TO THE GOVERNOR OE NEW ZEALAND.

11

A,—No. la.

towns or military stations, or to engage in active service. The Act and resolutions, however, merely speak of pecuniary contribution. And further, I could not but suppose, from the terms of your telegram, that the General Assembly prayed Her Majesty's Government to allow the 18th Regiment to be detained for some indefinite period in New Zealand, and had pledged itself to pay such contribution as Her Majesty's Government might demand for that indefinite detention. But it now appears that the prayer of the resolutions is not addressed to Her Majesty's Government, but virtually to Sir Trevor Chute, who is requested to detain the troops till the decision of Her Majesty's Government is known, and that the Act only assures him that the Colony will, if required, contribute towards the support of the troops, pending that decision. No offer or pledge is made, directly or indirectly, by the Government or by the Legislature, that the Colony will accept the decision of the Home Government respecting the terms on which the troops are to be finally stationed in New Zealand. The question substantially raised by these papers has been considered with the attention which its importance demands, and, as you are already aware, Her Majesty's Government have felt bound to adhere to the decision already communicated to you, that the Queen's troops should not be employed in the present hostilities. I do not under-rate the arguments which may be urged in favour of that employment. They are obvious in themselves, and have been forcibly urged by yourself and others. But the objections to that course arc overwhelming. All experience, and not least, the experience of New Zealand itself, has shown the fatal consequences of carrying on war under a divided authority. It can but lead to continual differences, imperfect co-operation, interrupted enterprises and the other evils which are alleged to have characterized the Maori war. The British and Colonial Troops must therefore be placed under the same command. But on the one hand, Her Majesty's Government arc under a responsibility for the safety, and honor, and discipline of British Troops, which they cannot transfer to a Colonial Ministry; and, on the other hand, they could not assume the conduct of a war, to be carried on ostensibly at the expense of the Colony, without making themselves chargeable for its ill success, and entitling the colonists to expect that it would bo prosecuted, —at the expense, if necessary, of this country, —to a successful issue. It may indeed be said that the British Troops might, in accordance with the conditions at present insisted on by Her Majesty's Government and suggested by your telegram, remain in the Colony for the mere purpose of holding certain towns or military stations; but such an arrangement could not, I think, be really maintained. If disasters are apprehended, it is impossible to suppose that the British regiment would not be counted on by the colonists as part of the force they have always available to avert or retrieve them; and if these disasters really occur, it is practically certain that, in the absence of other sufficient force, the regiment will be so used. The alternative will then recur which I have shown to be inadmissible: either this country must place its troops at the command of a Government not responsible to itself, or it must assume the responsibility of the war, or it must resign itself to the disasters consequent on a double government. And these considerations derive increased weight from the circumstances of New Zealand. If the active employment of British Troops in a Colony in which Besponsible Government has been established under ordinary circumstances is fraught with difficulties, it is still more objectionable when the presence of these troops is calculated to encourage the. Colonial Government in a policy which the Home Government have always regarded as pregnant with danger. The present distress of the Colony arises mainly from two circumstances, —■ the discontent of the Natives, consequent on the confiscation of their land, and the neglect of successive Governments to place on foot a force sufficiently formidable to overawe that discontent. That the discontent of the Natives does mainly arise from the confiscation of their lands is manifest. The neighbourhood of Tauranga and other confiscated