Great Need Of Europe Is Not So Much Arms As Morale

Wanganui Chronicle, 2 September 1950, Page 5

Great Need Of Europe Is Not So Much Arms As Morale

Writer Compares Military Strength Of Soviet Block And Tne West

LONDON, Sept. 1 (Reed. 6 p.m.)—The first need of Western Europe is not more arms and more American aid, but better morale, says an anonymous French military authority in the Paris newspaper “Figaro’,” in a series-of three articles examining the strength and weakness of Western Europe’s defences.

The writer, who is believed to be a highly placed French military officer, after carefully analysing the potential war strength of Russia and of Western Europe, refutes the popular view that, unless the Americans supply more arms and men, France and her neighbours would 'necessarily lx> speedily overrun by a Russian attack.

On the contrary, he contends that countries of Western Europe who are signatories of the Atlantic Pact are well able to look after themselves if they have but the will to do so.

The writer points out that Russia has not quite 200,000,000 inhabitants, of whom probably only about 125,000,000 are white and live in Europe. The five Brusells Treaty Powers alone (Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembour) can muster 104,000.000 inhabitants, and if to these is added orway, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal, the number rises to 162,000,000.

Russia, it is true, will have the support of her satellites, but numerically they are almost exactly balanced by the number of countries who are likely to support the Atlantic PowersGermany, Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland. Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia On this basis the Soviet Union in Europe and her satellites represent 237,000,000 inhabitants, and the rest of Europe 260,000,000. The balance in favour of Western Europe is greatly increased, the writer contends, by comparison of industrial potential and general development.

Russia’s chief advantage is in the centralisation of its executive administration, the capacity of its people for enduring hardships, and, of course, in its present military effectives—l7s active divisions, of which 100 face Europe and the Balkans, together with 14,000 aircraft, comparable to the best in Europe. Land forces could probably be doubled on mobilisation, but distance and poor communications would make it difficult for the Soviet to use more than 100 divisions and 7000 aircraft as a striking force against Europe. These figures can be set against the 100 French, 22 Belgian. 11 British, and 12 Dutch divisions, which in 1940 faced 130 German and 60 Italian divisions.

The author sums up: “The Soviet military threat to Europe is grave only because we disarmed. With American financial help Europe, can speedily be guaranteed against any threat of aggression, and without any serious lowering of living standards.” Ho contends that the last war showed the ineffectiveness of a static defence system, and that what is required is a highly mobile defence force, hacked by maximum air support. This force, he suggests, should be divided into a battle force of 50 divisions, equipped to meet the first shock and a reserve of 50 highly mobile divisions, which can be used to outpace any enemy concentrations. These two forces, with appropriate air backing, represent only one quarter of the total military potential of the Atlantic Pact group and only onethird of what the Brussels Treaty Powers can muster. —Special NZPA Correspondent.