AMERICAN AIR POWER

Waikato Times, Volume 194, Issue 22353, 20 May 1944, Page 5

AMERICAN AIR POWER

20,174 OF ENEMY DESTROYED WASHINGTON, May 18 The United States Army Air Forces from December 7, 1941, to May 15, 1944, destroyed 20,174 planes and lost 6154, said General H. H. Arnold, the Commander-in-Ckief, addressing a press conference. The Americans destroyed 16,510 planes, probably destroyed 4650 and damaged 5546 in aerial combat, and destroyed 3664, probably destroyed 337 and damaged 1432 on the ground. The American losses were 5718 combat planes in the air, 236 on the ground and 200 non-combat planes on the ground. General Arnold said the sustained bombing of Germany had cut aircraft production to one-fourth of the enemy’s planes. The present Luftwaffe combat strength was about the same as six months ago, but the Germans no longer had any worthwhile reserves.

“The Germans now defend only the targets they deem vital, for example, synthetic oil refineries,” said General Arnold, “but even these occasional fighter defence forces number about 200, compared with the early days when as many as 400 fighters attacked our bombers.” Asked whether Germany could be bombed out of the war, General Arnold replied: “I do not know what an air force can do. There has never been an air force with the power we now can use against Germany.” Pacific Problems Different Referring to the Pacific, General Arnold said: “We increased our efforts and are striking from several directions. However strategic bombing as practised in Europe does not yet fit in. in the Pacific. The long over-water flight is a factor. The problem of converting our war effort from Europe to the Pacific is tremendous. The difference in logistics is terrific, the character of the planes and the training is not the same. The establishment of bases to accommodate the vast air strength we have in Ei.rope will be a major problem.”

General Arnold asserted that none of the Pacific problems, were insurmountable. In fact they would all be solved long before the assault took place. He admitted that the superFortress, 829, was one of the answers to the Pacific problems, but he refused to give details. “I would rather that the Germans and Japanese got the information the hard way,” he said. “The 829 programme involves the highest degree of secrecy.”