FRANCE'S APPREHENSION OF THE GERMAN NATION

Wanganui Chronicle, 8 November 1950, Page 5

FRANCE'S APPREHENSION OF THE GERMAN NATION

Will It Turn The People To General de Gaulle? (By HAROLD KING, Reuter's Correspondent in Paris.) France’s isolation at the Atlantic Council over the issue of re-arming Germany has turned the minds of some leading politicians here in the direction of General Charles De Gaulle. Three months ago, French polical observers were inclined to regard the Gaullist Movement as a spent force. Today, behind: the* scenes in high places, serious consideration is being given to the possibility that the country may need him again and that circumstances may arise in which the President of the Republic would call upon him to take over the political destinies of France. Indicative of this trtnd was the fact that during the visit of the Sultan of Morocco to Paris, M. Vincent Auriol went out of his way to bring the name of General De Gaulle ino an official speech. Until the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the tendency in official and third-force political circles was to ignore him. Now, go-hptweens and. newspaper reporters are calling frequently again at the Gaullist headquarters in Paris, after having given it the cold shoulder for a long time. Cheques are today coming into the Gaullist coffers from industrialists ant other prominent citizens who, a year ago, said that they were not interested. SEVERE BLOW TO FRANCE The American attitude towards German rearmament has come as a severe blow to French public opinion. It is regarded here as an indication that the United States Government has now adopted a policy of relying in Europe on Western Germany instead of on France. With the Marshall Aid period more than half over and with the bitter battle in Washington over what share ot the Atlantic Re-arm-ament Programme is to be borne ly France, many Frenchmen see the United States withdrawing the support she has given France for so long. As a result of America's attitude, many leaders here see hopes fading of consolidating Europe on the basis of a France-German economic integration. They fear that German leaders may find the advantages which France could offer them in an economic agreement anticipated and eclipsed by what America in their eyes, has already virtually accorded. Given German participation in rearmament, the question ot lifting the permitted ceiling of German steel production, for example, to .maximum capacity appears here to (have been virtually decided already. This, it is fell is making Germany a present of a big advantage which she originally thought she could only obtain by joining the Schuman Coal and Steel Plan. Members of the French delegation to the Coal and Steel Pool Plan talks do not, as a matter of fact, share fears that the Schuman Plan will be “torpedoed” in this way. The draft treaty embodying the plan is staled at pool headquarters to be very near completion and the German delegation is stated not to be showing any signs of cooling off. Nevertheless, with a German Army just round the corner, Germany would have a weapon of diplomatic negotiation which might induce here to abandon the idea of becoming an equal partner in Western Europe in favour of an attempt to become: once again the dominating power on the Continent, backed by the United States. The average Frenchman Is not "ond of strong Governments, and he has long believed that the maximum of freedom and prosperity in an imperfect world can best be secured by Governments which are not too powerful or too efficient. At the same time, however, he wants to see some return for the money he pours out in constantly increasing amounts in the way of taxes and high prices. But laxity in Government can he carried too far, ever for the average Frenchman. With the heavy military reverse in French Indo-China in mind he feels more than ever that he is not getting any real army for the money allocated to that purpose. With America appearing to cast, her favours over Germany, he feels that his national security is still further decreased. Despite his innate preference for moderate Governments, he is beginning to lost faith in the middle-of-the-road

parties and is looking round for an alternative. He is apprehensive of the Gaullists because he feels that either they will fail to affect the situation enough to make much difference, or they will be efficient and therefore impose upon him a degree of civic discipline which he would find irksome. Nevertheless, he is at present wondering whether he can still acord easygoing methods of Government. Persons in high places are also seriously asking themselves the same question. So while Mr. Dean Acheson appears to have his eyes fixed on Dr. Adenauer, many French people are looking once again in the direction of General De Gaulle. AMERICA'S GERMAN POLICY America's German policy is also tending to produce a new kind of "neutrality” in France —a neutrality towards Communism and Russia. Since the Communists ceased to participate in a Franch Coalition Government three years ago, there has grown up some unity of view between all parties from left-wing Socialists to right-wing moderates on the Communist issue. This has never been a total unity of view, and while all parties have affirmed their resolute opposition to any new sharing of power with the Communists, there have always been a number of Socialists, leftwing Radicals and popular Republicans opposed to closing all doors against the Communists. The prospect of a France put into the European shade by a new and powerful Germany is certain to revive ideas of collaboration with the Communists. At the back of these currents of opinion lies the notion that if there is to be a powerful and unrestrained Germany, some kind of effort must be attempted to balance this by a working arrangement with Russia. Russia would once again, as Mr. Walter Lippman once put it, appear to be the potential ally in the rear of the potential enemy. In the small municipality of Watten, in the mining district of Northern France, the local Communist and Socialist parties made an election deal in October for the first time in three years. Both parties adopted 1 an identical programme for a municipal by-election, and the Communist candidal e withdrew in favour of the Socialist. One of the planks in the joint programme was “no rearming of Western Germany and no increase in the length of military service.” The Communist Party is now advocating alliance with the Socialists everywhere, but the significant thing about the Watlen election agreement is not that the Communists proposed it, but tliat the Socialists accepted it. Another small sign of the times worth noting is the change of tone about Russia and her leaders in some non-Communist papers. Thus, the “Petit Bleu,” a paper published in the parliamentary constituency of the Prime Minister, M. Rene Pleven, has lat-< been very laudatory of the intellectual and moral qualities of the Soviet. Foreign Minister, Mr. Andre Vishinsky. These and other straws in the wind show which way French pplitical sentiment may veer, and how, ultimately France’s foreign policy might be reorientated under the pressure of a pro-German policy in Washington. In certain circumstances, General De Gaulle would not be the only alternative to a continuation of third force Governments. Some French observers think that there could be a revival of a popular front Government, leaning in foreign affairs on Moscow.