DANGER OF INVASION

Waikato Times, Volume 124, Issue 20784, 20 April 1939, Page 13

DANGER OF INVASION

DEFENCE OF DOMINION POSSIBILITIES DISCUSSED IMPORTANCE OF LAND FORCE (By New Zealand Defence League) The land forces of New Zealand on which we would have to depend in case of invasion, seem to be the Cinderella of the services, and one of the reasons, and there is no justification lor it, is that people have the impression that the navy and the air force constitute all that is required for the protection of New Zealand. They overlook the fact that wars are not won and countries are not conquered by naval power alone, nor by air power alone. As far back as 1805 we have Trafalgar. When Nelson’s victory at sea broke the sea power of Napoleon it was not until nearly 10 years later that Napoleon was finally vanquished at Waterloo. History provides manysuch examples. If wars could be won by air power alone, it would not have been necessary for Japan with her overwhelming superiority in the air to have sent a single soldier into China —but she has a million of them there. Nor would it have been necessary for Franco with his superiority in the air to have a single man at arms, but he had thousands of men engaged in his land forces. The truth is that no country can be conquered until the last man is dug out of the last trench with the last onetThe essential requirement of New Zealand at the present moment is trained man power. We are firmly convinced that if we had in New Zealand an efficient army of 30,000 fully equipped and well trained troops, no country in the world would try to attack us. No country would try to attack New Zealand because the prize would not be worth the price. Example of Samoa uonsider the position of Samoa in 1914. Had Ihere been SUUU fully trained and well-equipped German soldiers in Samoa in 1914 New Zealand would not have tried to take It, because the prize would not have been worth the price. Consider further, the South African War. It took Great Britain together with troops from the overseas Dominions nearly three years and cost her from 1:300,000,000 to £400,000,000 and the use of between 400,000 to 500,000 men to subdue the Boers of South Africa. And how were the Boers eventually subdued? By that vast encircling movement on the veldt whereby they were surrounded. The circle contracted and contracted until it closed in on them, and they had to surrender.

That could not happen in New Zealand. The conformation of the country would not lend itself to it. New Zealand could he made into a hundred Gallipolis and if defended by 30,000 fully trained and well-equip-ped and determined men fighting on their own ground and for their own country could not be taken by fewer than 300,000 or 400,000 men fighting along lines of communication. To repeat, if we had 30,000 fully equipped and trained men no Power would attempt to attack us because such a force would act as a deterrent. It may seem to be fantastic to talk about the possibility of a large-scale land raid, or an invasion of New Zealand, but let us examine the position. Position of the Fleet We rely for our protection primarily on the British Navy, or that portion of it known as the Pacific Fleet based in Hong Kong or Singapore. Where was our Pacific Fleet in the Abyssinian crisis? It, or a large part of it, was in the Mediterranean —where it should be in the event of trouble in European quarters. Where was our Pacific Fleet in the September crisis? It was not in the Pacific; it or part of it was on the way to the Mediterranean and the North Sea. And on these two occasions, if a war had been in progress between Britain and France on the one side—assuming for the moment that the United States had not come in—and Germany, Italy and Japan on the other, New Zealand and Australia would have been laid bare to attack. And in the September crisis it is a published fact that Japanese cruisers were cruising off the coast of New Guinea. Does that not open up a vista of the danger which we face in New Zealand in the event of that alignment of Powers being arrayed against us? You will say that if Japan tried to invade New Zealand she would have to fight too far from her base and it would be impossible to move transports all that distance. Let us consider two propositions. (1) A bombing raid on New Zealand. Before the last war the Marshall Islands belonged to Germany. Early in the war, Japan seized them on behalf of the Allies. After the war she was granted a mandate over them by the League of Nations. But Japan has possession of the Marshall Islands. and she intends to retain possession of them. Japan and the Marshalls At Geneva in 1932, when Japan was a member of the League, her members were asked whether or not Japan was fortifying the islands in breach of the mandate. At first theV gave evasive answers, and then their spokesman said: “Japan is in possession of the Marshall Islands; Japan intends to retain possession of the Marshall Islands. If you want the Marshall Islands send your guns and your gunboats and take them.” The islands are approximately 2500 miles away from Auckland, and approximately 2100 miles from the east coast of Australia. Two thousand five hundred miles is not a great distance for a bombing plane to travel. Late last year British Yiekers-Wellesly bombers (lew from Ismailia in Egypt to Australia —a much greater distance —in about 2£ days. Certainly they did not carry bombs, hut in the event of war in which Japan may he aligned against us. what is to prevent her from assembling a number of air-craft carriers in the islands and sending them forth with their aeroplanes to bomb Australia and New Zealand, our Pacific Fleet being elsewhere? They could loose their aeroplanes 500 miles out from New Zealand. and they could bomb Auckland. Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, and be back to their carriers in time for lunch. This is not exaggeration; it is within the bounds of probability.

