one to apply to an ordinary statute conferring a right or giving a status, but this statute confers no right and gives no status. What we do is a mere shadow till Parliament chooses to give it substance by a further statute. That type of legal mind which delights in narrow interpretation, and values the letter more than the spirit, will strenuously dispute this construction of the Act of 1892, and insist that whether it be unique or not, or whether it confers rights or not, should make no difference in the rules of interpretation applicable to it; but I contend that its peculiarity makes all the difference, and entitles us to enlarge rather than contract its operations. By enlarging them we cannot hurt any one, for the Legislature has still to come after us with its action. By contracting them we may do serious injury, for we not only prevent the possibility of remedial action by Parliament, but by our refusal we should actually deprive Mr. Tiffen (if this case be within our jurisdiction) of land which has cost him over £12,000, and that admittedly ought to be his, if his transactions are honest and straightforward. I have always maintained that Courts exist to uphold men's rights and not to sacrifice them to worthless technicalities. The hair-splitting arguments which still disgrace our Courts and pass for learning make one blush, especially remembering that there are Courts where the display of that kind of learning is scouted. The 10th section of this Act provides that if we refuse our certificate " the shares in respect of which such certificate is refused shall be held by the Native owners freed from any liability in respect of such transaction." Thus our refusal carries serious consequences, though our granting of the certificate gives nothing. Therefore do I hold that the broad construction is the proper one, and that the narrow wording of the Act ought not to confine its operations only to transactions legal in their inception, and to deeds " intended to enable the alienee to obtain a freehold by due process of law." Mr. Day, the counsel who preceded Mr. Eees in the conduct of this case for the Natives, referred to another matter which I ought to mention, for it bears on this question of construction. He urged that it would be simply outrageous that such a Court as the Native Land Court should be held to have power to construe this statute as they please without bridle of any kind, and he insisted that at all events the ordinary appeal must lie to the Chief Judge to grant a re-hearing before two other Judges and another Assessor. I hold that no appeal lies under this statute, and this very peculiarity adds to my proof that we are simply agents of Parliament for inquiry and report. Section 14, under which the only semblance of an appeal is given from this Court, shows that no appeal to two other Judges and an Assessor can lie. That section 14 authorises the Chief Judge to refer back to us our certificate " for further inquiry, with such directions as to the taking of evidence or otherwise as he may consider necessary." It is difficult to understand the drift of this provision, which allows the Chief Judge to compel us to vary our recommendation after it is once sent in with our "reasons for it, and the evidence upon which it is based," without any indication to the Legislature that it is no longer our decision, but that of the Chief Judge. But, whatever may be the effect of this clause, it is clear that the Chief Judge (not two Judges and an Assessor) is the only person who can come between us and Parliament. I deny the right of the Supreme Court to intervene between this Court and Parliament, whose agents and delegates we are. If the Supreme Court by its prohibition forbids us to certify we shall of course obey ; but if the Speaker of either House of the Higher Court of Parliament should, upon resolution of his Chamber, order us to send up our certificate notwithstanding that prohibition, we are bound to obey the Speaker also, and this class of jurisdictions appears to me patent proof that the Supreme Court cannot have power to forbid us to send up our certificate as the statute directs us to do. I hold that the Supreme Court must leave it to Parliament to deal with us as its agents. The whole framework of the Act forbids interference with us from any quarter except the Chief Judge, and also invites breadth of construction by us as to the performance of our duties to Parliament, and it is upon that basis and upon the history of validation legislation that I build my inference that the Legislature intended all invalid purchases, whether lawful or unlawful in their inception, to be dealt with under this Act, even though the language of the Act fails to express that intention. Mr. Day said that it was only as to partition he had argued that these appeals existed to two Judges and an Assessor, not as to the rest of the statute. He never desired to state that two Judges and an Assessor were to re-hear the validation portion. The Judge: The Act makes no difference. It is only the Chief Judge who can interfere between us and and Parliament under this Act at any stage of its work.

Judgment No. lll.—Puhatikotiko No. 1. His Honour Judge Barton delivered the following judgment on Monday, the 15th May, 1893 :— The Court has now to decide which of Mr. Tiffen's purchases it will recommend for validation and which it will not recommend. The difficulties arising under this Act, partially explained in our former judgment, have compelled us to adopt a construction bold for any Court, but doubly so for a Court so constituted as the Native Land Court. Our only alternative course, would have been to