NOTES ON THE WAR

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXI, Issue 8835, 21 October 1942, Page 2

NOTES ON THE WAR

DOMINATION OF THE AIR AIM OF BOTH SIDES LESSON LEARNT IN THIS WAR If there is any lesson of the war That stands out more conspicuously than any other, it is the advantage of master)- of the air. Without it it seems that nothing can be done; with it anything is possible. To obtain air superiority is the prime object in the struggle on every front. Most of what the Axis Powers have accomplished in the main theatres of the war has been the result of initial air domination. This applies from the conquest of Poland . to the onslaught on Stalingrad and from Pearl Harbour to the Solomons. Similarly the successes of the Allies have been mainly due to air superiority wherever they can win it.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for either side to have command of the air everywhere. Goebbels, in warning the German people that they were at the most critical stage of the war, explained -that reprisal raids were not being carried out on Britain because German bombers were more urgently needed at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. Any gains that the Germans have made in their latest assault on Stalingrad have been due to the preliminary heavy air blitz on the desired objective. Obviously in this area the enemy has air superiority, not unchallenged, but still more or less effective.

But in the Middle East general air superiority lies with the Allies, who by constant raids have prevented the Axis' from accumulating strength on the Egyptian front sufficient either to make themselves secure or to venture an offensive. Malta is a thorn in the side of the Axis here, lying across their main line of communications with Europe, and that is the reason for the renewed mass attacks on the devoted island, which for a week have been beaten off with the loss of over a hundred planes by the enemy. Similarly, in their attempt to recapture Guadalcanal the Japanese have launched their main offensive against the American airfield with a view of putting it out of action and securing a temporary mastery of the air to enable the sea and land forces to function with greater effect. To concentrate on Guadalcanal the Japanase have depleted their air force elsewhere, particularly in New Guinea, and this has given the Australians an advantage they have been quick to exploit.

Japanese air weakness in Burma and China should provide the Allies with a similar opportunity there, if they are ready to take it.

Strategic Bombing

The use of Allied air power in Western Europe is of a different nature. It is air power pure and simple —“strategic bombing” is the name given to one phase—and the question is often asked whether it can achieve definite and decisive results.

The Luftwaffe spokesman, Major Blei, in a Berlin broadcast quoted in recent news, while admitting the “extraordinarily heavy” damage inflicted by the R.A.F., declares that the damage would be “far greater if the enemy directed his attacks against the military front,” adding that the war could be won “only on the military field.”

In the final analysis this will probably be admitted in most quarters, but in the meantime the damage done -by the R.A.F. is emphatically “extraordinarily heavy.” The case for “strategic bombing” is that it reduces enemy war production and gradually cripples the enemy war effort by (1) diversion of military strength to anti-aircraft personnel, A.RJP., demolition squads, and other action for dealing with raids; (2) destruction of German factories and mine plant; (3) diversion of labour and material to the rebuilding of factories; (4) loss of time and efficiency among war workers in -bombed areas; (5) stoppage of other factories far outside bombing area by the hold-up of supplies from factories and plants raided; (6) damage to transport and lines of communication. Le Creusot Raid It is admitted that, despite air photography, it is difficult to get exact evidence of the precise extent of damage done. But it is known that the Renault and Matford factories in occupied France were put out of action for many months by the R.A.F. raids in March and April of this year. The big day raid by nearly a hundred Lancasters on the Schneider armament works at Le Creusot, described in to-day’s news, should be equally effective. The Creusot works rank next in size and importance to Krupps and Skoda on the Continent and were serving the Axis in this war as effectively as they served the Allies in the last-. Le Creusot is the centre of a coal and iron area in the department of Saone-et-Loire, between the headwaters of the Saone and Loire Rivers, 17-0 miles southeast of Paris. The normal population is about- 40,099, but no doubt would be increased in wartime. The firm of Schneider-Canet had acquired a controlling interest in the Skoda works at Pilsen, Bohemia. A Famous Bomber

The Lancaster is probably the world’s most famous heavy bomber. It can carry a load of 15,8001 b., or over seven tons. The actual bomb load the Lancaster carries will depend on the distance of the target from the base.' When the bomb racks are full, the range will be limited, but all modern heavy bombers are built so that the bombjoad is interchangeable for extra fuel for longrange objectives. Wing loadings on these bombers are heavy, 401 b. per square foot be-