A.—No. 1

30

DESPATCHES FROM THE GOVERNOR OP NEW

Sir D. Cameron. Sib George Grey. orders which precluded them from taking any Cameron had written to say that he intended to active part in the operations against the pa, I beg attack the place himself in the spring,—that preto forward copies of a correspondence between parations were to be made for that purpose, —and General AVaddy and myself on the subject, from that they were afraid to interfere to defeat this which your Lordship will see how little foundation intention. General Waddy distinctly stated in there was for such statement. his first letter, of the 19th of July, that he would not direct an attack on the pa until General Cameron directed that such an attack should be made. 25. It appears, on the contrary, from General On the 19th Brigadier-General Waddy informed AVaddy's letter, that whilst that officer was pre- me that he could not direct an immediate attack pared to employ the troops under his command in on the AYereroa Pa unless he received the orders any way that could conduce to the capture of the of General Cameron to do so, who was at that pa, Sir George Grey displayed very little anxiety date distant in point of time from fourteen to for his co-operation, or for the arrival of the rein- fifteen days from Wanganui. Brigadier-General forcements he had requested him to send from AVaddy however undertook upon the same day, as AVanganui. a considerable time might elapse before he could 26. According to the Governor's Despatch, it receive orders from General Cameron, to establish was at two o'clock in the morning of the 20th that without delay a post of four hundred men at a he determined to commence operations against point I indicated, which post would serve at once the pa at once, without waiting for reinforce- as a moral support for the Local Forces and ments; and General AVaddy being at that time Natives, and answer the purposes of a post of at AVanganui, distant only twenty miles from the observation. pa, Sir George Grey might easily have communi- Brigadier-General AVaddy started into Wancated with him by mounted orderly in two or ganui to carry this arrangement out. I underthree hours, and the reinforcements might have stood distinctly that the troops were to march joined him on the afternoon of the 20th, or at from that place on the 20th of July, and were to latest on the morning of the 21st, before the pa arrive at the point arranged upon the morning of was evacuated. the 21st, and that Brigadier-General Waddy was 27. Sir G. Grey, however, did not think it to arrive with them. There was no change in my necessary to acquaint General AVaddy with the plans. I had determined on the 19th to attack change he had made in his plans, or to communi- the pa, and after inspecting the ground, I, during cate with him at all until after the evacuation of the course of the night of the 19th (that is, by the pa, but left him under the impression that 2 a.m. on the 20th), had decided on all the details nothing would be attempted against the pa until of the attack. All these were based on the suphe arrived with the guns and reinforcements from position that, as had been promised, the troops AVanganui. would march from Wanganui upon the 20th, and arrive on the 21st. The 20th however proved a rainy day, the order for the march of the troops was countermanded by Brigadier-General Waddy, and their march was delayed until the 21st from the rain. This change was not communicated to me, and I passed all the 21st in a state of great anxiety, expecting the momentary arrival of Brigadier-General Waddy and the reinforcements ; and I did not know until the night of the 21st or the morning of the 22nd, after the Natives had fled from the pa, the reason why the reinforcements had not arrived on the morning of the 21st. 28. And this is the more extraordinary, as, if The enclosed memorandum from Mr. Parris (see the position of Captain Brassey at Pipiriki was as Appendix G.) will show that a strong reinforcecritical, and the necessity of marching to his relief ™ent was rapidly moving up to strengthen the pa, as urgent as is represented in the Despatch, and whilst Captain Brassey's own letters, and those of if it was true that, had a larger force been at other persons, published with the original papers, the disposal of the Governor, he would have been show how critical was his position, and how enabled to occupy a second point below the pa, great his need. See especially in his own letter and thus to cut off the retreat of the Natives, of the 21st July, " Simus sine rebus belli satis. he had the strongest reason for wishing that the My cry, if I could make it heard, would be the reinforcements should join him with as little delay M. M." It seems almost cruel, when so brave as possible. a mail thus expresses himself, to say he was in no 29. In point of fact, however, no risk was in- danger, curred, nor any advantage lost, by the non-arrival of the reinforcements from AVanganui. Captain Brassey's post was strong enough to defy any force the rebels could bring against it, and some My opinion is quite different from General days afterwards when the communication with Cameron's on these points. I was at the place, him was re-opened, he and his detachment were which he was not. I had a good Native force and found perfectly safe. Nor would the occupation trained men of the Colonial Forces with me. of the point referred to by Sir George Grey have Many years' experience qualifies me to form a enabled him to cut off the retreat of the garrison, judgment on such subjects, aud lam sure General whose escape it would have been impossible to Cameron is wrong in what he here says. have prevented by night, even if he had invested G. Grey.

Euclosures 1 to 4.