The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 27,1950. THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

Wanganui Chronicle, 27 December 1950, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 27,1950. THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

JN any clash between the Soviet Union and the Western nations Germany plays an important part. Historically Germany provides Europe with the rampart between the Slav Sea and the West. This historic role should have ensured Germany with the support of the West in the past. Unfortunately the wisdom that saw the role of the German people did not see far enough to know how to enact the role. Hitler saw that the West, which included Germany, was confronted by a largeseale menace in that the Slavs would in time—it could not be foreseen when—make a thrust into Western Europe. He saw, too, that it would be to the advantage of the Western civilisation to have a solidified front to oppose such a thrust and that in such a defensive effort it was Germany’s role to take the lead. Thus far he saw clearly. Beyond that the mists settled over his vision and he could see no farther. What was lacking in his vision was how to deal not with the Slavs who opposed Germany but with the Europeans who supported it. All or nothing was his philosophy and unless he could attain to the dominance of Europe he was prepared to smash it. The weakness of Hitler’s position was reflected in the basis of his appeal to the German people, “One Fuehrer, One Reich, one Peonle’’ was good enough, as it turned out, for domestic consumption but to seek the leadership of a polyglot continent as is Europe on the basis of the superiority of one of its component parts was obviously a disastrous approach. It aroused dissensions where harmony was most needed. In order to gain time Hitler made a Pact of Friendship with Stalin, the one man with whom he could .not be friendly and the one source from which he could rightly apprehend an attack. r .\en in order to remove this menace he launched the German attack on Russian soil. By so doing he not only courted defeat in battle but in defeat he threw away the chance of Germany coming to the forefront of the nations by fulfilling its destiny as the defender of the west.

The Second World War was a silly tragedy when looked at from the European angle. The essential unity of Europe was broken up when it should have been drawn more closely together, while the-West was compelled to engage in the task of destroying its own. bulwark against the eastern flood. Hitler knew that there was within Europe a genuine regret that success for his western opponents would only weaken their position as against Russia and here again Hitler strove to thrust a bad bargain upon Europe under the peril of having to face a worse one. Hitler’s defeat was the more disgraceful in that it served no good purpose save his removal. He neither served nor sought to serve a useful purpose even though he or some of his advisers may haw had a larger idea as their ultimate goal. A large idea is in itself not enough. It is necessary to have the right approach to the implementing of that idea -if success is to be achieved or if good is to be served.

The problem which is now confronting the Good European is how to re-establish the essential unity of Europe with Germany occupying her historic role. This problem presents itself to the several parties concerned in different lights. The German people twice defeated in a generation and facing a future with a ruined country see no hope for themselves in the future. The will to fight cannot be expected to be strong with the rank and file of such a people. Western unity means little or perhaps nothing to them. It appears to be no more than a prize for which thev are to be asked to pay the major part of the price in blood and sweat and tears. Against this view is opposed the fact that thousands of Germans are removing themselves from Eastern Germany which is now dominated by the Russians to the West where they find conditions certainly hard but they do find that life and liberty are not held so lightly as they are in the East. To what extent this fear of Russia will turn the indifferent, German into a strong defender is a matter for conjecture at the moment. There can be no experiment in this for the loss of Western Germany to Russia would be irrecoverable save by a major war being waged which is precisely the catastrophe that all sensible men are striving to avoid.

On the whole it can be said that the majority of German people would prefer not to be “liberated” by the Soviet Union. The West has the more to give them and in association with the western civilisation Germany has a longrun chance of regaining her rightful and important place. Can Moscow offer as much to Germany? It is unlikely that the Russians would be content to allow the more technically intelligent Germans to dominate them politically, a field in which the German mind has proved itself to be extremely obtuse. The Russian idea of a satisfactory arrangement would be for them to retain the political control while employing the technological skill of the Germans to further Russian aims. While the German feels that his particular abilities gives him the right to a superior position to the Russian, the latter entertains precisely the same idea of his relative position in respect to the Germans. It does not appear at the moment that there is much ground for compatibity of there two when each considers himself to be the superior party. , . Russian diplomacy, however, contemplating this situation inside Germany could not remain inactive. It became necessary from the Russian standpoint to ensure that Germany did not have the choice clearlv placed before her of accepting the dominance of cither the East o’- the West. The best that could Ire hoped for by Moscow was that Germany should be kept out of the picture insofar as it fulfilling its European role was concerned. The problem therefore, was to ensure that a fissure was opened up between the German people as a whole and the West. What chances offered of brill" about, this fissure? Tn order to answer that question it is necessary to ask another: “What most do the German noonle want today?” The obvious answer to that question is as follows: the settling once and for all the terms of the peace treaty, so that the German people could know what was demanded and expected of them and thereby allow them to make an approach to that problem. Tn the furthering of that problem the nnitv of Germany could be expected to be assisted or permitted. This means that Russia on the one hand and the Western Powers on the other hand must agree to give to Germany that unity of control over her own terrain and people which would enable hereto function once again as a single economic unit. If Russia can contone to assume the role of the more generous giver in respect to Germany then notwithstanding the longterm considerations the German' peonle could be expected to be divided amongst themselves even though they did not all become Russophile. A total conversion would 1" regarded as beyond the wildest hopes of the Rremiin Russian diplomacy, therefore, can be expected to approach the German problem with the object of opening up the fissure in the German mosaic. Tn view of this being Russia’s ob.relive the p-obi-u confronting the West is what to do to counter such a, line of policy.