THE SKIRMISH AT KAKARAMEA.

Wellington Independent, Volume XX, Issue 2218, 13 June 1865, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE SKIRMISH AT KAKARAMEA.

(Wellington Independent, May 23.) Though Major Von Tempsky did not succeed in carrying out his original intention of attacking tho native settlement atKakaramea, by night, the fully justified an attempt which to military men of the " drillsergeant type" may have appeared rash in the extreme. To men who instead of mastering their profession have been mastered by it, nothing can be more bewilderiug than the occurrence of an event agaiust which they have not expressly provided. If everything goes smoothly they can fall back upon their memory, aud do as they have been taught to do with the monotonous perfection of a piece of lifeless mechanism, but if an unforseen accident occurs they are as thoroughly '\put out" as a clock would bo by the linger of a mischievous urchin poked in amidst its wheel- work. From Generals to Privates it is rare to find soldiers by profession, who have not had all fertility of resource educated out of them. They hay© learnt their " drill," as little girls learn to play on the piano,— -by dint of incessant practice, and are no inoro entitled to be considered authorities on war, (in the wide range of > the term) than a little girl who has learnt a few tunes is entitled to bo considered an authority on music. It is for this reason, that we need not be surprised at the failure of General Cameron with his vast resources to do more than act on the defensive during the West Coast campaign. It was much easier for him to charge the Colonial Government " with a culpable disregard for the lives of her Majesty's officers and men," than to alter a system of tactics to which he had been trained from his youth up. If the ability of a General is to be measured by his power of adapting the means at his disposal to a required end? Sir Duucan Cameron is very far from being an able General, however learned he may bo in the routine of his profession. Apart from his evident desire to thwart the Colonial Government, he appears quite unable to grasp what may be called the " idea" of the war, and still less able to work it out successfully. Throughout the war he has acted as if ho was engaged in a European campaign where great fortifications have to be attacked and great centres of population threatened. To a certain extent this method was successful in the Waikato, partly owing to the nature of the country, and partly owing to the fact that the natives themselves abandoned their usual mode of warfare, and concentrated themselves in strong positions, thus roughly reproducing the conditions usually met with in European wars. Under these circumstances General Cameron had little more to do, than to follow the rules laid down in the books. It was always easy for him to keep open his communication with his base of operations and his mere superiority of numbers did the rest — that is, pushed the enemy on one side sulliciontly to allow of tho country being occupied by military settlers. Practically the Waikato was conquered, and it will always remain a striking instance of what may be done by brute force and stupidity, lavish of means aud only economical in tho matter of common sense. Probably the natives understaud this quite as well as ourselves, and it is certain that if the Waikato campaign taught them what a British army could do, it also taught them what it could not. On the West Coast they have taken full advantage of this experience, and have kad every facility offered them for so doiug. The General has done nothing, with a dogged determination which might have done wonders had it been properly directed. Bothered, baffled, and angry, he has suddenly found out that the war is unjust, which being interpreted means, that it is more than he can manage. The admission has its value, for it must lead to that change in our mode of lighting the natives for which colonists and military men who are not mere drill sergeants have so long contended. " Tho pomp and circumstance of glorious war" ought to find no place in this country. We know exactly the sort of enemy we have to contend with, and wo must adopt our military system to the work required to be done. Wiiat we havo called the " idea" of the war is that of 'perpetually harassing the enemy. The natives have no great centres of population — no accumulated wealth — no.highly organised social system with vital points of attack. They differ from a European nationas acoral reef differs from ahorse. No single blow can have any effect, it is only a rapid succession of attacks that can show them our strength and their weakness. Small bodies of such men as those led by Major Von Tempsky will do more to subdue the natives than ten times their number of regular troops, even supposing they were used, which, uuder General Cameron, they are not likely to be. It is impossible to speak too highly of tho courage and endurance of tho little party of Forest ltangers and Waikato Militia, if the published account of the skirmish at .Kakaramea i 3 substantially correct. Men who could stand fire under the circumstances described can be thoroughly depended on. Much as we deplore the loss of Ensigu Whifcfield and private Mcßean, it is impossible to consider their lives wasted when wo know that they fell, not victims of military incapacity and red tape routine, but in the exection of their duty, and whilst assisting to carry out a policy which approved itself to their conscience and reason. Wo trust that tho war may soon becomo less imposing and more effective. That before long wo shall cease 1 to hear of " movements " and " operations " couducted by thousands of men apparently

. for no other object than to kill time, and with no result except to impress upon the native mind that one maori is equal to ten soldiers. We would much rather see the old colonial feeling revive that " a white man is more than a match for a maori, any day." We by no means advocate rashness, but still it is often less rash to run a certain amount of risk, than to attempt to fight without running any. The one plan results in occasional loss, the other 13 certain to give confidence to the enemy.