The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1950. GENERAL EISENHOWER’S NEW APPOINTMENT

Wanganui Chronicle, 22 December 1950, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1950. GENERAL EISENHOWER’S NEW APPOINTMENT

C' ENERAL Eisenhower’s appointment to the post of the Chief of the Western Defence Force is the result of a combination of political and military considerations. It is a good appointment. The problems which confront a general in the field are many. First and foremost he must outwit his enemy, for that is the reason for his command. In order to do this, however, he must have a closely knit organisation which extends from providing the rank and file with socks and boots and daily meals to their being in the right place to fend off an attack or to develop an aggressive movement. A modern army is, thereforee, a complex organisation and the more up-to-date it is the more complex must be its constitution. In order to move such a complicated human machine harmony must be preserved among both officers and men from the Commander-in-Chief down to the loneliest sentry. The human factor consequently counts for much more than it appears to in the organisation and operation of this “soulless machine.” In every army conflicting ambitions play a larger part than it would be wise to allow the soldiers even to know about. Were they to start taking sides with the various factions and schools of thought inside the army then it would probably not be long before they left off fighting the enemy in order to fight each other. One of the great aims of the soldier is to sow dissension in the ranks of his opponents ajid to preserve a high measure of harmony within his own ranks. In an army that comprises soldiers of one nation the problems of maintaining essential harmony throughout the command are by no means easy. Even in the German army which was probably the most highly disciplined army in the world, using that term in its best sense, there were fissures between Rhinelanders and Berliners. In the British forces there were some very wide spans to be negotiated, particularly between Indians and British soldiers where language, colour, caste, religion and personal habits created barriers between the twoThey might respect each other as soldiers but there were limits within which they could not associate. In the organisation of an international army the problem of maintaining cohesion in operations by keeping down to appropriate levels perso'nal and national ambitions is very difficult indeed. This problem presented itself during the Second World War in no small degree. _ It is to the credit of General Eisenhower that he proved himself a coordinator of the front-rank. Even among generals who. are in command of divisions and even of armies there are occasions for the display of sensitiveness and it requires a high degree of tact on the part of a commanding officer to keep the peace among the various -parts of his command. If General Eisenhower is as successful in the more complicated task of western defence as he was during the Second World War then a greater measuie of achievement has already been accomplished by his appointment to his latest important post. It is also to the credit of both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower that neither of them since the war had been indiscreet in his utterances or writings. It would be difficult, for instance, to employ General Mark Clarke as a commander or a field of operations in which the New Zealanders and Indians were component parts because of his involvement itj an argument concerning the bombing of the monastery at Cassino. It is expected that these two famous general officers, Eisenhower and Montgomery, will again team as they did during the Second 'World War and in combination they appear to have been able to work in unison .and to maintain harmonious relations between the American and British commands and the troops under each military authority. But why should Eisenhower be given the supreme command of 'the western world? The answer to that may not be found wholly in the field of military considerations but is more likely to be "discovered in the political field. It is probably still not clear to a large number of American citizens that military operations conducted in Europe are essentially defence measures for the North American continent. This lack-of understanding will assuredly be exploited by some American senators who seem to be the most backward and iiresponsible legislators in the entire world. For Eisenhower to take second place to Montgomery, for instance, would be an affront to these “hick” politicians. This may, on military grounds, be entirely regrettable, but senatorial reactions are a factor in the situation which must be accepted and dealt with accordingly. That Eisenhower is the man to fill American political requirements and at the same time be a team promoter is doubly satisfactory. Now the task of lifting Western defence to a higher level of efficiency can go on apace. . . . .. In the promotion of the western defence plan it is fot the North American continent to be the arsenal of democracy i again. Here again is a field calling for coordination, this time between the civilian and the military effort. An Ameiican commander could appeal with greater strength than could the «° die of any other nation to the American people to put forth then greatest effort. Even Pearl Harbour failed to touch some Ameticans, so vast is the country and so engrossing is life of the particular sections of the American community, enough the North American continent is unlikely to be out of the firing line in any third world war and the American attitude towards the conflict may be more realistic than ever before m sequence But even so the attacks on the American continent can be exacted to create a demand for a complete concentration of military effort upon purely American defence to the detriment of be the less easy exploit.