The Submarine Torpedo Boat.

Woodville Examiner, Volume XXI, Issue 3570, 26 June 1903, Page 4 (Supplement)

The Submarine Torpedo Boat.

Lieutenant G. E. Armstrong, R.N., contributes to the “Corniiill Magazine" a long and interesting article entitled the "Menace of file Submarine,” We quote from it the following extract; The British submarines, which at present number nine built and building, in addition to ten more included in this year's estimates, arc of an American type —the Holland—so named after a pioneer vessel of that name designed and built by the Holland Torpedo Boat Company. Five boats have been delivered, and the other four, of an improved typo, are still being built. These vessels are constructed by the firm of Vickers, Sons and Maxim at their works at Barrow. Their dimensions are approximately as follows: Length over all, 63.4 feet; beam, 11 feet 9 inches; height from the bottom to the superstructure dock, 12 feet. The hull is made of steel throughout, with a steel superstructure, a steel rudder, and a ‘ circular conning tower of armour steel 4 inches thick, closed at the top with a hinged cover. Thick glass “scuttles” arc provided for observation, and attached to the tower is a “periscope” (to be afterwards described). The armament consists of one bow torpedo tube, situated two feet below the water line, and five Whitehead .torpedos. The diving apparatus consists of an engine provided with an ingenious automatic attachment for maintaining the vessel in a horizontal position to secure a constant depth during immersion. Navigation is carried on from the conning tower, wherein are placed the compasses and the controlling levers for the steering and diving engines. The submarine can no .longer bo looked upon as merely a subject for interesting experiments. Indeed, dhe performances of the French boats during the last year’s manoeuvres were even more surprising and significant than • the results previously obtained. The effect of the attack on the French fleet at Brest by submarines last year created a profound impression upon the minds of the naval authorities in that country. Four submarines of the Francais type, now a comparatively old pattern, were employed, being driven by electricity. The ports of Chcrbnorg and Brest—the two chief naval harbours on the French side of the English Channel—were closely watched during the six days “naval war” by two different cruiser squadrons which had been specially warned of the projected attack by submarines. Yet these four baots actually succeeded in leaving Cherbourg entirely unobserved, and travelled 110 miles down Channel to the harbour of Brest, where, after eluding the squadron watching outside, they torpedoed the battleships lying up harbour. On the completion of this exploit they once more put to sea, again avoiding the protecting squadron, and returned in safety to Cherbourg, having travelled altogether 220 miles in a period of sixty-two hours. Although such a feat as this affords a striking example of the practical uses to which a submarine may be put, there were certain aspects of it that the detractors of this type of vessel my be trusted to lay stress upon. In the first place it may be fairly urged that their task was a comparatively easy one, owing to there being a definite objective, and no necessity to search for the enemy. Secondly, it may be argued that during the attack in Brest Harbour, when they rose momentarily to the surface conning purposes they would have been destroyed, :-and that the same fate would have overtaken them on the rare occasions when they were observed on the return journey. To both these objections I think sufficient answer can be given. It must be remembered that the type of vessel used in this particular experiment was a “submarine" pure and simple. It was absolutely dependent upon its own engine, an electric motor, and, unlike a vessel of the submersible type, had no gasolene engine to drive it along on the surface -when out of sight of the enemy. On this occasion, too, the feat it was called upon to perform was greater than it would probably ever be required to carry out in actual war, for the chief duty of the submarine will be the protection of its own harbour, or attack on vessels of a blockading squadron in the immediate neighbourhood . Attacks on the enemy’s coast across Channel or at a distance from the naval base will be entrusted to the submersiblcs, whoso range of action and seagoing qualities are considerably greater. The contention that these particular vessels would probably have been destroyed in actual warfare is not by any means a reasonable one. The Francais typo of electric submarine can dive when “closed up” in fifteen seconds, and if not “closed up” in two minutes. The American boat, bo it remembered, took only seven seconds. Perhaps only those' who have had actual experience of practice at sea with quickfiring and machine guns can properly appreciate the siguificanc of these figures. In the first place the target whi?li such a vessel presents, when awash, is about as difficult a one as could bo imagined. Secondly, only “direct hits-’ would be of any avail, and the chance of securing any of them in the short space of time at the disposal of captains of guns would be extremely slight; and in saying this I think even the most ardent gunnery man will agree with me. Of course, any attempt to injure a submarine whoa submerged would be out t of the question, owing to the resistance given by the water to even the heaviest projectiles, and the consequent deflection. It is true that in some of the submersiblcs—notably of the Narval type—rather a long time is taken in preparing to dive owing to the necessity of thoroughly cooling the engine and boilers before submersion; but this fault is being overcome, and when using this class of vessel the plan of attack will have to be so arranged as to allow for due preparation. But, generally speaking, the actual attack by a submarine will always bo carried on with the vessel in diving condition. and therefore able to present —under the least favourable conditions—only a small and momentary target to the enemy.

