BEFORE THE WAR

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXI, Issue 8837, 28 October 1942, Page 3

BEFORE THE WAR

CRITICAL PRE-WAR DAYS

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.S.R

AMBASSADOR’S OBSERVATIONS ' From January 19, 1937, until June 7, 1938, the United States Ambassador in Moscow was Mr Joseph E. Davies, one of the men chosen by President , Roosevelt to keep him fully informed on international affairs. Much of the information the President-received

from Moscow during this period has now been njade available in a 'remarkable and illuminating book containing a record of Mr Davies’ confidential dispatches to the State Departments, his official and personal correspondence and current diary and journal entries, including notes and comments up to October, 1941, some made when he was Ambassador to Belgium and others after his return home.

A book of this kind will be found interesting by different people for different reasons, but all are likely to apply to it one test: Were its author’s opinions and judgments borne out by events? In this test Mr Davies -gains high marks. Almost alone, it seems, among the diplomats in Moscow he became convinced that, despite the notorious “purges,” of generals and others, Russia was strong enough, militarily and economically, to offer a tremendous resistance to Germany.

Moreover, he foresaw, at an early date, the possibility that Germany and Russia would make an agreement and after it was made, that Germany would break it.

Incidentally, he was told on March 3, 1938, by M. Litvinov, then Foreign Commissar, that in Litvinov’s opinion “Hitler and Mussolini had Chamberlain on the spot; that Chamberlain would be required to make good before his public by effecting some sort of arrangement; that the dictators would either drive a hard bargain with him so as to make it impossible, or Chamberlain would be required to make a paper peace’ that would really amount to nothing more than a sham for home consumption.” That opinion was recorded before the German invasion of Austria, and nearly seven months before Munich. “Tell Chamberlain” The possibility of a German-Soviet pact was mentioned by Mr Davies in a letter written on January 18, 1939 to Mr Harry Hopkins. “The Chamberlain policy of throwing Italy, Poland and Hungary into Hitler’s arms,” he wrote, “may be completed by so disgusting the Soviets that it will drive Russia into an economic agreement and an ideological truce with Hitler. The reactionaries of England and France will shortly be wooing Soviets’ support in their desperation, but it may be too late if the Soviets get utterly disheartened.” In London, three months later, he asked the Ambassador there, Mr Joseph Kennedy to “tell Chamberlain from me that if they are not careful they will drive Stalin into Hitler’s arms.” . 'But, he added in his diary, “Somehow or other it seems impossible to make an impression on this London atmosphere. About the only man who really appreciates the real imminence of disaster is Winston Churchill. It was reassuring to have him tell me yesterday that by the middle, of the year this ‘damnable blackmail menace from the air will exist no longer, because we will be prepared.’ ”

On May 17, Mr Davies reported a conversation with Captain von Rintelen, who told him that “every effort was being bent by Hiller to prevent a British-Sov-iet alliance.”

On July 18, 'back in Washington, and reporting to the President, Mr Davies predicted that the war would come “either before Hindenburg’s birthday in August, or before the Nazi party rally at Nuremberg in September.” The President told him he had already sent, a message to Stalin “that if his Government joined up with Hitler it was as certain as night followed day that as soon as Hitler had conquered France he would turn on Russia, and it would be the Soviet’s turn next. He told me also to get that word to Stalin and Molotov, if I could.” The Soviet-German Pact was signed on August 22.

The Soviet System

These excerpts from the Ambassador’s opinions testify to the soundness of his judgment and the President’s, during a crucial period. Of equally great interest are his reports on the working of the Soviet system of government. He went to Russia as an individualist, a fervent admirer of American institutions, but resolved to free his mind from prejudice and to make a deliberate effort “to be •fair, judicial and objective-minded.” He convinced Russian leaders of his sincerity, and in consequence he had a long talk with Stalin, who had not hitherto met any foreign Ambassador. His"book contains long, factual reports and carefully considered opinions on Soviet industry and finally a dispatch entitled: “A Brief on the Facts as to the Soviet Union.” In this he emphatically declared that there was “no danger fr6m Communism here, so far as the United States is concerned. To maintain its existence this Government has to Apply capitalistic " principles. Otherwise it will fail and be overthrown. I expect to see this Government, while professing devotion of Communism, move constantly to the right in practice, just as it has for the past eight years. If it maintains itself, it may evolve into a type of Fabian Socialism, with large industry in the hands of the State, with, however, the agriculturaj and smaller businesses and

traders working under capitalistic property and profit principles.” ! “ The Price Is Too High ”

As an American profoundly convinced that the American system of government and way of life are the best, Mr Davies returned from Russia to say: “I don’t care how much totalitarian states or dictatorships may provide in material benefits or social benefits to childhood or old age, if liberty and freedom have to be sacrificed therefor, then the price is too high to pay.” This is his basic conclusion, not original or new, but very impressive in the context of this book, because of his transparent honesty of purpose, and because of his frank expressions of admiration for several aspects of the Soviet regime. Comparing it with Nazi-ism, he sees as a fundamental difference that “the Communistic Soviet State could function with the Christian religion in its basic purpose to serve the brotherhood of man. It would be impossible for the Nazi State to do so.”—“Mission to Moscow.” /By Joseph E. Davies. Angus and Robertson.