A.—No. 1

24

DESPATCHES EROM THE GOVERNOR OE

Eebruary for the embarkation of this regiment in 11.M.5. " Himalaya," in pursuance of your Lordship's instructions to me, those instructions Avere overridden in consequence of different orders having been sent by telegraph, (without any notice to me,) from the Horse Guards and Admiralty respectively, to the Major-General Commanding and to the Naval authorities on this station. Nor have I received from home any copy of the orders now issued to General Chute, so that I am not in a position to deny authoritatively the existence of his alleged discretionary powers. It will be seen, however, that in my Memorandum of the 24th ultimo (of which I beg to solicit an attentive perusal), I repeated the opinion which I had endeavoured to impress on the Ministers before the Parliamentary Resolutions respecting the troops Avere proposed, viz, : " that all action of this " kind is now too late, and that General Chute has no choice but to carry out his " orders." I thought it right to add that no intimation of the existence of the alleged discretion as to the removal of the 18th Regiment had been given to me either by the Imperial Government or by General Chute himself. 4. It will be further perceived that I felt it to be my duty " earnestly to " recommend Ministers not to relax, in the slightest degree, on the chance of " retaining Imperial aid, the exertions already made, or which can be made " hereafter, for internal self-defence." I hope that I shall be informed Avhether I have rightly interpreted the views of Her Majesty's Government, especially with regard to my practical suggestions concerning the Militia, the Armed Constabulary, and the defensive works. 5. As I have already intimated elsewhere, I have as yet no information as to the exact period at which the last battalion of the Queen's Troops Avill be removed from this Colony; nor is it probable that I shall know General Chute's final decision on this question before the departure of this month's English mail. I enclose copies of my last letters to General Chute and Commodore Lambert respectively, forwarding, at the urgent request of my Ministers, and simply for the information of those officers, the above-mentioned Ministerial Memoranda. I have, &c, The Right Hon. Earl Granville, K.G. G. E. BOWEN. P.S. —August 7th. —I have the honor to fonvard herewith the usual monthly Memorandum from the Minister for Native Affairs and Defence. I enclose also a copy of the telegraphic message Avhich, at the request of my Ministers, I this day send to your Lordship through the Governor of Ceylon. Einally, I forward six copies of "An Act to make provision by Law for the Payment of Imperial Troops," (32 and 33 Victoria, No. 17,) A\dvich has been passed almost unanimously by both/ houses of the New Zealand Parliament. G. E. B.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12. Memorandum by Mr. Eox. Wellington, 22nd July, 1869. Tee alarming news contained in the enclosed communications just received from Waikato and elsewhere of the arrival of Te Kooti and his armed band at Tokangamutu, the head-quarters of the Maori King, and of the probability of a combined attack on the settled districts in the neighbourhood of Auckland, renders it imperative on His Excellency's Responsible Advisers to lay again before His Excellency an urgent representation of the disasters which the removal of the only Imperial regiment in tho Colony at such a critical moment would in all probability occasion. Apart from all questions of general policy with respect to the retention of Imperial Troops in New Zealand, the only question now for consideration is the immediate result which may ensue from the instant departure of the 18th Regiment from this Colony, and the cifect it may have on the hostile Natives who are now gathered on the outskirts of our settlements near Auckland, and who are seriously deliberating whether or not to attack those settlements. Ministers cannot, consistently with their duty to the Colony, conceal from His Excellency their opinion that the removal of this regiment at such a juncture will precipitate a conflict, and will directly invite the rebels in arms and the King party, the latter of whom alone can at once muster on the spot 1,700 armed men, to unite in devastation and massacre. Independently of this large number of men at one place, the Maori King has numerous adherents throughout the whole of the Northern Island, who would almost certainly, in concert with their party, rise, at once. All the exertions of the Colony, strenuous as they have been, to place itself in a position of self-defence and to suppress insurrection, are paralyzed by this step, the eifect of which is not merely of a negative and passive character, such as the withdrawal of so much support, but of positive and active injury, tantamount to that which would be caused by the desertion of a large part of an army on the field of battle in the face of the enemy.