Supposing that a submarine is overtaken by the enemy and his gun fire becomes too accurate to be pleasant. All she has to' do is to 611 her ballast tanks and sink quietly out of sight—if necessary, for hours. The situation of the enemy immediately becomes a most perilous one. Liable at any time to be torpedoed by an unseen foe, the only course left is to clear off as-quickly as possible; and this would have been the fate of the French cruisers during last'year’s manoeuvres, if they had pressed the Francais boats too hard. ,

In the description given of the trials of the Mocassin I have pointed out that the boat rose to the surface three times before discharging her torpedo. This was done chiefly for the purpose of testing her diving capabilities. As a matter of fact neither submarines, nor submcrsiblos arc under any necessity—except in very bad wcathei-j when their chances of being hit would consequently bo reduced to a minimum—to rise to the surface prior to an attack. Any need for this is obviated by the use of the “periscope,” an instrument invented by Sir Howard Grubb, the greatest designer of telescopes in this country, and a distinguished astronomer. It consists of a long metal rod, about 15 feet long and 3 inches in diameter, containing a series of inclined mirrors which convey the image of surface objects down to the navigator in the conning tower. This instrument has a visual angle of about fiftyfive degrees, and is capable, by rotation, of giving a clear view all round; the man who steers can keep his eye to the periscope and steer with the same ease as a gun can be laid by telescope. The French claim to have a very efficient instrument, and the Italians have a good one also, oT practically the same type as the British. Our own periscope can be raised or lowered at will, and, when attacking, the best way of working it is to keep it up until seen by the enemy, when the boat can be taken to a depth which will cover the top of the periscope, rising slightly when necessary to take an observation. So perfect is it, and so regular in its action is the depth-keeping apparatus of an efficient submarine, that the Francais, for example, has run 'a course of eight miles underwater with the periscope contsautly one foot out of water. This means that the unfortunate gunners on board a ship which is being attacked would, under those circumstances, have a painted metal rod one foot long and three inches wide to fire at, at the distance of several hundred yards; and even if they accomplished a miracle by hitting it, they would hardly be better off than they were before ! The “invisibilty” of a submarine depends upon her size, colour, speed, and the time spent in an awash condition between her dives. In the smaller vessels there is very little “bulge” on the surface when the boat is submerged, but, of course, increases in proportion to size and lines. IF has been found that the best protective colouring is a blue grey, and, during the trials of the Gustave Zede, it was found that she could not be seen even in smooth water until nearly under the ship she was attacking. Our neighbours on the other side of the Channel have used every effort to acquaint their officers and men with all the aspects of submarine warfare. At Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon, and even Bizerta, the submarine occupies a prominent position in the internal economy of each naval poft and the strategical problems arising out of its use are constantly being thought out. In our own navy scarcely one officer in a hundred has ever seen a submarine.

Yet the strategical menace offered to us by these French boats is immense, and in the opinion of many officers in our own service who have devoted attention to the subject the whole principle of naval strategy in war time has undergone serious modification in consequence. Take Cherbourg, for example. Here we have a strongly-protected naval harbour within sixty miles of Portsmouth, containing a flotilla of submarines and submcrsibles, whose radius of action easily extends to the whole length of our Channel seaboard. A blockade of the harbour by a British fleet under these circumstances would expose our ships to wholesale destruction by a foe whom they would be powerless to strike even if they were aware of his approach. Wo are constantly hearing of some new invention for indicating the advent of the submarine; but what then? There is no means of striking it, even in the unlikely event of its position being discovered, and the situation would be rendered even more desperate if a flotilla of these bouts issued forth simultaneously. The only safe thing to do under' the circumstances would be to clear out—and thereby raise the blockade. The position of the captain of a British warship outside Cherbourg in war time may indeed be fairly compared with that of a man sitting on top of a powder magazine, which his enemy is in a position at any time to blow up.