REPORT OE THE MOTUEKA ELECTION COMMITTEE.

27

H.—No. 14.

Mr. Backer.

Bfch Sept., 1871.

witness entirely of truth. Mr. Bell has stated all the circumstances under which he became connected with the voting of these men. It is very important for the Committee to observe that Mr. Bell's connection with these men did not take place until after they had actually arrived at the place, or close to the place, where the polling was going on, and that these men, according to their own account, had made up their minds to go down and vote for Sir David Monro. That is perfectly clear. The Bosselmann who was examined stated that he came down intending to vote for Sir David Monro ; and I was going to call the attention of the Committee specially to the fact that the only other witness brought forward for tho purpose of proving bribery had signified that intention at a period long anterior to Mr. Bell's connection with him, because he admits that he signed the requisition. Mr. Allan : I do not want to interrupt Counsel, but, as I understand the case, it stands before the Committee thus—that several witnesses I proposed to call would support the evidence of the witnesses whom I did call; that there was the evidence, not of one man, but of several men, who are prepared to give the same evidence. The Chairman : That is not inconsistent with what Mr. Travers says. Mr. Travers: Who arc the men ? —I had no notice of who are the witnesses. Mr. Allan: Sixtus. Mr. Travers : Will my friend undertake to say that Sixtus voted for Sir David Monro. Mr. Allan : I will undertake to say nothing. The Chairman: You should confine you self to this fact, whether the money given for travelling expenses was a legitimate purpose on the part of Sir David Monro. Mr. Travers: I am not going to blink the fact that distinctions are drawn in the judgments to which I shall call the attention of the Committee, between money paid in pursuance of a previous condition and operating probably as an inducement to give the vote, and money paid in respect of ordinary travelling expenses after the vote has been given and without previous arrangement. The judgments which I am about to read to the Committee are those of Judges of the highest position in England —Baron Alderson and Justice Williams —and they clearly draw the distinction between the case of a vote given in consequence of a previous promise to pay expenses, and that of the payment of expenses of witnesses who have voted. There is a great distinction between voting under a contract, and voting and receiving money afterwards by way of expenses, tho payment in the latter case not operating in any way as an inducement for giving the vote. lam entitled to call attention to the character of the evidence, and to show that there was no change of mind whatsoever; that all of these men had come to the conclusion that they could not afford to lose time, and therefore would rather abstain from voting at all. That is an important point. Bosselmann distinctly stated that had they not been paid their expenses for coming down—not that they would have voted for the other side, but that they would not have voted at all. It was not as if there was any change of mind amongst them. They had made up their minds to vote for Sir David Monro ; but they said they would not have consented to waste their time in coming down unless they had been satisfied that their reasonable travelling expenses and so forth would be paid. Bell's connection did not take place with these men until they were actually at the polling place, forty miles from the scene of their labour. It was a previous arrangement with themselves that they should demand their reasonable expenses. There was no arrangement whatever to that effect with any authorized agent of Sir David Monro before they had actually started, and so earnest were these men in their desire to record their votes on that occasion that they actually started in the middle of the night, no doubt after having performed their ordinary day's labour. And it was not until they had reached the place of polling that any communication whatever took place between them and Bell, whose evidence, as I before observed, was given with the greatest degree of frankness and propriety. He was my friend's witness, and answered every question put to him. He was but little cross-examined, and he showed that he was acting as an honest man should do, namely, with the greatest care for his own character and with the greatest regard for the position of the gentleman whose election he had been promoting. Now, the case of Cooper v. Slade, 6E. and 8., and the judgments of the learned Judges, had an important bearing upon questions of this kind. The following is the judgment of Baron Alderson : — "In determining this question, we are to look to the declaration : and as that follows the words of the statute on which it is founded, we have to construe that statute. We are not called on to go into any general considerations as to what would be bribery if the statute had simply prohibited that offence by that word. What we have to do is. to construe a positive law which enacts that to ' promise' ' money' to a voter 'in order to induce any voter to vote,' and * corruptly' to give money to a voter 'on account of • such voter having voted,' are several matters which subject to a penalty the person so promising or giving. And upon the construction of this statute, we are of opinion that a promise to a voter of his travelling expenses, conditionally on his coming and voting for the promiser, is within the first cited part of the enactment; but that a promise of travelling expenses not so conditioned, is not. Again, consider the consequence of holding that an unconditional promise to pay travelling expenses is within the Statute. Would giving a free passage by railway be so, as a gift of a valuable consideration ? If not, there seems an absurdity: namely, that to give the price paid for the place is illegal, but to give the place itself is not. If the free passage is within the Statute, so also would be taking a person in a private carriage ; and the result would be, that any one taking in his own carriage a voter to the place of election, without any bargain that he should vote, would be guilty of a crime or misdemeanour, punishable by fine and imprisonment, subject to a penalty of £100, and liable to be disqualified for life from voting; which is an alarming and almost an absurd consequence. We are further of opinion that, if the letter of 12th August, 1854, is evidence of a promise within the Statute, namely, a promise to pay conditionally on the voter voting, and made to induce him to vote for Lord Maidstone and the plaintiff in error, then there is no evidence against the plaintiff in error that he authorized it. For we agree with the opinion he expressed, namely, that it is lawful to defray travelling expenses to bring up the out-voters ; and we cannot see that that opinion, which does not imply that the voting may be made a condition, authorized the making of a promise so conditioned, and therefore (as the plaintiff must contend) a promise prohibited by law. This, of course, would necessitate a venire de now.