CROSS AS VOTE

Waipukurau Press, Volume XXVIII, Issue 118, 13 May 1932, Page 2

CROSS AS VOTE

Intention Not Clear

SUPREME COURT’S VIEW RULE FOR FUTURE GUIDANCE The decision of the Court which heard the Rangitikoi election petition, delivered in the Supreme Court in Wellington last w r oek, will have an important bearing upon future Parliamentary and municipal elections as far us the use of a cross instead of ‘strik-

ing out’ a name or names to express the intention of the voter is concerned, says the “New Zealand Herald.” The court lays down that where a cross against a name is the sole indication of the way in which the voter desires to vote, it is impossible to say that the intention of the voter is clearly indicated, in that it cannot be said with any degree of certainty whether the voter wishes to vote against or for the candidate opposite whose name the cross is placed. Objection was made by the petitioner to certain voting papers on which, the voter had placed merely a cross against the name of one of the candidates, and which ■'he returning officer in reliance upon the decision of the Court in 1926, in the case of O’Brien v. Se ldon, had accepted as valid votes. The scrutiny showed .hat there were 24 papers so marked, 13 for respondent and 11 for petitioner.

“The question of the validity of these votes is one of general importance,” said the Chief Justice, Sir Michael Myers, in delivering the Court’s decision, “because it is necessary not only to determine the position in the present case, but to lay down a general rule for future guidance. “We have no right to indulge in guesswork,” continued the Chief Justice, “especially—if there can be any question of degree in such a matter — where as hero the difficulty of the situation is created by ignorance, gross stupidity, or gross carelessness on the part of the voter. We are entitled to assume that the course adopted by the voter is not duo to illiteracy. If it were, we are entitled, to assume that the provisions of Section 137, specially enacted to meet such a case, would have been resorted to. That course was not adopted and we have no right to surmise -where the voter has neglected the plain instructions on the ballot paper and chosen to adopt a different and ambiguous method of voting. Wo have rejected all the cross votes except in cases where there is an additional indication showing clearly for whom the voter intended to vote. ”