Again let us assume that our Pacific Fleet, or a laqge part of it, is not in the Pacific, but on the other side of the world helping to defend the heart of the Empire. Japan assembles transports in the Marshall Islands — about eight days’ steam at 15 knots an hour from New Zealand, and sends them down across the unprotected Paoific. What is there to deter them except our air force ? And our own trained and equipped man-power in New Zealand?

Let me say that Australia does not consider this possibility fantastic, as is proved by the fact that the whole basis of her defence policy has been changed since the September crisis. The whole of Australia’s defence policy at the present moment is based upon the fear of invasion, and if there is a fear in Australia of the possibility of invasion, then I suggest that there is even more ground for fear in New Zealand of the possibility of invasion. Australia’s Policy Australia is embarking upon a project of training and equipping 70,000 men upon the very principle that we have put before you—for the very reason that the provision of such a force will prove a deterrent to any other couniry and cause it to tiunk more than twice before attempting invasion. The same argument applies witli even stronger reason to New Zealand. Now let us look at a few of the fantastic tilings that have happened in recent years. Suppose in 1914 a New Zealander in Samoa had said to his friend Fritz: “By the end of this year a New Zealand force will have captured and taken possession of Samoa and you will be a prisoner of war.” Fritz would have taken him away to a medical man to have his mentality certified. But it happened. Who would have thought in 1937 that by the middle of 1938 the International Settlement at Shanghai would be dominated by Japan? But it happened. Who would have thought In 1937 that by March, 1938, Austria would have ceased to exist as a free and independent nation and would have become part of the Greater German Reich, that by September in the same year Czechoslovakia would have been dismembered and the alliance between Russia and France and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania) dismembered? But it happened.

Who would have thought in December, 1938, that in January, 1939, Japan would have occupied Hainan Island, inhabited by 3,uu0,00U Chinese, despite the protests of Great Britain, United States of America and France, an island now a menace to Hong Kong

and the trade routes east of Singapore? That by March, 1939, General FTanco would have achieved a complete victory in Spain; that in the same month Herr Hitler would in breach of his pledged word have annexed Czecho and Memel and that on Good Friday, 1939, Signor Mussolini would have invaded Albania and thereafter annexed that country? But all these fantastic things happened. Our point is this—if these things are likely to happen, or even if there is a remote possibility, it is the duty of ourselves to prepare ourselves for that eventuality should it happen. And we emphasise that we must prepare before the war begins, because when a war starts, what we want is soldiers and not recruits.

We people of New Zealand believe in a system of democratic government. We realise that this class of government has imperfections, but we prefer it to the kind that Germany and Italy have at the present time, i tur people if they want to preserve the freedom that they enjoy under such a system must he prepared to defend that system by personal service. And if the people of a democracy are not prepared to give that personal service that is necessary for the protection for the rights and privileges they enjoy under that system. then that system will perish. Democracy will not survive merely by reason of its own virtue. If " the people are not prepared to make these personal sacrifices to maintain their freedom, then democracy will perish just as sureiy as if it possessed no virtues whatsoever.