E—No. 2

For our part, we think that under no circumstances would it be wise in Sir George Grey to undertake a movement into the Waikato to pull down the king flag, suppress the king movement, and enforce Colonel Browne's terms. Equally unwise would it be to hold up in terrorem to the Natives a mere pretence of such a plan of operations. If the king party or their adherents are guilty of outrage upon settlers or their property, wheresoever they may be, whether on Native or European ground, it will be then for the Government to cousitler the proper means to be taken. In the meantime our position should be that of watchfulness, giving the unfriendly natives clearly to understand that any hostile aggression on their part will lead to sharp and swift measures of retaliation; though we hold it to be in the highest degree unlikely that the Natives, or any section of them, will be guilty of any such hostile aggression. Ou the question of undertaking military operations in the Waikato country, we have the opinions of Colonel Browne himself, the Military authorities, and the Military Defence Committee of both Houses of Assembly, who are all agreed that it would not be safe to move troops into that district without a large increase of our military force. Sir George Grey can himself judge whether the Home Government is likely to send additional troops, or whether he is prepared to recommend it. We, as Ministers, must say that without additional aid, particularly in the way of protection to the Southern Provinces of this island, no such movement ought to be undertaken. We rest these opinions on grounds of inexpediency iu a military point of view. We do not say that ou other grounds we should not equally object to such an aggressive movement, as uncalled for, attended with grave risk, costly, and not likely to produce adequate results. If it be decided not to undertake military operations against the Waikatos, we think it best to let the Natives understand our intentions. We see no good, on the contrary much evil, in keeping up false excitement, irritating the Native mind, rousing undefined alarms, stirring up against us their sentiments of pride and nationality, and probably leading the Government into a position where it may fiud itself unable to advance with safety or retreat with credit. Better far, in our opinion, if we do not mean aggressive war, to say so. If it be said that Government is bound by Colonel Browne's declarations, we hold the present Government free from any such embarassmeut. The circumstances are altogether new, and justify a new course of treatment. What course, then, should be pursued towards the king party, supposing them to persist in their present attitude of sulky indepcndeuce? In our opinion they should be left as they are, — treated with indifference, —and, as far as may be, regarded as in a state of outlawry. And they should be made to understand that such is the light in which we intend to regard them. We shall find means of distinguishing between frieuds and enemies, aud the Natives will not be slow to find out that their own interests will lie in returning to friendly relations with us. We have no confident expectation that the king movement will disappear, or the king flag be pulled dowu, on the occasion of Sir George Grey's visit to the Waikato ; and we think that he should be prepared for that contingency. But it would be worse than an absurdity to make such a matter a casus belli. To apply to the Natives of New Zealand principles of allegiance and treason drawn from our own jurisprudence, is simply preposterous. As to enforcing restitution of plunder, or compelling the Natives to allow roads to be made through their country, it may be well to insist ou these as conditions for conferring social and political advantages upon them; but very idle to make the non-compliance with such terms a ground of war. But, at the ensuing meeting at the Waikato, the language of the Governor to the Natives who have taken part in the king movement should, in our opinion, distinctly mark the Governor's disapprobation. The folly of that movement, if regarded as an attempt to establish a distinct nationality, should be pointed out. The absurdity of their endeavour to maintain a separate government, and the mischiefs which they will bring on themselves, and the benefits of which they will deprive themselves, should be shown to them. The opportunity should not be lost of insisting upon such topics. Above all, we must not treat all alike, friends and foes; our old allies and those who are at the best but half friends. The language and tone should be different towards those different classes. As regards the offer of improved social institutions, it should be made only to those who are friends, or willing to be such; and the Natives should bo made to understand that the Governor does not intend to force their adoption. They are in fact a boon of great value, which should be rather granted in answer to earnest solicitations, than volunteered as a new scheme contrived and peremptorily enjoined by the Governor, or pressed on their acceptance. Presented to them in that form, they may be viewed with jealousy aud suspicion. As regards the Ngatiruanuis and Tarauakis, we do not think that the Governor, in addressing the Waikatos, should speak on the subject with an uncertain voice. The Natives generally should be told in plain terms, that the Governor means to take such security for the future good behaviour of these Natives, as shall ensure the British settlements, Taranaki in particular, against a repetition of hostile attack. What particular measures he may adopt for that purpose, whether the formation of roads, the establishment of military posts, or the like, will of course rest with His Excellency; but the state of Taranaki demands decisive action, and the intentions of the Government on this point ought to be clearly stated to the Natives: they should be informed that, whatever the Government may determine on that subject will be carried out. Above all, we think it desirable to threaten nothing which we do not mean, and are certain of performing; aud what we do mean should be clearly stated. As regards the financial aspect of the experiment about to be made, Ministers have already addressed His Excellency in another memorandum. They will only add their belief that the

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