E—No. 3c

FURTHER PAPERS RELATIVE TO

transport, I lost no time after my return to New Plymouth on the 28th August, in causing to be warned for embarkation as many of them as the vessels placed at my disposal were able to accommodate. I regret to say, however, that in my endeavours to carry out this very desirable measure, I did not meet with that cordial co-operation on the part of the Civil Authorities of the Province, which, in the delicate position I was placed in, I had a right to expect, and thrf people shewed so much unwillingness to leave the place that after only about 112 women and 282 children had been shipped, I found that without resorting to actual force no more could be induced to go. Under these circumstances T found myself most reluctantly compelled to abandon a measure whicli I believed to be essential to the efficient prosecution of the war and the sanitary state of the town. In the meantime I neglected no opportunity of attacking the enemy wherever he shewed himself. On the 20th August a number of rebels having been seen on the cleared ground near Elliott's farm, I despatched a party of 250 men under Lieut.-Colonel Murray, 65th Regiment, ■who, after ;i skirmish, in which the enemy suffered some loss, with no casualty uri our side, drove them back into ihe bush. The detachment at the Waireka under Major Ilutchins, 12th Regiment, succeeded on several occasions in inflicting loss on the eremy without any casualty on our part. On my return from Auckland I found that the enemy had abandoned their strong positions at Puketakuere and Waireka, which were immediately destroyed by the Troops, and a large portion of them left t't>e neighbourhood, the Waikatos going northward, and the Ngatiruanuis and a part of the Taranakis, south. I have not been able to learn the cause of this sudden and unexpected alteration in their plans, but it is certain that whatever may have been the motive it cannot have been long premeditated, as nearly up to the day of their departure, they continued to improve their defensive works, which, at Waireka especially, were of very considerable extent, and must have cost them a vast amount of labour. I looked upon this movement as a subject rather of regret than of congratulation, as it prevented me from carrying out my intention of attacking; Puketakauere the position of which, owing to its distance from the bush, offered perhaps a more favourable opportunity than any which is likely to occur again of surrounding and cutting off the retreat of the enemy. I have, in previous Despatches, informed your Excellency of the successive attempts which I subsequently made to surround and surprise the rebels, the result of which has been to convince me of the utter hopelessness of all endeavours to prevent their escape from any place which they do not intend to defend. I cannot, however, agree with you in thinking that these operations can by any possibility be construed by them into a retirement on the part of the Troops and a success on their own. The actual state of the case is as follows :— During the past few weeks the Troops under my command have destroyed between 20 and 30 pahs, many of them very recently built, and provided with rifle pits and other defences, constructed in the most careful and elaborate manner. The rebels did not venture to defend any of these places but deserted them all on the approach of the Troops, in some cases in such haste that on our entry we found meat half cooked on their fires. We have also destroyed a great number ot " whares" or native habitations, and a considerable quantity of provisions. During thb whole of this period the enemy have been suffering very severely from sickness caused by privation and exposure, and I have certain information that they have lost a good many men, including several of their most influential Chiefs, who have been killed in action or have died of their wounds. The whole of our casualties, on the other hand, throughout all these operations, amount to only one man killed and four wounded. I cannot conceive that such a result can be looked upon as a success on the part of the enemy. The plan which your Excellency proposes of harassing them by secret, sudden, and constant attacks by bodies of Troops without baggage is, in my opinion, impracticable. It is impossible to surprise them, as the scouts who are constantly on the watch about their pahs will always give them sufficient notice to enable them to effect their escape should they be desirous of doing so, or to prepare for defence if they mean to remain. Experience has proved that to send Troops unprovided with artillery to attack a pah entails certain failure, accompanied with a useless loss both of men and of prestige. I consider it of the highest importance, not only to the successful termination of the present war, but to the future peace of the Colony, that the Maories should become convinced of the superiority of the Troops in warfare, and of the hopelessness of their endeavouring to gain any material advantage over us ; and I cannot think that it would be wise or justifiable knowingly to place the Troops in a position in which that superiority would disappear or perhaps be converted into inferiority. I arrive ;>t a different conclusion from the opinion expressed by your Excellency, that the present excess of our numbers over those of the enemy in this Province places us in a more favourable position for the prosecution of the war than we shall probably l>e in two or three months hence, when the proportion may be reversed ; on the contrary, the principal difficulties with which I have now to contend arise from this very cause, and I am satisfied that any increase in their numbers which might give them sufficient confidence, either to defend a pah in an accessible position, or to accept battle in the open country, would lead to a mucli more satisfactory result than a lengthened continuance of the present state of affairs. In conclusion, I beg to assure your Excellency that no exertion that I can make, or nojopportunity shall be lost of harassing the enemy in any way in my power, and thus endeavouring to terminate this unhappy war. I have, &c, T. S. Pratt, Major-General Commanding. To His Excellency Colonel Thomas Gore Browne, C.8., Governor and Commander-in-Chief, &c, &c. &c. New Zealand.

18